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1 PENSIONS 
Section I 
Pensions: the 1999 Welfare and Pensions Reform Act 
 
Trine P. Larsen, Anne Daguerre and Peter Taylor-Gooby 
 
Pension reforms since 1986 have followed relatively similar paths. Indeed, both the 
Conservative and New Labour government have expanded private pension provision 
and means-tested state pension and scaled down the state occupational pension (State 
Earning Related Pension Scheme, SERPS). The 1986 Social Security Act  sought to 
promote personal pensions by extending the right to opt out of the SERPS and cutting 
the benefits available. It also provided generous incentives for middle-class earners to 
build a private pension scheme. The new system relied on the private pension industry 
for its own regulation. Central government had and still has little control over the 
pension system.  The New Labour government did not reverse the trend towards 
privatisation: the 1999 Welfare and Pensions Reform Act developed private pensions 
whilst at the same time providing a new safety net for poor pensioners.  
 
This paper focuses on the political debates behind the adoption of these reforms, with 
a special emphasis on the 1999 Act. Section one describes the key features of the 
pensions system as in 1997, i.e. prior to 1999. This section also analyses Conservative 
policies, mainly the 1986 Social Security Act. Finally, it examines the position of key 
actors in relation to the 1986 and 1995 pension reform. Section 2 identifies the 
pressures for change as well as the key problems, which led to the adoption of the 
1999 reform under New Labour. Section 3 analyses the positions of key actors 
concerning the 1999 Welfare and Pension Reform Act. Section 4 assesses the 
implementation of the 1999 reform.  
 
1.1 The Pensions system prior to the implementation of the  1999  
Welfare and Pension reform 
 
1.1.1 Key features of the pension system prior to 2000 
 
The British pension system is two-tiered with means-tested assistance for the least 
well-off. The UK first passed pensions legislation in 1908. However, it first became 
universal under the National Insurance Act 1946 following the recommendations of 
the Beveridge Report. (1942).  The 1946 Act introduced the basic flat-rate pension, 
the first tier of the pension system. It consisted of a Pay as You Go (PAYG) basic 
state pension (BSP), which was never raised above the level of means-tested 
assistance for most people.  |Poverty among pensioners was identified as a major issue 
by researchers in the 1960s (Abel-Smith and Townsend, 1966). 
 
In 1975, the Social Security Pensions Act introduced a second tier system. Like the 
first tier, the second tier, also unfunded and compulsory, guaranteed contributors an 
additional 25% pension percentage of their earnings during the best 20 years of work. 
The 1975 Act indexed pensions to the growth in earnings and extended the basic state 
pension to include an earnings related component (the SERPS). Both the SERPS and 
the BSP come under the responsibility of the National Insurance Fund, which is 
administered by the Contributions Agency (CA), a semi-autonomous institution. The 
CA is placed under the overall responsibility of the Department of Social Security. 
The other part of the second tier system consists of personal and occupational pension 
schemes run by the private sector. In many jobs occupational pensions are considered 
a condition of employment. Employees contributing to an occupational pension 
scheme, which guarantees the same level of pension as SERPS, are permitted to opt 
out of the SERPS and be paid a reduced National Insurance rate. In tax-approved 
schemes, the employees’ contributions receive tax relief at marginal rates so that 
contributions are effectively subsidised by the government. Pensions funds are now 
major investors in the equity markets and own about 40% of the UK’s equity sector 
(Daguerre, 2002, Taylor-Gooby, 2002 and Leverhulme Centre for Market and Public 
Organisation, 2002 ). An overview of the pension system is presented in table 1. 
 
Table 1: The UK Pension System 1979-2000 
First Tier PAYG Basic state pension (indexed to prices only 1980-88, then de-indexed) 
Second Tier state PAYG  SERPS 
(from 1979; in 
decline from 
1988) 
 
Second Tier 
Private 
 Funded occupational OR Funded portable personal (from 
1988) 
Assistance Means tested IS 
pension 
 
Source: Taylor-Gooby, 2002 
 
1.1.2 Pensioners’ characteristics and Expenditure on Pensions  
 
In contrast to Continental and Scandinavian welfare states, the UK does not have a 
well-established, routinised and institutionalised pension system which provides 
substantial benefits.  This makes it more vulnerable to welfare retrenchment in the 
1980s (Pierson, 1994). SERPS was intended to provide benefits of 25 per cent of 
earnings but payments would not have built up to this level until the late1990s, and it 
was cut back before that date.  This is illustrated by the fact that the UK spends 
relatively little (24 per cent of GDP) on pension provision compared to other 
European countries.  The Government Actuary's estimate that the unfunded liabilities 
generated by pay-as-you-go state pensions are against 60 per cent for Italy, 102 per 
cent for France and 150 per cent for Sweden (Taylor-Gooby, 2002 and Daykin, 1998).   
 
However, since the 1970s expenditure on pensions expanded owing to the maturation 
of the pension system and demographic changes (ageing population). Between 1971 
and 1998 the number of retirement pensioners increased by 44%. Retirement 
pensioners constituted the largest group of benefit recipient and accounted for 46% of 
social expenditure. Virtually all men 65 and women aged 60 or older are entitled to 
state pensions. Among this group 52% received SERPS and at least 65% also received 
private or occupational pensions. Income support was paid to 22% of pensioners in 
1998/99 (usually in addition to state pension). (Walker & Howard 2000).  
 
 
 
 
1.2 Policy context and Conservative policies  
 
In the 1980s, the Conservative government wanted to cut back public expenditure on 
pensions, promote pension privatisation and simplify the existing system. Although 
future UK demographic patterns were actually more favourable than those 
experienced during the post-war expansion of the demographic system and did not 
require major cutbacks in pension commitments, the Government used the 
demographic argument to justify its pension policies (Bonoli, 2000).  Norman Fowler, 
the Secretary of State for Social Security, claimed that population ageing would 
increase the costs to an unsustainable level:  
‘We shall put a halt to the enormous growth in pension expenditure in the next 
century which the continuation of SERPs in its present form would have entailed' 
(DHSS, 1985a, p. 45).   
 
1.2.1 Proposal for Reform: The Fowler Pension Review  
 
 The Conservative government initiated a major pension review in order to simplify  
and  privatise the system. The Conservative Fowler pension review, described by the 
Secretary of State as ‘a thorough review of the largest single element of social 
security provision in this country’ (House of Commons statement, 2.4.84), was set up 
in November 1983. The pensions review team consisted of seven ministers and five 
senior figures from the pension industry. The review recommended: 
· compulsory contributory occupational or portable private pensions, financed by 
employers and employees,  
· minimum contribution to be four per cent of income, split equally, three per cent 
of it rebated from National Insurance contributions. These would be  the Defined 
Contribution (DC) schemes, the resulting pension depending on the state of the 
annuity market at the time of retirement  
· SERPS would be phased out over time, the basic state pension would be 
continued, but not uprated, and women and men should have equal rights (DHSS, 
1985b, pp7-9). 
 
These proposals implied a radical transition to a liberal market system following the 
market ideology of the Thatcher government.  The state would be confined  to the role 
of pensioner provider for the poor.  Private pensions were to replace SERPS.  
 
1.2.2 The new pensions system  
 
Under the Social Security Act of 1986, the Conservative government attempted to 
radically privatise the pension system, especially the SERPS. However, the 
government had to withdraw some of its most radical proposals due to the strong 
opposition in Parliament. The 1986 Social Security Act thus allowed the SERPS to 
continue in a reduced form. It also introduced the new portable personal pensions 
(intended to supplant SERPS, which was drastically cut back) and simplified the 
regulatory regime for private and occupational pensions. The target rate for SERPS 
was cut from 25 to 20 per cent of relevant earnings, the pension was to be based on 
re-valued lifetime earnings rather than the 20 best years and surviving spouses' 
pensions were cut to half rather than all of the deceased contributor's pension. At the 
same time personal pensions were introduced on an optional basis, but with a 
Treasury subvention of 2 per cent of National Insurance contribution for those who 
switched before 1994.  
 
Privatisation of pensions and retrenchment of state intervention were the main 
characteristics of the Conservative policies. To cut public spending radically was the 
overreaching goal  of  the Conservative government. The 'Portillo reviews' initiated by 
the Treasury in 1993 represented the pillar of this strategy.  The Portillo reviews  
identified areas 'where better targeting can be achieved or from which the state can 
withdraw altogether' (Hansard, 8.2.93, col 683).  They constituted a pro-active 
Treasury intervention in other policy areas, in contrast with the former reactive annual 
Public Expenditure Review system (Deakin and Parry, 1997).  They presaged the 
1997 Labour Government's 'Comprehensive Spending Review' and formed part of the 
process whereby direct Treasury control of a widening range of aspects of social 
policy was introduced.  The reviews led to the justification of the final decision to 
equalise pension ages at the age of 65 rather than earlier (to be phased in by 2020), the 
abolition of a Guaranteed Minimum Pension requirement for portable pensions and 
the ending of SERPs indexation in the 1995 Pensions Act. The 1995 Act further 
tightened the rules governing the calculation of earnings on which the SERPS pension 
was based. Although the 1995 Bill to retrench SERPs was defeated in the House of 
Lords on the issue of pension splitting after divorce, the clauses were reinstated by the 
government.  The Social Security Secretary, Peter Lilley, proposed that the state's role 
would be limited to 'basic pension plus' - whereby the government provided the basic 
national insurance pension and subsidised contributions to private sector schemes to 
continue the trajectory of privatisation in the run-up to the 1997 election.   
 
1.3 The position of other actors  
 
During the 1980s-2000s, the key actors can be identified as follows: the central 
government (the Department of Social Security and the Treasury), political parties 
(the Labour Party), the pension industry, the CBI and the TUC. However, their 
positions changed during the policy making process, which is why this section 
examines their positions in relation to first wave of pension reforms in the late 1980s 
and mid-1990s.  
 
The Pension Industry: the National Association of Pensions Funds (NAPF) and 
the Institute of Directors   
 
The free market Adam Smith Institute launched proposals for the transfer of social 
security funds to stock market investments as the basis for a complete privatisation.  
These approaches fitted that advocated by the NAPF in a paper published in April 
1995 which recommended that state involvement should be confined to those on low 
incomes and proposals by both the Institute of Directors and NAPF to privatise the 
second tier of pensions in commentary on the election manifestos (Taylor-Gooby, 
2002). 
 
The Labour Party  
 
The Labour party continued to advocate for the restoration of SERPs until the early 
1990s.  This line of thinking changed after the electoral defeat in 1992. The report of 
the Commission on Social Justice (1995), set up by John Smith in 1992, led the 
debate on remaking Labour's social policy.  The report rejected the increase of the 
basic pension as too expensive and proposed a minimum pension guarantee, based on 
the combination of the basic pension and means-tested support (p.9).  A universal 
second pension would supplement this, based on SERPs or a vaguely-described 
National Savings Pensions Plan.  Occupational and personal second-tier private 
pensions would continue, under improved regulation.   
 
Meanwhile Frank Field MP, who had developed a substantial reputation as chair of 
the House of Commons Social Services Committee, proposed an innovative 
'Stakeholder' pension for compulsory second-tier provision, to be managed by mutual 
bodies rather than government, employers or for-profit insurance companies, in 
evidence to the Commission and in a series of books and articles (see for example, 
Field, 1996).  This approach was officially disowned by Labour, in a statement by 
David Blunkett, Shadow Secretary of State for Education on 12.7.93, but was 
influential on Labour pension policies in 1997.   
 
By the time of the election, the party policy was moving towards a combination of the 
means-tested guarantee for lower income pensioners and second tier regulated private 
or state second pensions for others - a substantial shift towards liberalism from its 
universalist social democratic position at the beginning of the 1980s, and the basis of 
its current policy position. Attempts to ensure that a full restoration of SERPS was 
included on the policy agenda had been rejected by the Labour leadership at the 1996 
party conference. 
 
The TUC  
 
Since the 1980s pension reforms by the Conservative government until the late 1990s, 
the Trade Unions Congress (TUC)'s position on pensions centred around two 
demands: to restore the indexing of the Basic State Pension by average earnings 
(rather than prices), and to restore the full value of SERPS. Along with the Labour 
Party, the TUC opposed the introduction of private/personal pensions by the 
Conservative government (Bonoli 2000: 78-79).  After the election of New Labour in 
1997, the TUC and some unions took up Stakeholder Pensions with some enthusiasm, 
but without giving up the demand for substantial uprating of the Basic State Pension. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Section II:  
Pressures for change 
 
The 1986 Act dramatically cut back  SERPS and extended the importance of the 
private sector in pension provisions. At the end of the 1980s some 40 per cent of 
workers were entitled to SERPS second tier pensions and 55 per cent to private, 
occupational or personal provision, so that about 15 per cent would be likely to have 
their basic pension supplemented to the means-test level by assistance (Agulnik, 
1999, p. 59, DSS, 2000, ch 2).  By 1999, the proportion in SERPS had shrunk to 
about 20 per cent, 29 per cent were in personal pension schemes and 30 per cent in 
occupational schemes (House of Lords, 1999).  Personal schemes initially grew 
rapidly, but then stabilised as concerns developed.  Over 90 per cent of those on 
incomes about £20,000 as against 40 per cent of those on £7,000 are in private or 
occupational schemes (Agulnik, 1999, p. 60).    
 
1.4 The Key problems  
 
The new pension scheme with its sharp expansion of reliance on private pensions 
caused various problems for individual pensioners, since the responsibility had been 
transferred from the state and the employers to the individual.   The main problems 
were: poverty and inequality, cost to the state, complexity and regulation of the 
private sector. 
 
1.4.1 Poverty –an unresolved issue  
 
The new legislation led to a rapid change in pension provision. However, many 
personal pensions were too small to really lift people on basic state pensions out of 
poverty. Therefore, the poorest pensioners remained reliant on state pensions, 
supplemented by means-tested support (Taylor-Gooby, 2002). 30% of the pensioners 
were below the poverty line in 1998-99 although the pensioners’ income as a whole 
had grown in real terms by approximately 70% over the last two decades (Paxon,W, 
2000 and Daguerre, 2002; see also table 2 below).  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 2: Source of Pensioners' Incomes 1999/00 by quintile of the income 
distribution £ per week, July 1999 prices 
 Poorest Q2 Q3 Q4 Richest All 
Pensioners couples 
Benefits  
Occupational pensions 
Investment income  
Earnings  
Other income  
Gross income  
 
£125 
£13 
£8 
£1 
£0 
£147 
 
£151 
£31 
£10 
£4 
£1 
£195 
 
£161 
£57 
$17 
£10 
£1 
£245 
 
£154 
£120 
£33 
£25 
£1 
£333 
 
£139 
£297 
£197 
£145 
£8 
£746 
 
£146 
£95 
£53 
£37 
£2 
£333 
 
Single pensioners  
Benefits  
Occupational pensions 
Investment income  
Earnings  
Other income  
Gross income 
 
 
£74 
£4 
£4 
£0 
£0 
£82 
 
 
£95 
£13 
£6 
£1 
£1 
£115 
 
 
£111 
£20 
£5 
£2 
£0 
£139 
 
 
£121 
£42 
£11 
£3 
£1 
£178 
 
 
£129 
£110 
£63 
£31 
£5 
£338 
 
 
£106 
£38 
£18 
£7 
£1 
£171  
Source: DSS Pensioners' Income Series 1999/00 
 
 
The table illustrates that pensioners’ incomes are markedly unequal.  In 1999, the  
richest fifth of pensioners couples have incomes five times those of the poorest fifth  
(£746 versus £147 per week), while among single pensioners the ratio is £338 versus 
£82 per week (Taylor-Gooby, 2002 and DSS, 1999-00). Thus, income inequalities 
remained an unresolved problem. Moreover, it became an even more contentious 
issue due to the financial market crisis in the early 1990’s and the lack of public 
control of the pension funds.  
 
 
1.4.2 Increasing public expenditure  
 
The personal pension scheme became so attractive that by 1993 nearly 5 million 
rather than the half million originally estimated had moved to personal pensions and 
the cost to the Treasury in tax relief exceeded £2 billion, against an original estimate 
of £500 million (Taylor-Gooby, 2002). The popularity of the personal pensions 
became therefore a disaster for the government and the pension industry. Reducing 
the rising public expenditure became, therefore, a key issue. 
 
 
1.4.3 The Complexity of the System 
Although the Conservative government intentions were to simplify the current 
system, it became even more complex with the introduction of the 1986 Act. People 
had difficulties in understanding the different pensions’ alternatives and their 
implications. (Disney, Emmerson, Tanner, 1999). 
 
 
1.4.4 Lack of Regulation- a prominent issue  
 
The regulation of the private pension industry also became a controversial issue in the 
early 1990s.   In the 1990s, a series of scandals involving misuse of pensions funds 
triggered public awareness of this issue. In 1991, the media revealed that a leading 
newspaper owner, Robert Maxwell, had misappropriated occupational pension funds 
to shore up unsuccessful businesses in 1991. This resulted in a loss of £1 billion from 
the pension funds and was referred to as the Maxwell scandal. The miss-selling of 
personal pensions constituted the second series of scandals. Individuals were 
encouraged by agents eager for commissions to opt out of SERPS even if it was not in 
their interests to do so. Nearly one million people were affected negatively by this.  
Older workers were particularly exposed as they did not have enough time to 
contribute and therefore generate an adequate fund (Taylor-Gooby, 2002, Waine, 
1995, Goode Committee, 1994).  This scandal rendered the regulation issue even 
more contentious for public opinion. 
  
As a direct result of the Maxwell scandal, the House of Commons Select Committee 
on Social Security recommended that a committee be established to review the 
regulation of pension plans (called "schemes") in the United Kingdom. This 
committee—known as the Pension Law Review Committee or the Goode 
Committee—issued its report and recommendations in late 1993. The Goode 
Committee recommendations were set out in the Pensions Bill published by the U.K. 
Government in December 1994. (Gegelman, 1996). The Goode committee 
recommended stronger controls over private and occupational pensions and 
arrangements for the compensation of those who suffered as a result of 
mismanagement of funds.  NAPF, the CBI, the TUC and the Securities and 
Investments Board endorsed these. 
 
The CBI mounted a strong campaign, which succeeded in securing the crucial 
recommendations that employers would be in a majority on pension boards and that 
the employer should be able  to make the key decisions on the nature of the pension 
scheme, despite opposition from the TUC. Concern was expressed by employees’ 
representatives, the TUC and also by the Institute of Actuaries about the dilution of 
requirements for minimal solvency to a minimal ‘level of funding’ in the stipulations 
for the schemes. This effectively reduced the required margin funds to allow for 
changes in market conditions. The CBI lobbied successfully for the dilution of the 
minimum solvency requirement and for limitations to the ban on schemes investing 
their funds in the employers’ company. 
 
Action on miss-selling was subject to delay. After an attack on pension commission 
agents by NAPF in 1994, the supervisory body, Lautro, launched a series of enquiries 
into companies and demanded that they compensated those who had lost money as a 
result of bad advice.  The TUC had identified the power of employers as a major issue 
in occupational and personal pensions from the Maxwell scandal in 1991 (for 
example, Annual Report, 1993, p. 60) but did not start to campaign on the issue of 
miss-selling until much later (the first reference to active campaigning in the Annual 
Report is in 1996, p.70).  Some companies were fined for their unethical practices 
from the end of 1996 onwards, although it was not until 1998 that action was taken 
against the Prudential, the largest company and the one most prominent in miss-
selling.  
Despite these initiatives, pensioners remain unprotected from the fluctuations in the 
stock market.  
 
In sum, these problems posed a new agenda for pension reform. The 1999 Welfare 
and Pension Reform Act represents New Labour’s policies to address these problems, 
especially the issues of pensioners’ poverty and rising expenditure.  
 
 
1.5 Policy making processes behind the adoption of the 1999 
Welfare and Pensions Act  
 
The key actors of pension reform were the Department of Social Security, Frank 
Field, then Minister for Welfare Reform, the Treasury, and the pension industry. The 
TUC and the CBI were much less influential than the pension industry. One can 
distinguish two stages of the reform processes: Frank Field, then Minister for Welfare 
Reform, initiated the first series of proposals but these were opposed by the Treasury 
and the government. The second state of the reform was initiated by the DSS and the 
Treasury. The final proposals are included in the 1998 Green Paper Partnership in 
Pensions.  
 
1.5.1 The initial proposals: Frank Field  
 
The New Labour government held basic state pension uprating to price inflation for 
its first year (in a clear contrast to the plans of the party in the 1992 election). New 
Labour also set up a fundamental review of social security under Frank Field, who 
was encouraged by the Prime Minister to 'think the unthinkable' in his approach to 
policy innovation (Taylor-Gooby, 2002). 
 
Frank Field, as Minister for Welfare Reform, initially experimented with the idea of 
stake-holder pensions, which was first rejected by the Labour party in 1993. In 1998, 
these ideas were back on the governmental agenda. However, there were considerable 
difficulties in achieving agreement by the industry and by civil servants on the details 
of such a scheme. Indeed, it would have a strong mutual element, would involve 
regulation and would be compulsory, although Field's deputy, Harriet Harman, floated 
the idea of compulsory stakeholder pensions in 1997 (Taylor-Gooby, 2002 and 
Guardian, 4.9.97).  The proposals produced in the Green Paper: New Ambitions for 
our Country: A New Contract for Welfare were unspecific. They simply referred to 
the uprating of the basic pension and the development of new Stakeholder Pensions in 
the context of enhanced private-public partnership (DSS, 1998a). Both the pension 
industry and the Treasury opposed the proposals.  
 
The Treasury  
 
The Chancellor opposed Frank Field’s proposals for two reasons. First, compulsory 
membership of the new scheme would imply a large Treasury subsidy and 
compulsory employers' contributions. Second, Gordon Brown was afraid of the 
consequences of compulsory savings, construed as tax increases, on work incentives, 
which were key to the Treasury’s Welfare to Work Strategy (Taylor-Gooby, 2002).   
 
The pension industry  
 
The pensions industry expressed concerns about compulsion while welcoming the 
idea of a greater role fo r the private sector.  For example, the Association of British 
Insurers suggested that the aim should be to create a climate in which people could 
understand the need to save for their retirement and were encouraged to do so' (ABI, 
1998, p.6).  Thus, a combination of Treasury and industry opposition redirected 
Labour pension reform in the late 1990s. 
 
Field was unable to take his ideas forward, and resigned in August 1998. New 
government proposals were published in December 1998 by the Department of Social 
Security and the Treasury.  
 
1.5.2 The final proposals  (DSS  White Paper 1998b and Welfare Reform Act)  
 
Under the leadership of Gordon Brown, the Comprehensive Spending Review 
contributed to a real increase in basic pensions and in the Income Support rate for 
pensioners. This raised effected the means-tested Minimum Pension Guarantee in 
1999 and in 2000. 
 
The pensions White Paper: A New Contract For Welfare: Partnership In Pensions 
(DSSb, 1998) proposed a new insurance contract for pensions with three main 
elements: 
 
· A means-tested The Minimum Income Guarantee (MIG), at a level to be increased 
year by year 'as resources permit', and intended to rise in line with earnings.  This 
benefit is set at a substantially higher level than the previous means-tested Income 
Support pension it replaced.  
 
· State Second Pension to replace SERPS for low earners (defined as those earning 
less than £9.000 a year). 
 
· Regulated private Stakeholder Pensions targeted at middle earners (defined as 
those earning between £9.000 and £18.500 a year) to increase the level of private 
pension provision among this group.(Disney, Emmerson & Tanner, 1999). 
 
The personal and occupational private pensions remain.  The above proposals are 
designed to make private pensions attractive to new groups and improve state 
protection for low earners, without increasing state spending very substantially and 
without compelling people to take out particular schemes. 
 
1.5.3 The parliamentary process  
 
The Welfare Reform and Pensions Bill, 1999, was subject to much opposition from 
Labour back-benches. MPs were particularly concerned about the transition from the  
insurance-based provisions to means-tested benefits for disabled and incapacitated 
people.  The Labour majority was cut from 160 to 47, and the Bill was defeated twice 
in the House of Lords on these issues, but ultimately passed.  The revolt has to be 
understood in the context of the Labour plans to reject most hereditary peers from the 
House of Lords at the time (Taylor-Gooby, 2002). 
 
The new scheme effectively codifies the means-tested minimum arrangements 
towards which the Treasury has been working.  It adds the new regulated second-tier 
Stakeholder Pension and substitutes a new State Second Pension for SERPs. Thus 
compulsion is avoided and the transfer between state and private sectors will be 
gradual (Taylor-Gooby,2002). 
 
1.5.4 Position of other actors  
 
The Pension Industry  
 
The pension industry had expressed concern about three aspects of the proposals:  
 
· The fact that an individual cannot contribute to both stakeholder and occupational 
pensions;  
· The possibility that some employers may move employees from occupational to 
the State Second Pension because it has a simpler and less onerous regulatory 
framework,  
· The complexity of regulation which they would like further simplified (NAPF, 
1999).   
 
The concerns about regulatory structure and arrangements to opt out of the State 
Second Pension are echoed by the DSS's 'Pensions Provision Group', consisting of 
industry and trade union representatives (Pensions Provision Group, 1999).  The 
government conceded the first point, whereby the State Second Pensions can 
supplement the incomes of those unable to afford adequate occupational pensions. 
 
The CBI  
 
The CBI welcomed the increased flexibility of the arrangements but would prefer 
even more flexibility in occupational pensions (CBI News, April, 1998). 
 
The TUC 
 
The TUC and New Labour have become estranged partners owing to New Labour’s 
determination to dissociate themselves from the unions, at least in the eyes of the 
public. Labour’s reliance on trade union funds has been criticised by the media and 
the Conservatives alike. The old left was seen by the public as soft on labour demands 
because of these financial links up until the mid-1990s - in contrast with Mrs 
Thatcher's comprehensive defeat of the mining unions in the 1980s.  Tony Blair, the 
leader of New Labour, launched a major internal restructuring, which consisted of 
severing the links between the TUC and the New Labour elite. These issues have 
gained increased prominence since 2000. Moreover, the recent high-profile fire-
fighters' strike over pay and other public sector pay disputes in education, health and 
social care, local government and transport  mean that the Prime Minister cannot 
afford to be seen as soft on the unions. The lack of governmental responses to Unions’ 
concerns in relation to pension reform must be understood in this global political 
context. 
 
The TUC broadly welcomed the new arrangements, but expressed some reservations 
about means-testing: ‘The TUC cannot accept the idea that the Minimum Pension 
Guarantee should be means-tested, the uprating of the proposed second pension in 
line with prices only and the fact that employer contributions to the state second 
pension are not compulsory’ (TUC Annual Report, 1999, p. 89). After the election of 
New Labour in 1997, the TUC and some unions took up Stakeholder Pensions with 
some enthusiasm, but without giving up the demand for substantial uprating of the 
Basic State Pension. 
 
New Labour has paid little attention to union demands.  By early 2000, the TUC was  
outraged by the £0.75 increase in the Basic State Pension in the 2000 budget. Their 
opposition has grown more assertive. At the July 2000 National Policy Forum, the 
TUC compelled the government to agree to hold a debate on pensions’ policy, with 
particular reference to ‘pensioner poverty’. The Chancellor signalled a significant 
increase in the Basic State Pension (in the 2001 budget) but refused to concede a 
return to indexation. 
 
1.6 Assessment of the Reform  
 
1.6.1  The New Regime 
 
 The 1999 Act aims to reduce public spending on pensions by increasing the role of 
the private sector in pension provision. At present some 60% of retirement income 
comes from the public purse and 40% from occupational and private pensions and 
private savings. The objective is, by 2050, to have reversed this ratio. 
 
The new pension plans retain the key features of the previous system.  Means-testing 
for the poor and private provision for the better off, with no commitment for a 
universal state pension - are preserved, although government plans a new contributory 
pension targeted at low earners and more regulation of the private sector.  It is the 
SSP that undertakes the task of providing for those with irregular incomes or who 
spend substantial periods out of the labour market for care and other responsibilities 
in line with New Labour's commitment to opportunities.  However this requires tax 
subsidies, and the benefits are consequently close to the means-tested GMP level for 
many pensions, to keep taxes low (Taylor-Gooby, 2002). 
 
In sum, the 1999 Pension Act introduced three major reforms.  
 
· First, the Minimum Income Guarantee (MIG) is a new means-tested benefit, based 
on the previous Supplementary Pensions, to ensure that no pensioner’s income is 
less than £100 a week (by April 2003); indexed by earnings growth. To qualify for 
the MIG, the capital of a single person or a couple must be below £12.000 and 
capital between £6.000 and £12.000 reduced the amount of Income Support 
payable. (Meagher, 2002 & Paxton, 2000). 
· Second, the Stakeholder Pensions came into force in April 2001. The target group 
for Stakeholder Pensions is full- time workers whose annual earnings fall between 
£9,000-£18,500 a year (below the average income but above the low wage level). 
Additionally, members of occupational pension schemes who earn less than 
£30,000 a year can take out a Stakeholder Pension to enhance their entitlement by 
making additional voluntary contributions.  
· Third, the State Second Pensions  replaces SERPS in April 2002. It is designed to 
provide a better pension for the low paid, and to eliminate the need for means-
testing pensions by 2050. Employees can contract out of S2P (as previously from 
SERPS) provided they have an occupational pension, a private pension, or a 
Stakeholder Pension. 
 
These reforms address the public spending commitment identified as a policy 
constraint earlier and to some extent the issue of pensioner poverty, but poverty is not 
entirely resolved, inequality will remain and the issues of complexity is made worse, 
with more schemes, and regulation of the private sector is not addressed. 
 
There are three chief policy problems: 
- poverty and inequality - uprating of the MIG is dependent on government 
generosity.  The recent past has been a time of relatively buoyant public finances.  
The future is more uncertain. 
- SSP provides benefits little better than MIG.  If it is taken up by a substantial 
number of people it will reduce the tax demands of financing the MIG, but 
incentives to join the scheme may be limited except for those groups, such as 
women with interrupted working lives, who in case require tax subsidies for 
periods spent in unpaid care-work, thus limiting the savings. 
- SHP is an unknown quantity.  Part of the simplification regime limits annual 
management charges to 1 per cent of contribution.  This generates little income for 
providers and may result in few SHP pensions being offered or only on 
unattractive terms. 
 
1.6.2 Path dependency of the 199 reform 
 
There is a strong pattern of continuity between the Conservative policies and those of  
New Labour. The current government has not reversed the trend towards privatisation 
endorsed by the Conservatives in the mid-1980s. The reason is to contain public 
spending.  The emphasis on ideas of partnerships with the private sector, allowing it 
an enhanced role in the delivery of public policies, is still strong. None of the major 
new quasi-governmental agencies created by the Conservatives have been threatened 
with abolition. The move towards the hollowing out of the state has been reinforced.  
In the early period in office of the new Labour administration, there is no indication of 
a reversal of this trend:  
 
“The two areas where some slowing or reversal of this trend appears to be occurring 
are in the move towards a regulating or contracting state, and in the restructuring of 
the organisations of the state. In both cases., however, much more would need to be 
done to show that the centre is assuming a stronger role.” (Gray, 2000:294).  
 
However, the new system is more generous than the previous one as it introduced the 
MIG at higher levels than the previous Income Support. The extent to which the MIG 
will lift pensioners out of poverty has been called into question (Paxton, 2000, p. 
240).  Nevertheless, this means-tested pension floor is likely to play an increasingly 
important role, given the prominence of private systems only suitable for better-off 
people in stable employment in the new pension settlement. The basic insurance 
pension will continue, but will be at a level lower than the means-test in most cases. 
 
Overall, the government tries to combine somewhat contradictory objectives: first, the 
need to provide better for people with low incomes figures prominently on the 
agenda; second, the will to shift responsibility in providing pensions provision away 
from the state towards the private sector, and to employers and employees is also a 
dominant goal.  Government however has chosen to do this without compulsion, so 
that private sector providers are able  to ignore poorer customers if they cannot make 
a profit from them. 
 
1.6.3 Implications of the reform and current debates 
 
The major problems with the new system as it operates in practice have been the 
reluctance of the pension industry to offer Stakeho lder Pensions under the regulatory 
regime proposed, and the effective competition between the Minimum Income 
Guarantee and the return likely from a State Second pension.   It is difficult to assess 
whether Stakeholder Pensions will develop in the future, particularly since they have 
been launched at a time of disruption in financial affairs.  The SSP is likely to offer 
benefits for many groups only marginally above their means-tested entitlement.  The 
Institute for Fiscal studies, estimates that, if the MIG is up-rated by earnings, by 2025 
as many as three-quarters of pensioners will fall within it (Clark and Emmerson, 
2002, p.13) so that incentives to save will be reduced. 
 
It is difficult to combine a means-tested non-contributory pension for the poor at a 
decent level with contributory provision for those on lower-to-middle incomes, 
especially if the latter is not compulsory, but it is necessary to do so if the government 
is not willing to tax finance provision for all those for whom the market cannot 
provide adequate benefits.  Previously, the UK system had sought to avoid this 
problem with a universal basic pension at a level which took many low-income 
people just above the means-test.  However unwillingness to raise the hypothecated 
National Insurance contribution, which originally financed that benefit, or to increase 
subsidy from general taxation, meant that the basic pension fell to a level where it was 
unable fulfil this role, increasing the pressure on the means-tested pension.  New 
Labour faces the conflict between a desire to civilise the market by being generous to 
those who cannot contribute and enthusiasm for a market-based system for all who 
can, including those barely able to do so (Taylor-Gooby, 2002). 
 
 
1.7 Conclusion 
 
The UK experience illustrates how a government in a relatively strong centralised 
state with few veto points and a liberal policy-making tradition can  pursue private 
pensions, without paying much attention to opposition from the pensioners' or Trade 
Union lobbies. It also shows how such a government is relatively weak in the face of 
private industry if it is committed to a market liberal regime.  It shows how the 
existence of a powerful private industry to which many pensioners look for incomes 
in old age can divide pensioner interests so that pensioners constitute a less powerful 
force in defence of existing state provision than in many other countries.  It also 
shows that it is difficult to arrange regulation of a private pension industry in a way 
that will protect all those investing in it and enable companies to compete in providing 
attractive pensions, especially at a time of financial instability.  In addition it indicates 
the problems faced by a government which wishes to use such a system to provide 
adequate means-tested pensions for the poor, but to contain its tax commitments by 
ensuring that those on relatively low wages still pursue contributory pensions (Taylor-
Gooby, 2002). 
 
 
 
 
 
Section III 
 
The 2002 Pension Credit and Current Debates 
 
The British pensions system has been reformed almost continuously since the 
introduction of SERPS in the 1970’s. Most of these reforms have reduced the future 
generosity and costs of the state pension system and kept budgeting further state 
spending on pensions at a relatively constant leve l as a proportion of GDP (Disney, 
Emmerson & Tannar,1999). However, the latest pension reforms introduced by the 
New Labour government have been more generous than those of its predecessor. 
Particularly, their latest reform: the 2002 State Pension Credit Act can be seen as 
rather radical. The reform consists of two parts: a guarantee credit and a savings 
credit, which provides greater assistance to the poorer pensioners and ensures that 
savings are better rewarded. The latter is a new direction within British policies 
(Meagher, 2002 and DSS 9/11-2000a). In the following, this paper will examine the 
policy processes behind the reform. The paper is divided into five sections. The first 
section indicates the key problems that lead to the reform. The second section 
analyses the first part of the policy processes by presenting the key actors and their 
position as well as examines the main issues of the consultation process that lead to 
the governments’ final proposal. The third section analyses the parliamentary debates 
and key actors’ positions. The fourth section presents the main characteristics of the 
reform. The fifth section examines the current political debates on pensions and 
provides an overall assessment of the recent reforms including proposals of the 2002 
Green Paper: Simplicity, Security and Choice- Working and saving for retirement.  
 
1.8 Pressure for Change 
 
Since New Labour came into office in 1997, their main priority has been to help 
people living in poverty among them the poorest pensioners, whose income has fallen 
over the last 20 years compared to the incomes of all pensioners (Meagher, 2002). As 
a result, the government has focused on increasing the value of the Minimum Income 
Guarantee (MIG), which was introduced as part of the 1999 Welfare and Pension 
Reform Act. Thereby, the government has resisted the demands from within and 
outside the Parliament to restore the link between the increase in average earnings and 
the level of the basic state pension (Meagher, 2002). The tendency to focus primarily 
on helping the poorest pensioners has made the pension issue even more contentious. 
Particularly, three problems have appeared in the aftermath of the 1999 Welfare and 
Pension Reform: the complexity of the system, the information gap between the state 
and the people and the lack of incentive to save up for retirement due to the levels of 
the MIG. All result from the basic decision to reply on private pensions and the 
difficulty the UK state has in devising a regulation regime that is both simple and 
effective , while allowing freedom to the market. In the following, these three key 
problems will be analysed.  
 
1.8.1 The Complexity of the Pension System  
 
Instead of simplifying the current pension system, the 1999 Welfare and Pension 
Reform Act only added to its complexity. Appendix one illustrates this development 
of complexity within the pension system since the 1970s. Consequently this system 
leaves millions of people literally gambling on their future, since the public does not 
understand the current system for old age. They do not know what to expect from the 
state and to provide for themselves (IPPR 11/12-2001).  
 
Moreover, the complexity of the claim process deters many pensioners to take up 
means-tested benefits (Meagher, 2002, DSS, 2000a). A written answer in November 
2000 in the House of Common suggested that around 500,000 pensioners failed to 
claim the MIG (HC Deb, 13/11-2000 c519W). Moreover, a survey by the Department 
of Social Security in November 2000 indicated that 23% of pensioners in the survey 
did not claim Income Support although they are entitled to it. However, by being 
advised about their entitlements 40% said they would definitely make a claim, 18% 
said they would probably make a claim and 26% announced that they would not claim 
the benefit. The latter was primarily due to the stigma connected to receiving benefits 
(Meagher 2002, & DSS, 2000b). In addition, the claimant’s obligation to turn up 
weekly for means-tested assessments with officials can also explain the low take up of 
the MIG (DSS 9/11-2000a) 
 
1.8.2 An Information Gap 
 
A recent survey from the IPPR illustrates that existing pensioners feel that the state 
has broken an implicit contract where citizens pay their taxes and in exchange are 
looked after in retirement. Several older workers are now realising that they need to 
save much more for a comfortable old age. Those on low-incomes can often not 
afford this and have to rely on the state after all. In relation to this, many older 
workers think that they have not received adequate advice about  planning for their 
retirement and feel therefore they have been let down by the state. This indicates an 
information gap between the government and the future retirees (IPPR, 11/12-2001). 
 
1.8.3 An Unfair system 
 
The government’s emphasis on securing the poorest pensioners by introducing the 
Minimum Income Guarantee (MIG) has worsened an already existing problem – the 
danger of discouraging thrift when a permanent system of pensions is subject to 
means test. Similar to its predecessor, income support, the MIG provides the poorest 
pensioners with an income safety net that tops up the flat-rate basic state pension. 
However, the topping-up is to a fixed level regardless of whether the recipients have a 
private income or not. Pensioners with small amounts of income in addition to the 
basic state pension have their income deducted pound for pound from the amount of 
top-up received (Meagher, 2002 & Clark 2002). Therefore, any pensioner with an 
income before means-testing below the MIG-level receives the same final income. 
Consequently, the 330,000 MIG recipients, who have an occupational pension, see no 
additional benefit from the contributions they made in the past. Moreover, those 
pensioners with an income just above the MIG level are only one or two pounds better 
off than those who did not save. Indeed, this distorts the incentive to save up for 
retirement by making saving unappealing for low-wage workers, who will be low 
income retirees (Meagher 2002, Clark 2002 and IPPR, 11/12-2001). 
  
This pre-existing problem has become even more pressing due to the recent rapid 
increases in the value of the MIG compared with basic state pension. In 1998 the gap 
was just £5.35 compared with £19.65 in April 2001. The limit before for a pensioner’s 
private income has an effect on his/her final income has roughly been tripled in the 
last three years. Therefore, the government’s strategy of targeting help at the poorest 
implies that even more pensioners fail to be rewarded for their thrift (Meagher, 2002 
& Clark, 2002). This unfairness seems also to be worsened by the existing capital 
rules, which penalises pensioners who have saved little (Department of Social 
Security, 9/11-2000b).  
 
In sum, the 1999 Welfare and Pension Reform Act did not only add to the complexity 
of the pension system. The reform also caused negative side effects such as removing 
the incentive to save up for retirement and failed to provide security in retirement for 
future pensioners. In the following the government's responses to these negative 
effects are presented. 
 
1.9 The First Stage of the Policy Process- the Consultation 
Document  
 
The Pension Credit Reform was not part of the 1998 Green Paper: Partnership in 
Pensions (DSS1998). It was a government response to the criticism of their pension 
policy since 1997, especially in relation to the negative side effects of the MIG. The 
pension credit was announced by the Chancellor of Exchequer Gordon Brown in the 
March 2000 Budget Statement. It was part of the government's tax credit package that 
aimed at helping the most needy. In September 2000, Alistair Darling, Secretary of 
State for the then Department of Social Security, announced that a consultation 
document would be published later in the autumn with a view to introduce the 
necessary legislation in the next parliament (Meagher 2002 & DSS11/9-2000). The 
government launched the consultation paper: The Pension Credit: A Consultation 
Paper in November 2000. The document set out New Labour’s plans for reform and 
the government consulted on these proposals until 28th of February 2001 (DSS 9/11-
2002). The government received over 400 responses to the consultation document 
among them 57 were from trade unions, pensions and financial service organisations. 
Among this group of respondents, some actors were more influential than others.  In 
the following, the proposal is outlined along with the position of the key actors. The 
key issues of the consultation process are also examined together with the main 
changes in the government’s proposals. 
 
1.9.1 Proposal for reform- The Consultation Document 
 
The main incentives behind the Pension Credit aimed to tackle poverty, promote 
incentives to work and save, improve benefits take up, targeting support at the most 
needy and improve efficiency in customer service delivery. In order to achieve this, 
the policy instruments were: 
· To simplify and increase the MIG payments from next year - leading to a 
guaranteed minimum income of over 100 pounds a week for a single pensioner 
and 154 pounds for couples in 2003 in order to take action to end pensioner 
poverty 
· To reward Work and Savings in Retirement by abolishing the capital limits and 
introducing cash rewards for modest savings, earnings or second-tier pensions. 
These cash rewards are calculated as a proportion of all savings that exceed the 
saving credit threshold, which is the level of the basic state pension. The 
proportion is 60% of the difference between the proposed guarantee income level 
and the savings credit threshold up to approximately £13.8 per week for singles 
and £18.60 per week for couples. They are given to claimants aged 65 and over or 
to claimant couples where at least one partner is at least 65. 
· To modernise the system by abolishing the weekly means-test and moving more 
into line with the tax system, which is based on an annual cycle, thus paving the 
way for further tax and benefit integration in the future (DSS 9/11-2000b). 
 
With the introduction of the Pension Credit in 2003, the government aims at helping 
5.5 million pensioners to be better off and three million are expected to gain from tax 
changes. Two thirds of these pensioners should be women because they tend to have 
smaller occupational pensions than men, live longer and are more exposed to a 
relative decline in their pension income (DSS 9/11-2000b). The cost of the reform 
was estimated to be 4.4 billion pounds. 
 
The proposals imply a radical transition, since the government aims at not only 
helping the most needy, but also pensioners with modest savings. This was trumpeted 
by Alistair Darling when he presented the consultation document: 
 
“For the first time ever the Pension Credit will make sure savings will be rewarded... 
The Credit will reward the thrift of millions of people who have worked hard to save 
for their retirement… Our aim is to end pensioner poverty and ensure that all 
pensioners share in the rising prosperity of the nation…” (DSS, 9/11-2000). 
 
To ensure that all pensioners share in the rising prosperity of the country was also the 
goals of the 2001 New Labour's Election Manifesto. The government had included a 
detailed description of the proposed pension credit reform along with its other reforms 
aimed at helping the poorest pensioners (Meagher, 2002, The Labour Party, 2001, p. 
21).   
 
1.9.2 The Key Actors in the Consultation Process 
 
Besides New Labour, the key actors in the Consultation process were Age Concern, 
Help the Aged, the Chartered Institute of Housing, the Pension Provision Group, The 
Financial Service Authority (FSA), the National Association of Pension Funds 
(NAPF) and Associations of British Insurers (ABI). The Institute for Fiscal Studies 
IFS and The Institute for Public Policy Research (IPPR) also provided the government 
with some influential research. Conservative Party and the Liberal Democrats were 
less influential. The ESRC Research Group, the Simulating Social Policy for an 
Ageing Society (SAGE) and National Pensioners Convention had also little influence 
in consultation process.  
 
The National Association of Pension Funds  
 
Although NAPF supported the principle of rewarding savings, they criticised the 
pension credit for being too complex. This complexity might, therefore, discourage 
people to save up for retirement, since they have difficulties in working out whether 
they qualify for the credits (NAPF 9/8-2002) 
 
Associations of British Insurers  
 
Although ABI warmly welcomed the Pension Credit they proposed an improved 
Pension Credit that would give more rewards to those on lower incomes in order to 
strengthen the savings message. They proposed to disregard the first £10 pounds per 
week for private income in retirement. ABI also urged the government to note that the 
FSA should play a crucial role in the creation of the supportive regulatory framework 
for promoting savings (ABI, 28/2-2001) 
 
Age Concern, Help the Aged and the Chartered Institute of Housing 
 
Age Concern, Help the Aged and the Chartered Institute of Housing overall supported 
the government's proposal of providing retirees with additional income. However, 
they continued to advocate for the restoration of the earnings link for the basic state 
pension. They believed this was the best way of ensuring adequate living standards 
for all (Age Concern 2001 and IPPR, 6/3-2002). In addition, Help the Age and Age 
Concern criticised the new system for being too complex. Help the Aged also argued 
that many older people contacting the government's advice line were confused by 
regular changes in the benefits names (Meagher 2002, Guardian 1/12-2002,  and 
Forum Brief 15/4-2002). Consequently, red tape and increased complexity were 
expected to have a negative impact on benefits take-up, which was already a source of 
concern with the MIG (Forum Brief, 9/8-2002) 
 
Age Concern and the Chartered Institute of Housing also recommended an option for 
designing the relationship between the Pension Credit, Housing Benefit and the 
Council Tax Benefit in order to prevent reduction in the value of these benefits when 
pensioners claim the Pension Credit. Their recommendation was to make no 
associated change to the treatment of Pension Credit income for HB and CTB 
purposes (Meagher, 2002). 
  
The Pension Provision Group 
 
The Pension Provision Group, which was established by the Secretary of State for 
Social Security in 1997 to contribute to the government’s pension review, produced a 
very critical response to the government’s proposals. Firstly, they claimed that the 
next year's increase in the basic state pensions would not have any significant impact 
on the long-term pensions policy although these increases were welcomed. Secondly, 
the amount of people gaining would depend on the government's changes in the 
Housing and Benefit and Council Tax Credit. Thirdly, the Pension Credit could end 
up with reducing rather than increasing the amounts some people save. Fourthly, the 
Pension Credit could jeopardise the government's long-term strategy for pensions 
announced in the 1998 Green Paper. Besides these criticisms, the Pension Provision 
Group also recommended that the Pension Credit should become a transitory scheme. 
Benefits would eventually be replaced by higher pension rights announced by the 
1998 Green Paper reforms (The Pension Provision Group March 2001) 
 
The Financial Service Authority  
 
In their response to the government's proposals, the FSA argued that the Pension 
Credit would increase the complexity of the current system instead of simplifying it.  
In particular, they expressed concern that the Pension Credit could put two of its 
statutory objectives e.g. to increase public awareness and protect consumers, at risk. 
This was mainly due to the increased complexity of the pension system,  which may 
add to individual need for personal investment advice when considering making 
private saving options. According to the FSA, such an advice would be more difficult 
to provide. This would mean that consumers would not be able make the right 
financial decisions or even worse not be bothered to save for old age altogether 
(Meagher, 2002).  
 
IFS and IPPR 
 
Similar to the Pension Provision Group, the IFS argued that the Pension Credit might 
have an unintended effect when it comes to savings. Instead of encouraging people to 
save up, the means-tested pension credit might have a financial disincentive. They 
argued was that the increasing rates of the MIG over the next years would 
unambiguously discourage savings due to an additional 500,000 pensioners would 
qualify for the Pension Credit (Clark, 2001 & Meagher, 2002).  
 
In their recommendations to the Work and Pension Committee, the IPPR emphasised 
the complexity of the state pension system including the Pension Credit. They 
claimed that many people would miss out on means-tested benefits and live in poverty 
as a result. Therefore, IPPR criticised the Pension Credit for being an unsatisfactory, 
half way measure. They instead recommended an increase in the Basic State Pension 
to the level of the MIG and index it in line with earnings. According to the IPPR, this 
would provide a solid foundation for retirement income since it would end pensioner 
poverty and at the same time reduce unpopular means-testing (IPPR, 6/3-2002).  
 
1.9.3 The Key Issues of the Consultation Process 
 
A large number of respondents broadly welcomed the principles underlying the 
government's proposals both in terms of the principle of rewarding savings and the 
commitment to end pensioner poverty (Meagher, 2002). However, five key issues 
appeared during the consultation process. These were: 
· The complexity of the calculation method used for the Pension Credit could lead 
to a reduction in take-up rates 
· The Pension Credit should be carefully designed to allow interaction with other 
state benefits e.g. housing benefit and Council tax reduction 
· The negative effect of pensions credit on the saving behaviour of people currently 
of working age 
· Restoring the earnings link to the Basic State Pension  
· The long-term viability of the different stands of government pension policy.  
 
Almost all respondents stated that calculation method of the pension credit and the 
saving rewards were too complicated. Several respondents among them Age Concern 
and Help the Aged expressed that this would reduce the take-up of the benefits if 
potential claimants found it too difficult to work out their entitlement (Meagher, 
2002). Moreover, several actors also criticised the government for complicating the 
claim process by abolishing capital rules and introducing yearly assessment of the 
claimants’ entitlement to the benefits. The government responded positively to the 
criticism. Firstly, New Labour changed the yearly assessment arrangements to a five-
year basis and introduced a new Pension Service, the purpose of which was to inform 
pensioners about their eligibility for the Pension Credit and their state pension. The 
government also decided to maintain the lower capital limit of £6,000 below which all 
capital is ignored. It also intended to abolish the upper limit of £12,000 pounds, which 
prevented pensioners with capital above this level from being entitled to the MIG 
(Meagher, 2002) By introducing these changes, the government hoped that the claim 
process would be simplified and that this would increase the take-up of means-tested 
benefits (Meagher 2002).  
 
 
The second key issue of the debate concerned the interaction of the Pension Credit 
with other benefits such as the Housing Benefit (HB) and Council Tax Benefit (CTB). 
As already mentioned both Age Concern and the Chartered Institute of Housing 
proposed various designs to ensure that any gains from the Pension Credit would not 
reduce the value of other benefits. However, the government rejected their options for 
being too expensive. Instead the government proposed in their White Paper: The 
pension Credit- The Government’s Proposals to raise the applicable amount for HB 
and CTB purposes by the amount of the maximum savings credit (Meagher, 2002, 
DSS 9/11-2001), and Explanatory notes, 2002). Consequently, claimants of the 
Pension Credit would also receive an increase to their HB and CTB.  
 
Economists from the IFS, the Pension Provision Group and FSA pointed out the 
negative effect of the pension credit on the future retirees’ saving behaviour. They 
claimed that the overall impact on saving would depend on two different factors: the 
income effect and the substitution or price effect. The income effect means the 
urgency to save is reduced if someone knows they are going to have a minimum 
income in the future. The price or substitution effect refers to the rate of return e.g. 
whether extra saving actually would produce a yield in the future. Consequently a low 
rate of return will discourage saving. Often these two effects can work in opposite 
directions. However, people with less than full Basic State Pensions would not receive 
much incentive to save due to a deficient contribution record. Pensioners with an 
income below the level of the savings threshold, which is the basic state pension, are 
not taken into account for the savings credit. Several actors among them SAGE and 
the Fawcett Society saw this potential inequity between people who do and do not 
receive a full basic state pension as unfair, particularly towards women. They 
proposed that the any savings income above the level of the basic state pension should 
render the individuals eligible for the saving credit. The government rejected this 
proposal on the grounds of complexity and equity. They argued that giving someone 
pension benefits as if they had made contributions when they have not, would be 
unfair to those who had (Meagher, 2002). In addition, the complexity of the pension 
system was also seen by both the FSA, the Pension Provision Group and IPPR as 
having a disincentive on peoples saving behaviour. The government did not answer 
these queries (Meagher, 2002). 
 
The fourth issue concerned the restoration of the earnings link for the basic state 
pension. These responses came particularly from trade unions and groups representing 
pensioners. Their main argument was that this would help meeting the government’s 
stated policy objectives. It would also reward savings and could provide an incentive 
for younger people to contribute to private pensions and build up other savings. 
However, New Labour, who saw such amendments as too expensive, rejected this 
recommendation (Meagher, 2002). 
 
The long-term viability of the Pension Credit was a crucial issue identified during the 
consultation process. There was a potential conflict between the government’s wish to 
target help at the poorest pensioners and the wish to reduce public expenditure on 
pensions. ABI had estimated that the Pension Credit would be payable to around 70% 
of all pensioners by 2025 (ABI 28/2-2001). The FSA, the Pension Provision Group 
and IPPR expressed concern about the long-term sustainability of the credit. IPPR 
was particularly strident in its criticism. In the IPPR report published in August 2001, 
experts questioned the complexity and the costs of the Pension credit (Meagher, 
2002). Despite these criticisms, the government left the issue unresolved and it 
reappeared later on the political agenda in the House of Lords.  
 
In sum, the consultation process indicated that only minor changes were made to the 
government’s proposals to the Pension Credit as the analysis of the final proposals for 
the Pension Credit makes it clearer. 
 
1.9.4 The Final proposals (The 2001 White Paper: The Pension Credit- the 
Government’s proposal) 
 
The Department of Work and Pension announced and introduced the final proposal 
before Parliament on 28 November 2001. The proposal set out the framework for the 
new Pension Credit. This new social benefit consists of a minimum income 
guarantee- and a savings credit.  
 
· The Guarantee Credit is designed to ensure a minimum level of income for 
claimants over the age of 60. The credit intends to replace the MIG. It insures that 
no pensioner needs to live on less than £100 a week or £154 for couples. Capital 
assets below £6000 pounds are disregarded from and any pensioners with savings 
above this threshold will receive a notional of income set at around 10% 
compared with the current 20% rate for pensioners with income between £6000-
£12,000  
· The Savings Credit is available to claimants over the age of 65 and will provide an 
additional income for pensioners, who have low or modest incomes in addition to 
the full rate of the basic state pension. The savings credit can give up to a 
pensioner a maximum of £13.80 a week (or £717.60 a year) or £18.60 (or 967.20 
a year) for couples depending on their savings in banks or second pensions. 
Pensioners above the guarantee level will qualify if their incomes are up to about 
£135 a week or £200 a week for couples (DWP 2001). 
 
The interaction of the Pension Credit and the Housing Benefit and Council Tax 
benefit means that any pensioner receiving the Guarantee Credit will be entitled to 
full Housing Benefit and Council Tax Benefit. The means to do this is by raising the 
level at which pensioners qualify for help in line with the Pension Credit and also by 
mirroring the new rules on savings. However, the government intended to keep the 
current maximum savings threshold of £16,000 for people entitled for HB and CTB.  
In addition, the government also proposed to raise the age-related personal allowance 
by £240 over indexation in order to increase the gains from savings for pensioners 
with higher incomes (DWP 2001) 
 
The final proposal was introduced for the first reading in the Parliament on in 
November 2001. In the following, the main issues of the debates are presented along 
with the positions of the other key actors.  
 
1.10 The Parliamentary Process 
 
The State Pension Credit Act received Royal assent on the 25 June 2002. During 
parliamentary passage the Act was subject to fierce opposition. Alistair Darling made 
a formal statement to the House of Commons about the government’s proposals for 
the Pension Credit. In response, David Willetts, Shadow Secretary of State for Work 
and Pensions, argued that under the new proposals, the basic state pension would 
become less important in determining the income of a large group of pensioners. 
Approximately 50% of all pensioners would depend on means-test benefits. This 
would affect the government’s general policy on savings, especially its policy to 
encourage the take-up of stakeholder pensions. Future pensioners would face benefit 
withdrawal rates of 40%. The Liberal Spokesperson on Work and Pensions for the 
Liberal Democrats, Steve Webb, argued that the Pension Credit calculation would be 
more complicated to claim than the basic state pension. He, therefore, questioned 
whether the take-up rate would be any higher than that for the MIG (Meagher, 2002). 
However, these critiques were ignored by the government. Similar rejection of 
criticisms appeared in the government’s response to the Select Committee for Work 
and Pension and to the House of Lords.  
 
1.10.1 The Select Committee of Work and Pension 
 
Prior to their announcement of the report: Pension Credit in April 2002, the Select 
Committee for Work and Pension invited various interest groups to submit and 
discuss their assessment of the new credit at three meetings. Most of the issues raised 
were similar to those identified in the consultation process in 2000-2001. The 
meetings within the Committee took place from the 27th of February to 13th of March 
2002. The results of the debates were published in the Committees report to the 
government. Overall the Committee supported the elements of the Pension Credit. 
However, they recommended that an inquiry concerning the immediate and long-term 
costs, benefits and affordability of the Pension Credit should be established. In 
addition, the Committee was also sceptical of the financial incentive for younger 
people to save up for old age. During the hearings of the Committee, Alistair Darling 
denied that the State Second Pensions were in practice ruled out in the current 
government’s pension strategy. However, he failed to convince the Committee.  The 
Committee argued that escalating Pension Credit costs would lead to a decrease in the 
financial value of the State Second Pension. These criticisms were similar to those of 
the IPPR, IFS, NAPF, the Pension Provision Group and ABI.  
 
The Committee also urged the Government to reconsider its policy on the Credit’s 
treatment of earnings. The committee proposals similar to the recommendations of the 
National Pensioners convention. Both recommended that the first £40 of all weekly 
earnings income should be disregarded in the calculation of the Pension Credit in 
order to encourage more pensioners to remain involved in the labour market (Select 
Committee on Work and Pensions, 12/4-2002).  
 
The government agreed with the Committee’s recommendations. However, New 
Labour opposed the proposed earnings disregard in the Pension Credit on the ground 
of costs (estimated to be £180 million a year) (House of Commons Work and Pension 
Committee, 26/6-2002). Moreover, the government did not accept the view expressed 
about the future viability of the State Second Pension. They claimed that the State 
Second Pension and the Pension Credit were essentially complementary. The State 
Second Pension rights would be rewarded in the Pension Credit. These two policy 
instruments would, therefore, greatly boost the retirement income of the most 
vulnerable future pensioners (House of Commons Work and Pension Committee, 
26/6-2002). This indicates that the Select Committee’s influence depended on 
whether their recommendations followed the overall policy of the government e.g. to 
help the most needy and to keep spending under control.  
 
 
1.10.2 The Pension Credit’s Progress in the House of Lords 
 
During the Bill’s progress through the House of Lords, issues identified in the 
previous consultation process reappeared: the financial incentive to save up for 
retirement, the long-term viability of the Pension Credit, the treatment of earnings and 
the complexity of calculation methods. However, the government simply ignored 
most of the criticisms (Meagher, 2002).  
 
A new issue appeared on the political agenda during the Bill’s passage through the 
house of Lords: the hospital downrating meant that people currently had their social 
security benefit down-rated after six weeks in hospital. Pensioners were most exposed 
to such reductions. Age Concern had advocated for a change in these rules as 
penalised old people for being ill. The House of Lord, the Royal College of Nursing, 
The Royal College of Psychiatrists and the College of Occupational Therapists 
supported this argument. However, the House of Lords led by Baroness Hollis had 
three main concerns regarding the changes.  
· The administrative costs of such changes,  
· The justification of the amount of benefits which are down-rated due to the absent 
of research in savings made by in-patients  
· The difficulties patients face in restoring their benefits when discharged from 
hospital.  
 
The government followed up on the recommendation of changing all hospital 
downrating rules. They announced that benefits would be down-rated after 13 rather 
than six weeks. However, the initiative was not incorporated as a part of the State 
Pension Credit, since such changes did not require primary legislation. The timing of 
these changes was to coincide with the introduction of the Pension Credit in 2003.  
The House of Lords welcomed the government’s proposal, but Age Concern was still 
concerned that the government’s changes would not solve the problem, since the rules 
still would continue to penalise around 6,000 old people (Meagher 2002 & Age 
Concern, 27/2-2002).  
 
In sum, the Pension Credit Act went through the parliament without leading to any 
major changes to the government’s initial proposals. However, both the Select 
Committee on Work and Pension and the House of Lord also influenced the policy 
process by initiating different proposals which enabled minor changes to the final 
proposal. Various interest groups also managed to influence the parliamentary debates 
via the public consultations in the Work and Pension Committee. Particularly Age 
Concern was successful in achieving their goal of changing the rules of hospital 
downrating. By contrast, both the Liberal Democrats and the Conservatives impact on 
the political debates was limited due to New Labour’s power in majoritarian system.  
 
1.10.3 The New Regime 
 
The new regime’s framework was faithful to the government’s final proposals. The 
only amendments were:  
· An increase in the benefit expenditure by £2 billion,  
· The improvements in pension service delivery 
· Changes in the hospital down-rating, which was not included in the Bill.  
 
The Pension Credit is to be administrated by the new organisation “The Pension 
Service”, which is placed under the overall responsibility of the Department of Work 
and Pension. Unrelated to the Pension Credit, the act also contained provisions of 
amendments of the legislation covering the contracting out of the SERPS. These 
amendments were aimed to promote gender equality between widows and widowers 
equally. (Explanatory notes, 2002).  
  
The Pension Credit represents a further move towards a means-tested system. 
Consequently, this will along with the more generous policy of the government 
increase the number of pensioners entitled to the credit and the attendant bureaucracy 
and costs. In addition, several critics have claimed that the State Second Pension will 
become irrelevant compared with the Pension Credit, once the latter is implemented 
in 2003. This conflict between the government’s overall pension strategy and its 
intentions of helping the most needy is also present in the more recent pension 
initiatives proposed by the government. This aspect is examined further in the 
following section, which focus on the current pension debates.  
 
 
 
1.11 5- Policy debates: in search of a coherent governmental pension 
policy 
 
1.11.1 The Key problems  
 
In 2002, the most pressing issues arise from a combination of different factors. These 
were the occupational pension crisis, instability of the stock markets in an 
individualised system and lack of adequate personal savings for old age. These three 
key problems are analysed in the following.   
 
The occupational pension crisis and the issue of regulation  
 
A record number of companies are closing their generous final salary pension 
schemes to new staff (the Defined Benefit (DB) schemes).  These are being replaced 
by Defined Contribution (DC) schemes. The problem is that in DC schemes the risk 
rests with employees since the value of their pensions depends on investment 
performance. Employers have also taken the opportunity to reduce contributions to 
DC schemes compared with DB schemes. According to the TUC: “they typically pay 
almost two thirds less. The average long-term employer contribution is 15.4%, in 
money purchases the figure is just 6%" (TUC, 2002). Employers guarantee only what 
gets saved towards a pension, not what is actually paid on retirement. Individuals 
build up their own savings funds which they will use to buy an annuity on retirement. 
The shift away from DB schemes has been justified on the grounds that increased life 
expectancy makes it more expensive for employees to provide generous pensions 
schemes. Business interests argue that pensions are becoming increasingly expens ive 
for companies to run because of rising life expectancy and unnecessary regulations. 
These complaints are aimed primarily at the Minimum Funding Requirement (MFR)1 
and Financial Reporting Standard 17 (FRS 17).  Although FRS17 and the MFR may 
have had a serious impact on final salary schemes, the problems facing employers, 
unions and government today have been emerging since the early 1990s. The most 
recent figures from the Government Actuary’s Department (GAD) show a decline in 
the coverage of occupational pensions that predates any of the phenomena referred to 
above. GAD estimates suggest that the coverage of final salary schemes in the private 
sector fell from 5.6 million in 1991 to a projected 3.8 million in 2001, assuming that 
the rate of decline between 1991 and 1995 continued over the following six years. In 
June 2002, at the peak of the crisis in the pension schemes, the government has tried 
to defend its regulation regime.  The former Work and Pension Minister, Alistair 
Darling accused British businesses of closing pensions schemes in order to cut costs. 
He also stressed that many companies were wrongly blaming closures on the new 
accounting regulation, FRS17, when in reality the reason was that firms wanted to cut 
costs. 
 
Instability of the stock market  
 
Three years of falling stock interest rates coupled with the fact that employers do not 
contribute enough to DC schemes pension industry means that investment risk lies 
solely with the individual scheme member. If the stock market dips before their 
retirement and if the level of employer contribution is declining - which  has been 
happening over the past few months - their pension investment shrinks as a result and 
they will not be able to buy as large a pension. This will affect mostly future retirees, 
not current baby boomers who still benefit from DB schemes. Thus future retirees will 
get lower pension provision due to the deficiencies in DC schemes. This represents a 
                                                 
1 Introduced in the 1995 Pensions Act to protect pensioners against a repeat of the Maxwell pension 
fund scandal. 
 
radical break with the past and makes the government uneasy but also unable to 
reduce the level of individual risk, since compulsory membership is not an option due 
to the joint opposition of business interests and their best ally, The Treasury.  As the 
TUC pointed out: "there was an understanding that making provision for retirement 
was a shared responsibility between the state, individuals and their employer. This 
social contract is now under threat with the state's retreat from pension provision 
being matched by employers' headlong rush away from DB pensions... If current 
trends continue the UK is heading towards a system in which DC dominates." (TUC 
2002). 
 
Lack of adequate personal savings for old age 
 
Future retirees are not saving enough for retirement, which poses a threat to their 
living standard in an increasingly individualised pension system, especially in a DC 
schemes. Indeed, in a defined benefit pension scheme, members pay contributions in 
return for a pension promise that is related to the number of years over which they 
contributed. In a DC scheme, the saver buys an annuity at retirement, which 
guarantees an income for life. In the government’s words, this means they are buying 
two products - a pension and an annuity - and need to make two choices. The 
government therefore encourages buyers to shop around for the best annuity, which 
fits well with the Third Way agenda: to promote people’s personal responsibility and 
capacity to make their own choices provided that they have all the information 
required (DWP, 2002:53). Despite the multiplication of financial incentives to 
encourage these future retirees to save such as pension credit and stakeholder 
pensions. But future retirees retain a short-term perspective, which adds to New 
Labour’s concern.  Only when they get closer to retirement age do they actually shop 
around for the best annuities as the government is currently encouraging future 
pensioners to do so.  
 
 
1.12 The government’s proposals  
 
The government has issued a series of consultation documents and set up two 
independent reviews in order to address the problem of employer’s behaviour in the 
context of the generalisation of DC pension schemes. These reviews are the Sandler 
and the Pickering reviews2. The latest government proposals are the Green Paper 
Simplicity, Security and Choice- Working and saving for retirement. The 2002 DWP 
Green paper is the response to the two previous reviews.  
 
 
1.12.1 The Sandler review  
 
The Treasury asked Ron Sandler, the former chief executive of Lloyds Bank, to look 
at ways of reducing the costs of pension products. The Sandler review suggested a 
new range of financial products that are easier to understand, and easier for the 
                                                 
2 Headed up by Alan Pickering, former chairman of the National Association of Pensions Funds, the 
industry’s main lobbying body, and Ron Sandler, former Lloyd’s insurance market chief executive.  
 
industry to sell and consumers to buy. The idea behind the Sandler review was to 
reduce miss-selling. Due to the complexity of the system,  individuals had to rely on 
financial expert advice. However this was not a sufficient guarantee, not necessarily 
because of personal advisors’ bad faith, but because the equity system had become so 
complex that it represented a challenge to advisors themselves. 
 
Sandler pointed out that tax incentives have created more confusion. The report 
stated: 'Tax-based savings incentives affect composition of saving more than they do 
overall savings levels. Indeed, there is little evidence to suggest that tax incentives 
have a significant impact on overall savings levels, especially amongst the lower-
income groups for whom increasing saving should be a priority. What is more, it is 
evident that such incentives generally increase the complexity of the regime as a 
whole, and that this complexity leads to higher costs”. (Sandler 2002).  The Review 
therefore recommended that, in future, governments should avoid introducing new 
tax-based savings incentives if their aim is to increase aggregate savings levels.' 
However, the Sandler review puts the onus on the consumer to learn more about the 
products they are buying (Guardian 6 July 2002). The emphasis on personal 
responsibility reflects New Labour’s vision of ideal citizenship: responsible, alert and 
well- informed consumers are expected to shop around for the best product with the 
government’s enabling hand. However, the government does not provide hands outs, 
even in a system which has become so complicated that is puzzles experts themselves.  
 
 
1.12.2 The Pickering review  
 
The Pickering review has delivered its report in July 2002. It recommended 
compulsory occupational pension scheme as part of employees work contract with 
their future employers. It also recommended the simplification of the current tax 
system by introducing primary legislation. It also advocated for the creation of new 
regulatory agency which would be more pro-active than the pre-existing occupational 
pensions Regulatory Authority. This new agency would act as an advisor and 
regulator. The new regime should place greater reliance on professiona ls and trade 
unions for helping consumers and providing guidelines. He also stated that regulations 
should be relaxed, especially in relation to the hereditability of pension rights by 
spouses, to encourage provision. Pickering also urged that the state pension age 
should be raised to70 years of age to tackle the funding crisis (Pickering 2002). The 
Pickering report has shaped the Green Paper’s proposals.  
 
 
1.12.3 The December 2002 Green Paper  
 
The Department of Work and Pensions published its proposals on Tuesday 17 
December 2002 . The government’s main aim is to encourage people to save more 
money into pensions in order to build a nation of responsible retirees. This is a 
typically Third Way project to the crisis of DC scheme as the government emphasises 
people’s individual responsibility in relation to old age. Privatisation is not being 
ruled out but simply regulated with an enhanced role for various semi autonomous 
regulatory agencies.   
 
The policy instruments are:  
- An increased role of the Occupational Pens ions Regulatory Authority (which 
deals with occupational pensions) in order to regulate pension schemes and make 
them more transparent and user-friendly 
- Dilution of MFR - should this be mentioned?? 
- A simplified and unified tax system which makes pension provision easier for 
employers and employees alike  
- The creation of a regulatory agency in order to protect member schemes. The new 
regulator  “will focus on protecting the benefits of schemes members. The new 
regulator will operate proactively to anticipate problems, concentrating its efforts 
on schemes where it assesses there is a high risk of fraud, bad governance or 
maladministration.” (DWP, 2002: 6).  
- The introductions of a flexible retirement age which enables people to “work a 
few years longer”. People will be able to phase out their retirement and can carry 
on working part-time for the same employer if they wish too. This is not an option 
in the current system since they have to work for another business once they reach 
age 57 (Guardian, December 18 2002) 
- People will also be financially encouraged to delay retirement as the government 
plans to add extra state pension for late retirees. 
- Employers will have to build best practices policies and the government plans to 
end compulsory retirement and age discrimination. These measures will be built 
upon existing provisions such as the New Deal for the 55+, already a tremendous 
success according to the 2002 Green paper. However, employers will still be able 
to resort to early retirement if they wish to. There is no mechanism that ensures 
that employers will play by the rules: the government’s policy is based on 
employers’ good faith and on the hope that future retirees will carry on working. 
This option is already increasingly popular amongst current retirees and is likely 
to become the choice of future retirees. However, early retirement before 55 will 
be banned. 
 
The government has ruled out three solutions:  
 
- An increase in the level of the basic State Pension  
- A significant increase in the MIG 
- The introduction of a compulsory occupational pension system.  There is to be an 
enquiry headed by Adair Turner on this, to report in 2-3 years' time. 
- Raising the state pension age, a solution proposed by several pension 
organisations.  
 
In line with the promotion of activation policies, the government believes that older 
people’s increased life expectancy and improved health mean they will be able to 
work longer. If every able bodied must work, this applies to older people as well. This 
explains why under the New Deal fo r 50+ extra-help will be provided for those who 
return to work, even on a part-time basis. The government will thus not spend extra 
money on pensions due to the Treasury commitment to keep taxes low and to target 
help at the poorest pensioners (DWP, 2002). 
 
 
1.12.4 The position of other actors  
 
 
CBI’s Position 
 
Overall the CBI has generally supported the government’s pension strategy. However, 
the CBI was very critical of the MFR, which has been abolished by the government. 
CBI described the government’s Green Paper as “A useful first building Block” for 
stabilising the pension system. However, they are critical of the plans of making small 
firms obliged to provide financial advice (CBI17/12-2002).  
 
 
The Pension Industry  
 
The NAPF welcomed the Green Paper main proposals. The tax review makes a 
number of radical proposals which may make it easier for firms to retain their pension 
schemes, and offers the genuine prospect of some employers being able to offer 
schemes where there currently are none. The Green Paper is a positive contribution, 
picking up on much of what Alan Pickering and Ron Sandler proposed five months 
ago.”  
The NAPF particularly welcomed proposals for:  
• Greatly simplified tax rules 
• Measures to support flexible retirement 
• Progress on replacement of the Minimum Funding Requirement, and 
• A new, more risk-based, regulatory regime  
 
Ms Farnish added:  
“Having listened, however, the government must now act. One outstanding question 
mark hangs over the timing of these changes. The tax proposals invo lve a four month 
consultation process – which means no change for at least another 16 months. For 
many pension schemes and their members, this would be like getting your Christmas 
presents on Boxing Day.  
“We are also disappointed that the government has failed to take this opportunity to 
simplify the state pension system, which is too complex and too reliant on means 
testing. “  
The NAPF will play a full role in the consultation process, and will continue to press 
for further reforms aimed at boosting incentives for pension saving, and removing 
complexity. 
  
Trade-unions  
 
Since the 1980s pension reforms by the Conservative government until the late 1990s, 
the Trade Unions Congress (TUC)'s position on pensions centred around two 
demands: to restore the indexing of the Basic State Pension by average earnings 
(rather than prices), and to restore the full value of SERPS. Along with the Labour 
Party, the TUC was opposed to the introduction of private/personal pensions by the 
Conservative government (Bonoli 2000: 78-79). But, along with the 1997 (New) 
Labour Party, the TUC and some unions took up Stakeholder Pensions with some 
enthusiasm---but without giving up the demand for the serious uprating of the Basic 
State Pension. 
 
Relations between the (New) Labour government and the trade unions have been no 
less tense than during previous Labour administrations, with the difference that New 
Labour has been set upon distancing itself from the trade unions. By early 2000, the 
TUC was restive over a number of issues (e.g. minimum wage; workers’ consultation 
rights; union recognition) - and then outraged by the 75 pence increase in the Basic 
State Pension in the 2000 budget. Thereafter, the TUC has been contesting the 
government, starting with the showdown at the (July) 2000 National Policy Forum in 
which the TUC compelled the government to agree to a debate on pensions’ policy, 
with particular reference to ‘pensioner poverty’, at the September 2000 party 
conference. The Chancellor signalled a significant increase in the Basic State Pension 
(in the 2001 budget) but refused to concede indexing to ‘average earnings, or 
inflation, whichever is greater’.  
 
Trade unions have failed to win indexing of the Basic State Pension by average 
earnings. They seem to have little influence on the government.  However, S2P, 
Stakeholder Pensions, the Minimum Income Guarantee, and the Pensioner Credit, all 
focus on improving the pension position of the lower paid, which meets some of the 
union demands. Whether the policies result from union pressure or from Gordon 
Brown’s mission to raise the living standards of the poorest is an open question. 3  
 
TUC’s response to the government’s Green Paper is overall positive. However, their 
campaign for the creation of compulsory occupational schemes has failed. They 
mainly see the document as a step in the right direction (Press Release TUC 17/12-
2002). 
 
IPPR 
 
IPPR has been the most critical of the Green Paper. They saw it as a missed 
opportunity to deliver a new pensions settlement that would command widespread 
support. In particular, they were disappointed that the government failed to raise the 
Basic State Pension to the level of the MIG and to phase out both the Pension Credit 
and SERPS/State Second Pension. IPPR described the Pension Credit and 
SERPS/State Second Pension as redundant (IPPR Press Release, 17/12-2002).  
 
1.13 Assessments of New Labour’s reforms 
 
The problems faced by the British government are the direct consequences of a hybrid 
pension system, which tries to reconcile nature contradictory policy objectives. The 
Labour government wants to provide a decent living standard to the poorest4 whilst it 
consistently increases the level of private funded provision in order to balance the 
budget. In this respect, the Pension Credit reform has been portrayed as a radical 
change, since it is the first time ever that future pensioners are rewarded for saving up 
                                                 
3 The general strategy of improving the lot of the poorest is very much Brown’s policy, supported by 
Alistair Darling, which is imposed on the government by virtue of the Chancellor’s commanding 
position. 
 
4  The need to provide targeted state support is one of  New Labour’s mantra in social policy. But New 
Labour is also keen to avoid the politically damaging issue of rising pensioners poverty (hence the 
MIG and the pension credit). 
for old age (Meagher, 2002 and DSS, 2001b). However, one should keep in mind that 
the Pension Credit is part of an overall reliance on the same type of policy instruments 
under New Labour in all social policy areas, e.g. means-test and tax credits. These tax 
credits bear the imprint of Gordon Brown. They also reflect the Treasury’s reluctance 
to increase taxes and spending on pensions. Indeed, the government praises its own 
record on the sustainability front:  
“ The level of private funded provision is high by international standards and the 
value of UK pensions asset is similar relative to GDP to that of the US… The 
projections set out in HM Treasury recent report on the long-term sustainability of 
public finances shows that public spending on pensions is likely to remain relatively 
stable over the next five decades – fluctuating around 5% of the GDP, in marked 
contrast to other European countries.” (DWP, 2002:3).   
 
 
1.14 Conclusion 
 
In sum, old age is increasingly being portrayed as a personal and private matter by the 
British government. This is a no longer seen as a direct governmental responsibility. 
Instead, individuals have to been persuaded that they should save enough for old age 
or else…work as long as they can. The fact that the termination of SERPS happened 
in April 2002, at a particularly critical time for future pensioners further illustrates the 
shift away from state to individual responsibility. Quite simply, there is no longer a 
social contract for the traditional risk of old age in the British system, even for middle 
class earners. As in other areas of social policy, the British government has not 
developed a coherent strategy in relation to pensions. Instead, it has issued a series of 
consultation documents and set up two independent reviews, with a third now 
underway, in order to address the problem of employer’s behaviour in the context of 
the generalisation of DC pension schemes. The government is thus responding in a 
reactive way and seems to have lost its capacity to steer the direction of the debate. 
The main problem lies in the government’s difficulty in regulating the pension 
industry and in imposing rules on reluctant employers, or in providing high- level state 
pensions, which would limit the scope for the private market. However, the recent 
Pension Directive from the EU may force the government to intervene due to its focus 
on securing employees pension rights.  
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2 UK POLICY MAP: LONG-TERM CARE 
 
Section I 
The 1990 NHS and Community Care Act 
 
Trine P. Larsen, Anne Daguerre and Peter Taylor-Gooby  
 
2.1 Introduction 
In 1989, the Conservative government introduced the 1990 National Health Service 
(NHS) and Community Care Act as a response to various critiques of the British long-
term care system. The reform concentrated mainly on reducing public expenditure on 
long-term care by transferring the responsibility of long-term care from institutional 
care towards community care i.e. Local Authorities (LA) and the independent sector. 
Thus the reform was accepted by the Parliament in 1990. It was first implemented 
fully in 1993. Ministers’ feared that the costs of the reform would push up the poll tax 
beyond politically acceptable bounds. (The Independent 10/1-1993). This paper 
analyses the policy processes prior to the 1990 National Health Service (NHS) and 
Community Care Act. The paper is divided into four sections. The first section 
describes briefly the British long-term care system as well as the British tradition of 
social care policies. The second section indicates the key problems that lead to the 
reform. The third section concentrates on the policy processes behind the drafting of 
the reform by presenting the key actors and their position as well as the main issues of 
the debate within the different committees. It thus focuses on the period of 1989-
1990. The last section presents the main characteristics of the reform and assesses the 
impact of the reform on older people.  
 
2.2 Background information 
 
2.2.1 The British Long-term Care System  
The British long-term care system is based on the principle that meeting the caring 
needs of older people is primarily a responsibility of the individual and the family 
rather than a responsibility of the state. Long-term care services are therefore means-
tested instead of being free of charge. Only older people living at the minimum 
income guarantee level have usually free access to care. (Baldock, Forthcoming, p. 
120f.). It is the state that plays a key role in funding and providing health and social 
care. It has delegated the service planning and resource allocation to the two 
institutions NHS and the LA, which are placed under the Department of Health. The 
two institutions operates within fixed, cash limited budget, which means that their 
resources are supply-determined and not a function of demand. The British long-term 
care system differs, therefore, from the rest of Europe. (Alaszewski, Billings, 
Baldock, Twigg & Coxon 2002). The NHS and LA’s responsibilities are divided 
according to blurred definitions of health- and social care. The NHS is responsible for 
health care, which is free of charge for the individual and covers medical treatments, 
few geriatric hospital units and limited nursing care at the local level. Social care 
refers to different social services such as institutional care in nursing homes or 
residential homes, adult day care centres, assistant devices, domicilary services e.g. 
nursing care, personal assistance that includes lifting, washing, bathing, food delivery, 
rehabilitation service. The LA is responsible for this type of care but has partly 
contracted out the provision of the services to voluntary- and private organisations. In 
contrast to health care, social care is provided on the grounds of assessments of 
individual caring needs and is means-tested. (Shinoda-Tagawa & Koike 2002 and 
Lewis 2001).  
 
2.2.2 The Traditions of British Social Care Policies    
Findings from earlier research indicate that social care, has been a neglected policy 
area. Mainly because long-term care is seen as a family matter. It is a silent issue and 
has a low political profile. (Baldock forthcoming p. 11, Hall, Land, Parker & Webb, 
1975, Means, Morbey & Smith 2002). As a result the important decisions of long-
term care are often products of settlements between different sections within the 
bureaucracy, particularly between the Treasury and the spending ministries such as 
the Ministry of Social Security and the Ministry of Health. (Baldock, forthcoming, p. 
133) This indicates that social care is dominated by a top-down approach, where the 
public rarely has any influence on the different outcomes. 
 
2.3 Key Problems Prior to the 1990 NHS and Community Care Act 
Similar to the rest of Europe, the British long-term care system faces new problems 
due to an ageing population and a decline of informal carers. The latter is primarily 
caused by the fact that more women enter the labour market and the number of single, 
separated and widowed elderly are increasing. However, these new problems did not 
figure on the political agenda prior to the reform. This may seem surprising, since 
particularly, the ageing population was one of the main arguments behind the 1988 
pension reform. The problems debated were instead the disputes between the NHS 
and LA concerning the division of caring responsibilities, the problem of geographical 
diversities in care services and rising public expenditure. Rising costs were portrayed 
as the key issues. 
  
2.3.1  The Disputes between the NHS and the LA  
The blurred definitions of health- and social care have led to conflicts between the 
NHS and the LA since the late 1940’s. (Lewis 2001) Each partner accuses the other 
one for not providing the care needed for older people in order to achieve an effective 
long-term care system. An example is when older people are discharged from 
hospital. The NHS then blames the LA for creating an ineffective system, since they 
do not provide the care services that enable the NHS discharge the patients. In 
contrast, the LA blames the NHS for discharging older people too early and thereby 
overloading the LA’s care system. Lack of adequate funding has forced the 
institutions to minimise their responsibilities, which is along with the lack of ring-
fenced governmental social care grants some of the reasons for the disputes. It has 
enabled local politicians to prioritise other policy areas to the detriments of social 
care. (Lewis 2001 and Means, Morbey & Smith  2002).  
 
2.3.2 The Geographical Diversities in the Provision of Long-term Care Services  
Social care provisions vary widely in the UK due to the lack of national homogeneity. 
Consequently, users have difficulties in knowing which entitlements are available 
and/or eligible. (Baldock forthcomming, Lewis 2001, Means, Morbey & Smith, 2002, 
Audit Commission 1986 and Griffith report 1988). The geographical diversities are 
caused by the inconsistencies in civil servants’ assessment criteria and the complexity 
and disorganisation of the long-term care system. The latter is a result of the disputes 
between the NHS and the LA, the scarce resources provided for long-term care and 
the lack of ring-fenced funding. (Baldock forthcomming, Lewis 2001, Means, Morbey 
& Smith, 2002, Audit Commission 1986 and Griffith report 1988). 
  
2.3.3 The Rising Public Expenditure  
Rising expenditure appeared as a new problem prior to the reform. Within a decade 
the national expenses of social security escalated from 10 million pounds in 1980 to 
2.6 Billion pounds in 1992. (Lewis & Glennester 1996 and Means, Morbey & Smith 
2002). The rising costs were caused by changes in the rules under which people could 
claim board and lodging expenses in November 1980. If they lived with a landlady, in 
residential- or nursing homes older people could now qualify for public funding if 
they did not possess any capital. Most elderly could if they possessed any savings 
hand them over to their children before becoming officially poor and then claim the 
public support. (Lewis & Glennester 1996). The LA also acknowledged the 
possibility of sending older people to private and voluntary residential- and nursing 
homes in order to avoid funding the fees themselves. (Means, Morbey & Smith, 
2002). Whether the politicians and officials were aware of this loophole in 1980 is 
uncertain. (Lewis & Glennester 1996). 
 
 
2.4 The Key Actors and Their Positions  
A variety of actors were involved in the policy-process prior to the 1990 NHS and 
Community Care Act. In order to classify them and their positions, this section is 
divided into two subsections. The first subsection focuses on the Audit Commission’s 
1986 report, Sir Roy Griffith’s report 1988 and the 1989 White Paper. These 
documents provided the information on the current problems within the British long-
term care system and proposed solutions, which can be seen as the starting point of 
the political debates in 1989-90. The second subsection analyses the position of the 
key actors within the political debate between 1989-90. These were the Conservative 
government, the Labour Party, the Treasury, the Department of Health (DoH), the 
Department of Social Security (DoSS), the NHS, the Institute of Health Services 
Management and representatives of LA and the independent sector as well as trade 
unions. 
 
2.4.1 The Audit Commission, Sir Roy Griffith’s report 1988 and the 1989 
White Paper 
 
The Audit Commission Report 1986 
The Audit Commission is an independent agency responsible for overseeing LA 
spending. In 1986, it produced the report “Making a Reality of Community Care”. 
The Audit Commission report can be seen as the trigger for the reform. It highlighted 
not only the key problems with the British long-term care system. It also pinpointed 
the inconsistency within the Conservative government’s policies. The rising public 
expenditure conflicted with the Conservative’s policy goal of wanting people to live 
in own residence as long as possible. Instead of enabling people to live at home, the 
government encouraged indirectly older people to enter residential- and nursing 
homes, since they funded their fees via the existing rules of social security benefits. 
The escalating social security expenditure also conflicted with the Conservative 
government’s overall policy goal of minimising the role of the state (Audit 
Commission 1986, Lewis & Glennester (1996) and Means, Morbey & Smith 2002). 
In addition, to its criticism, the Audit commission also proposed various solutions to 
the problems and recommended a review of the British long-term care system. The 
latter was realised by the report by Sir Roy Griffith. 
 
Sir Roy Griffith’s Report 1988: Community Care: Agenda for Action 
In December 1986, Sir Roy Griffith, Margaret Thatcher’s trusted advisor on the NHS, 
was appointed to undertake an overview of the community care policy. The main 
purpose was to solve the problem with the escalating social security expenditure. 
(Griffith 1988). Sir Griffith was in favour of transforming the existing long-term care 
system into a market-based system, where the LA contracted out the provider role to 
the independent sector and the elderly were seen as consumers. Sir Griffiths’ more 
specific recommendations were: 
 
· To appoint a Minister of State to be responsible for community care   
· To develop the mixed economy approach, where the LA is the leading agency 
for organising, designing and purchasing care facilities from the independent 
sector instead of being the main provider. Older people should be seen as 
consumers that can choose freely between the different care facilities.  
· The LA should within the resources available develop local care plans with 
health authorities, voluntary- and private organisations, carers and clients  
· Introduction of means-test for caring fees in order to reduce public 
expenditure.  
· Provide LA with enough resources to match their caring responsibilities, 
although, annual limits should be given for each LA in order to prevent 
increases in the social security expenditure. Ring-fenced grants should be 
provided to ensure adequate management systems and that local objectives are 
in line with government policy. (Griffith 1988, Means, Morbey & Smith 
2002). 
· The Griffith report was also one of the starting points of the political debate 
that took place between 1989 and 1990.  
 
The 1989 White Paper: “Caring for People-Community care in the Next Decade 
and Beyond” 
The 1989 White Paper was produced within Whitehall and was highly inspired by the 
recommendations made by Griffith. This is, particularly, obvious when focusing on 
the six key objectives of the White Paper: 
· To promote the development of domiciliary-, day- and respite care to enable 
people to live in their own homes.   
· To provide support for carers  
· To make proper assessment of need and good case management the 
cornerstone of high quality care 
· To promote a flourishing independent sector and quality services 
· To clarify the responsibilities of agencies notably the NHS and LA  
· To secure better value for taxpayers’ money by introducing a new funding 
structure for social care. (White Paper 1989 and Lewis & Glennester 1996). 
 
By comparing the recommendations by Griffith and the six key objectives of the 
White Paper, it appears that Griffith’s two recommendations to appoint a Minister of 
community care and to provide ring-fenced grants were not present in the 1989 White 
Paper. This indicates that other actors have been more influential in the process of 
producing the White Paper than Griffith. The recommendations of the White Paper 
can be seen as the centre of the political debate, since it was the Government’s 
framework for the 1990 NHS and Community Care Act. 
 
2.4.2 The Key Actors  
The Main Political Parties 
The Conservatives’ policies of long-term care were based on the assumption that 
meeting the caring needs of older people was a priva te matter. They wanted to reduce 
the role of the state and to introduce a more market-based system. To reduce the 
public expenditure by introducing means-testing and encouraging domiciliary care 
were, though, their main goals. Moreover, the Conservatives supported to a large 
extent the recommendations made by Griffith. However, the Conservatives did not 
incorporate ring-fenced grant to the LA and the appointment of a Minister of 
Community Care in the White Paper, because this would have led to an expansion of 
the public sector. (Social Services Committee, 17/7-1990, p. 4) In contrast to the 
Conservatives, the Labour party was more in favour of a universal long-term care 
system, where care services were made free of charge. In addition, their policies 
focused more on improving the existing care services and equalising the geographical 
diversities than cutting public expenses. The Labour party also argued for increasing 
the involvement of older people and carers in the development of local care plans. 
(Standing Committee E 9/1-1990, Standing Committee E 11/1-1990, Standing 
Committee E 15/2-1990, Standing committee E 22/2-1990). 
 
The Treasury, The DoH and DoSS 
The main concern of the Treasury was to reduce the national expenses on social 
care. Although, the Treasury welcomed most of Griffith’s recommendations, it 
wanted to avoid ring-fenced grant to the LA. Their main concern was that LA would 
expect a certain amount of money and would claim that the available resources were 
not enough. This would put the Treasury under pressure and restrict their policy 
manoeuvres. In contrast, the DoH and DoSS favoured ring-fenced grant to the LA 
since it would force the LA to use money on social care and thereby improve the 
services. (Social Services Committee, 17/7-1990, p.4). The DoH and the DoSS also 
supported the recommendations made by Griffith and the White Paper. However, 
the DoSS was sceptical of the introduction of means-test and the limited support 
given to older people under the new system.  (Social Services Committee, 17/7-
1990, p. 13f) 
 
NHS, Representatives of LA and IHSM 
The NHS’s main goal was to transfer social care responsibilities to the LA whereby 
the NHS could focus only on medical treatment. The NHS was, therefore, in favour of 
the proposed solutions in the 1989 White Paper, since it proposed that social care 
should be a responsibility of the LA. (Social Services Committee, 17/7-1990, p.250).  
 
The representatives for the LA such as the Association of Metropolitan Authorities 
(AMA), the Association of District Councils (ADC), the Association of County 
Councils (ACC) and the Association of Directors of Social Services (ADSS) argued 
for an increase in the social care funding for the LA to ensure the objectives of the 
White Paper. Moreover, these organisations also advocated for an increase in income 
support for informal carers and for improving social care services. The LA 
representatives were also in favour of ring-fenced grants. (Social Services Committee, 
17/7-1990, p. 166f, 177f, p. 238f and p. 89).  
 
Similar to the Labour Party, the IHSM supported a universal system with free charge 
of services. Moreover, they also welcomed the ideas of ring-fenced finances to the LA 
and the mixed economy approach launched in the White Paper. However, they feared 
that the independent sector’s services would be more expensive than the public and 
that they would not provide better services than the public sector. (Social Services 
Committee, 17/7-1990, p. 102) 
 
Representatives of the Independent Sector  
The voluntary care organisations representing older people were Age Concern, the 
National Federation of Housing Associations (NFHA) and Carers National 
Association (CNA). These organisations advocated for better care services and an 
increase in income support for carers due to several older people already had financial 
crisis. They also welcomed the idea of ring fencing the financial resources delegated 
to the LA. (Social Services Committee, 17/7-1990, p. 196, p. 53ff, and p. 146). Age 
Concern was also critical of the fact that social care no longer was a duty but a 
responsibility of the LA. Age Concern also objected to funding people living in 
private or voluntary homes differently from those living in public residential homes. 
(Social Services Committee, 17/7-1990, p. 53ff).  
 
Trade Unions  
The Royal College of Nursing (RCN) and The Royal College of Psychiatrists (RCP) 
and the British Association of Social Workers (BASW) also advocated for ring-
fenced grants. These organisations, particularly BASW, were also worried about the 
financial pressure faced by the LA if adequate resources did not follow LA’s new 
responsibilities. Both RCN and RCP argued that elderly living in own homes should 
be entitled to the same services as older people living in nursing- and residential 
homes, since the number of informal carers were declining. Moreover, the RCN, RCP 
and BASW also advocated for a more transparent system and higher income support 
in order to make the new system efficient. (Social Services Committee 17/7-1990, p. 
22, p.40 and p. 68.)  
  
 
2.5 A Decision-Making process dominated by the Conservative 
Government 
The political debates prior to the 1990 NHS and Community Care Act took place 
within the Standing Committee of the Parliament and the Social Services Committee. 
The latter consisted only of Conservative MP’s, the Spending Ministries and various 
interest organisations.  
 
2.5.1 The Political Debate in the Standing Committee 
The political debates within the Standing Committee were characterised by the 
Conservative’s tendency to ignore the requests from the opposition. Most of the 
debates could not be characterised as actual policy-making, since the debates mainly 
consisted of the opposition asking questions to the responsible ministers who then 
reject or ignore the proposed questions. (Standing Committee E 9/1-1990, Standing 
Committee E 11/1-1990, Standing Committee E 15/2-1990, Standing committee E 
22/2-1990). Moreover, responsible Conservative MP’s rarely appeared in the 
Standing Committee during the meetings. The Labour representative Ms Harriet 
Harman complained about the attendance of Conservative members. During a 
meeting she expressed: 
 
“We are discussing the essential matter of people’s access to local services. Dos my 
hon. Friend agree that it is scandalous that 10 Conservative members, more than half 
of the Government members of the Committee, are not here to listen to the 
arguments” (Standing Committee E, 18/1-1990, p. 233) 
 
As a result of the Conservatives attitude, the Labour Party could not resist the 
proposed solutions in the White Paper. Their recommendations tended to be either 
rejected or ignored by the Government. Their lack of influence is also evident when 
focusing on the final draft of the reform. The requests from the Labour party are 
hardly present. (see section four). This indicates that the Conservative government 
had the possibility to ignore the opposition without fear of the reform being rejected 
in the Parliament. The Conservative Party can, therefore, be seen as the most 
influential party in the Standing Committee due to their political power.  
 
2.5.2 The Political Debate within the Social Services Committee 
The political debates within the Social Services Committee indicate that only limited 
changes were made to the Conservative’s 1989 White Paper. Only a three-year ring-
fenced grant given to the LA was added to the White Paper under the title of 
transitional grant. (Lewis & Glennester 1996). This grant was incorporated in the final 
draft of the reform thus the Treasury and the Conservative government opposed ring-
fenced grants. In order to enforce the grant, the Secretary of State used her power 
available in the 1988 Local Government Act. In the Act she is able to give a specific 
grant to the LA for a designated purpose. (Lewis & Glennester 1996). This indicates 
that the ring-fenced grant only was incorporated in the reform due the power of the 
Secretary of State and not as a result of political debates where most key actors 
advocated for ring-fenced grants. This seems also to be supported by the fact that the 
grant only was available for a three-year period, whereas most of the key actors 
wanted a long-term agreement. The impact of the independent sector, the trade 
unions, the representative for LA, the DoH and DoSS was, therefore, limited. This is 
also supported by the fact that most of their requests were not reflected in the final 
reform.  
 
Although most key actors advocated for better care services and financial support, the 
reform maintained the insufficient level of financial support and social care services, 
which were introduced in the 1989 White Paper (Social Services Committee, 17/7-
1990, p. 145.). The LA’s representatives did not achieve an increase in social care 
funding to cover the extra expenses of implementing the reform. The IHMC 
suggestion of making social care services free of charge was also ignored. This 
applies as well to the RCN, RCP and Age concern’s request of equalising the 
opportunities for social care among older people living in own residences, public and 
private residential and nursing homes. In contrast, the NHS achieved their long-
lasting goal of transferring care responsibilities to the LA. The Treasury also achieved 
its policy goal of reducing public expenditure whereas their target of preventing ring-
fenced grants only was partly achieved. The Conservative government got most of 
their goals proposed in the White Paper presented in the final draft of the reform. 
However, they had to accept the three-year ring-fenced grant that was imposed by the 
Secretary of State.  
 
In sum, only the Conservative Government ’s proposals got through the parliamentary 
process. Therefore, the most influential actor in the political debates is the 
Conservative government. This is also supported by the fact that the Conservatives 
were able to prevent a reform in the mid 1980’s. This was mainly due to the 
Conservative Leader Margaret Thatcher. By contrast to the Conservatives and the 
Treasury, Margaret Thatcher denied cutting social security expenditure. Her main 
concern was that by removing the social security benefits small private homes, which 
were family businesses she approved, would go bankrupt, since their raison ‘d’être 
were social security benefits. (Lewis & Glennester 1996). The reform could only 
proceed if this problem was solved. Griffith’s suggestion of transferring financial 
resources to private providers rather than LA convinced Margaret Thatcher and, 
thereby, enabled the reform to proceed. Margaret Thatcher was, therefore, one of the 
veto points in the political process. 
 
2.6 The 1990 NHS and Community Care Act 
By comparing the 1990 NHS and Community Care Act with the reports of the Audit 
Commission and Sir Roy Griffith as well as the White Paper 1989, it appears that the 
reform is highly inspired by the recommendations of these documents. The 
recommendations in 1989 White Paper are practically identical with the legislation of 
the Act. The reform constitutes of four main concepts. One of the main concepts was 
the introduction of the Purchaser-Provider split, which is based on a mixed economy 
of care. The responsibility of long-term care was transferred from the institutional 
level to community care, where the LA became the leading agency. The LA had to 
contract out the provision of services to the independent sector such as the family, the 
voluntary and the private organisations. Through these organisations the individual 
could as a consumer purchase and choose between the different care services provided 
by the public and the independent sector. In order to make an incentive for the LA to 
contract out residential care and social care services, the reform also introduced a 
Residential Allowance only given to older people placed in an independent sector 
home. Along these lines, a three-year ring-fenced grant was also introduced to ensure 
that social care services reached the dependant. The grant was restricted by a 85% 
clause that compels the LA to allocate these funds to the independent sector. (White 
Paper 1989, Lewis & Glennester 1996, Means, Morbey & Smith 2002, Twigg 1999). 
The second main concept was the introduction of case managers, where one single 
social worker takes the responsibility of assessing, commissioning and co-ordinating 
and sometimes purchasing support for the client. The third main concept was the 
introduction of means-test and assessments of the individuals need for long-term care 
in order to ensure that people received the right care and that financial help only was 
given to people in need. (Twigg 1999) The fourth main concept was the Social 
Services Departments obligation to produce community care plans that reviewed the 
needs of their areas sat their objectives and priorities as well as discussed these issues 
locally with both citizens, voluntary- and private organisations. (Lewis & Glennester 
1996).  
 
In sum, the overall goals of the reform were to reduce the public expenditure and 
clarify the responsibility of social care. Improvements of social care services played 
only a minor role. 
 
2.6.1 The Path dependency of the Reform   
    The initiatives indicate partly a new approach to the management of long-term care. 
Firstly, the introduction of social planning was seen as radical, since it was the first 
time this had been made a statutory requirement. Secondly, the introduction of the 
internal market approach was also a new phenomenon. Prior to the reform, the long-
term care system had been based more on the central governmental management and 
the public service provisions than a mixed economy approach, where the independent 
sector was in focus. Thirdly, to provide free social care was no longer a mandatory for 
LA. These changes indicate that the 1990 NHS and Community Care Act cannot be 
seen as path-dependent.  
 
2.6.2 The Implications of the 1990 NHS and Community Care Act 
The introduction of user charge for older people made the reform very unpopular and 
was seen as one of the main implications of the reform. The population saw it not 
only as the state had broken its social commitment to provide long-term care. They 
were also unsatisfied with the fact that elderly, who entered private or voluntary 
nursing homes, now had to use their own savings and assets to pay for their stay. 
Particularly, house-owners, where the houses were owner-co-occupied were exposed 
to the negative effects of means-test. Families were often forced to sell the house in 
order to free capital to pay for the older persons caring fees. (Means, Morbey & 
Smith, 2002). The reform also pressured the LA’s budgets, since the LA did not have 
capital to invest in social care facilities. Additionally, the LA’s obligation to consult 
carers and users did not work in practice due to the difficulties in reaching the target 
groups.  (Parker 2002). Moreover, the conflicts between the NHS and the LA 
continued to be a problem. (Lewis 2001).  
 
2.7 Conclusion 
The Agenda of the reform was dominated by the Conservatives. The opposition 
played a very limited role and their voice was hardly heard by the government. The 
community care legislation was a “Byzantine debate” with little if any involvement of 
a wider audience. The political structure of Whitehall and the majoritarian system 
account for the weakness of the opposition and the absence of veto points. . 
 
 
Section II 
 
The 1999 Royal Commission and the 2001 Health and Social 
Care Act 
 
2.8 Introduction 
Both the establishment of the Royal Commission on long-term care and the 2001 
Health and Social Care Act can be seen as the New Labour government’s responses to 
the unresolved and the newly created problems of the 1990 NHS and Community 
Care Act. In December 1997 the New Labour government established the Royal 
Commission. Its main purpose was to examine the options for a sustainable system of 
funding long-term care for elderly. In March 1999, the Royal Commission published 
its recommendations, but the New Labour government did not respond to the 
recommendations until July 2000. The 2001 Health and Social Care Act was part of 
the New Labour’s replies to the Royal Commission. The draft of the reform 
concentrated on abolishing the Community Health Councils, enabling health 
secretaries to disclose patient information, which is in the public interest, transferring 
the responsibility of health and social care services to new care trusts and it offers free 
nursing care for elderly. (Guardian 12/3-2001 and NHS Plan 2000). In the following, 
this paper will describe and analyse the policy processes prior to the reform. The 
paper is divided into five sections. The first section examines the background for the 
establishment of the Royal Commission. The second section indicates the key 
problems that lead to the reform. The third section analyses the policy processes 
behind the reform by presenting the key actors and their position as well as the main 
issues of the political debate. It thus focuses on the period of 1999- 2001. The fourth 
section presents the main characteristics of the reform and assesses its impact on older 
people. The fifth section consists of the current political debate of long-term care.  
 
2.9 Background Information – Pressure for Change 
Since the 1990 National Health Service (NHS) and Community Care Act, long-term 
care has become an increasingly controversial issue. This is mainly due to the 1990 
NHS and Community Care Act’s transfer of the caring responsibility from the NHS 
towards the Local Authorities (LA) and the introduction of means test. Firstly, as 
social services after the reform included personal care services such as bathing and 
personal hygiene, the distinction between the NHS and the LA’s responsibilities had 
become more blurred. It was often difficult to assess whether such services were the 
responsibility of the NHS or the LA, since personal care can be defined as both 
health- and social care. Therefore, instead of solving the conflicts between the NHS 
and the LA, which had been the rationale of 1990 NHS and Community Care Act, the 
reform added new conflict issues. (Henwood 1999).  
 
Secondly, the blurred boundaries also had significant implications for the users, since 
social care services were chargeable whereas health services were free of charge. 
Together with the transfer of the caring responsibility towards the LA, this meant a 
shift of cost from the NHS to the LA and, thereby, the individual. Older people with 
an income and capital assets of more than 16.000 pounds including the value of their 
house had to pay the full cost of any home fees or services.  Elderly having assets 
between 16.000-10.000 pounds were charged against means-test, whereas older 
people with assets less than 10.000 pounds received free care services. With average 
residential and nursing care home fees of more than £240 or £340 per week, 
respectively, savings and assets could rapidly be exhausted. (Henwood 1999). 
Consequently, this created negative reactions in the public who perceived it as a 
double betrayal. Many people saw it as the state had broken its social commitment to 
provide long-term care, since older people, who, previously, would have received free 
care services, were now obliged to pay for them due to the introduction of means-test. 
(Health Committee 1995-1996, Means, Morbey & Smith, 2002). Moreover, the 
inclusion of people’s homes in the assessment of care was seen as unfair. Particularly, 
because the previous Conservative government had promoted home ownership and 
the possibility of cascading it down to generations as a right of citizenship since the 
early 1980’s. Being obliged to sell their houses to receive care undermined this vision 
and was seen as a betrayal. (Henwood 1999).  
 
This growing discontent among home owning electorates through the 1990’s, the lack 
of the Conservative government’s intervention in this area, the New Labour’s pledge 
in their election manifesto to establish a Royal Commission that examined a fair 
system for funding long-term care, and the 1997 election result created the immediate 
background to the establishment of the Royal Commission. (New Labour, 1997 and 
Henwood, 1999). The Royal Commission was set up in December 1997 as an 
independent organisation and was chaired by Sir Stewart Sutherland. Within 12 
months, the Commission had to report to the government about the short- and the 
long-term options for a sustainable funding system of long-term care for elderly and 
the costs of such a system in regard to the individual and the public funds. (Royal 
Commission, 1999). The Royal Commission’s report can be seen as the starting point 
of the political debate prior to the 2001 Health and Social Care Reform. It diagnosed 
the key problems within the current system and proposed various solutions, which 
triggered the political debate prior to the 2001 Health and Social care Act. The Royal 
Commission’s diagnosis of the key problems is presented in the following.  
 
2.10 The Key Problems acknowledged by the Royal Commission 
The Royal Commission acknowledged several problems within the current long-term 
care system, which they classified within five categories. However, the Royal 
Commission did not see the demographic “time bomb” as a key problem, although, it 
recognised that the number of elderly above 85 would increase dramatically. Its main 
arguments were that the UK already had lived through a period with an ageing 
population earlier this century and that higher productivity would make it possible to 
support a higher ratio of non-working people, even though, their caring needs might 
increased. In addition, the Royal Commission also announced that the availability of 
informal care would remain unchanged in the future and was, therefore, not a 
problem. (Royal Commission 1999). The key problems the Royal Commission 
recognised were instead grounded on problems within the current system. 
 
2.10.1 The Confusion of NHS and LA caring Responsibilities 
A key problem with the current system was its complexity since it caused confusion 
and the feeling of helplessness among the users. The blurred division of the NHS and 
the LA’s responsibilities of providing health and social services mainly cause the 
complexities and confusion. Often the Health Service seemed to abnegate its 
responsibility for care and force people to rely on their own resources. The 
insufficient service deliveries were mainly due to LA’s less centrally controllable (and 
more locally variable) system of finance, which produced variations in the 
implementation of the funding system. (Royal Commission 1999) 
 
2.10.2 The Fairness of the Current System 
Another key problem was the communication gap between Government and citizens 
when it came to the funding of long-term care. This lack of information had caused 
uncertainty and bitterness by large numbers of people and lack of preparedness of 
many. (Royal Commission 1999). As a result, large numbers of people perceived the 
current system as unfair and feel that the state had betrayed them. Mainly, because the 
system did not live up to their expectations. They believed they had paid into a system 
through the National Insurance Scheme and were, therefore, entitled to have their 
caring needs covered by the state for free. However, instead of free services, older 
people had to pay for such services themselves out of their savings and assets due to 
means-test. Therefore, old people felt they were penalised for saving up. (Royal 
Commission 1999). This belief of unfairness and betrayal is also seen in more recent 
research findings where old people express the injustice of the current system due to 
them having to pay for care while others who have not contributed to the society 
receive free services. In some cases old people even denied to pay for such services 
whereby the families had to take over the caring responsibility. (Henwood 1999 & 
Larsen, Baldock & Hadlow, forthcoming). Another aspect highlighted by the Royal 
Commission is that the LA do not monitor an individual’s assets whereby many 
elderly continued to pay full charges, even though, they were entitled to state support. 
This also contributed to the unfairness of the system. (Royal Commission 1999). In 
addition, the Royal Commission also emphasised the aspect of unfair treatment in the 
current system when it comes to paying for care services. In contrast to people 
needing acute care such as treatment for cancer, people suffering from Alzheimer or 
dementia would have to pay for their care services thus both diseases are caused by 
bad health and not because people are old. This was mainly a result from the unclear 
definitions of health and social care. Moreover, the Royal Commission also 
emphasised the lack of support to carers. (Royal Commission 1999). 
 
2.10.3 Maximum Choice, Dignity and Independence 
A main problem was the lack of national homogeneity in the provision of long-term 
care services. In some areas domiciliary services were free, but not in others. 
Moreover, the levels of services also varied dramatically across the UK. Therefore, 
instead of having a free choice as intended in the 1990 NHS and Community care Act, 
the consumer’s choice depended on what was offered locally and the state of the LA 
budget. As a result, the Commission concluded that under these circumstances there 
was an element of lottery when securing the most appropriate care for the individual. 
Another problem was as well that the current system had in-built financial incentives 
such as the Residential Allowances. This encouraged the LA to push people into 
residential care earlier than necessary instead of focusing on the individual’s needs. 
Thereby, the LA compromised the individual’s dignity and independence on the 
expense of financial incentives, since the two concepts meant avoiding resident ial 
care unless it was absolutely necessary. Moreover, the various schemes people had to 
complete to receive assistance were also complex and militated against both their 
choice and dignity. (The Royal Commission 1999& Henwood 1999). 
 
2.10.4 Security, sustainability and adaptability  
The Royal Commission also perceived the lack of sense of security for older people as 
problem. The funding system did not meet the caring needs of the individual and the 
procedures of complaint were too complex. Several elderly were, therefore, anxious 
about their future. Often admissions to residential and nursing homes were arranged at 
times of crisis such as following hospital admission. In such situations the current 
system failed to give sufficient time to consider the best caring options available to 
the individual and thereby maximising the scope for rehabilitation and recovery. 
(Royal Commission 1999 & Henwood 1999). Not only did this make the older person 
feel insecure, but it also questioned the sustainability of the system. Moreover, the 
current system provided in many cases no incentive for developing alternative care 
facilities in the private sector, since this would mean withdrawing sums from current 
patterns of provision in which the LA were locked with contracts and their own 
provision of care. (Royal Commission 1999). This indicates that the current system 
were relatively inflexible and not capable of adapting to peoples’ needs. 
 
2.10.5 Best Value and Quality 
The current system is dominated by little definable relationship between quality and 
cost.  An insurance that the individuals obtain the best value and quality services 
within the system, as a whole is questionable. Irrespective of appropriateness and best 
value for the individual the current system is clearly biased towards residential care 
due to its in-built financial incentives and lack of general standards.  These are 
primarily a result of inadequate financial resources given to the LA to cover the extent 
of need. (Royal Commission 1999). 
 
In sum, the Royal Commission concluded that the current system was failing and they 
recommended a major restructuring. By comparing the key problems with the 
problems prior to the 1990 NHS and Community Care Act it is seen that the conflict 
between the NHS and the LA still remain unresolved despite the reforms attempts to 
clarify their responsibilities. The geographical diversities in the service provisions, the 
complexity of the system and variation in the assessment criteria also continued to be 
key problems. Therefore, the former Conservative government only managed to 
reduce the rising public expenditure with the 1990 NHS and Community Care Act. 
However, this intervention created, as illustrated above, new problems such as the 
perverse incentive of sending people to residential home earlier than necessary, an 
unfair system and lack of quality services.  
 
2.11 The Key Actors and their Position 
During the period of 1999-2001 nine key actors can be identified: The Labour Party, 
especially the secretary of Health Alan Milburn and the Minister of Health John 
Denham, the Conservative Party, The National Assemblies of Scotland and Wales, the 
Treasury, the Department of Health, more precisely, the Select Committee on Health 
of the House of Common, the NHS and the LA. The Royal Commission, the minority 
group of the Royal Commission and centre-left think tanks such as the Institute for 
Public Policy Research also produced influential research. By contrast trade unions 
such as RCN, RCP and BASW, the Liberal Democratic Party and the SPAIN group 
especially Age Concern and Help the Aged only had a limited impact on the drafting 
of the reform.  
 
 
The Royal Commission 
As part of its report, the Royal Commission proposed 24 recommendations for 
change.5 However, the Royal Commission had two main recommendations. Firstly, 
long-term care should be divided between living costs, housing costs and personal 
care. Personal care such as bathing and personal hygiene should be free of charge and 
financed through the general taxation. The rest should be co-financed according to 
means, where the levels of means-test should be changed from the existing £16.000 to 
£60.000. Secondly, a National Care Commission should be established to monitor 
trends such as demography, spending, ensure transparency and accountability in the 
system as well as representing consumers’ interests and set national benchmarks, now 
and in the future. (Royal Commission 1999). These recommendations were based on 
the Royal Commission research, which had indicated that action had to be taken, 
mainly due to the complexity of the current system, the lack of clarity as to what 
people can expect, the unfair mechanisms of state support and the perverse incentive 
of sending older people to residential homes when this is not needed.  
 
The Minority Group of the Royal Commission 
The Minority group of the Royal Commission consisted of the two members Joel 
Joffe, an Human rights Lawyer and the Director and former Deputy Chairman of 
Allied Dunbar Assurance, and David Lipsey, the political editor of the Economist and 
a Public Interest director. They added a note of dissent to the report of the Royal 
Commission. They rejected the Majority report’s recommendation of free personal 
care financed through general taxation. Their main argument was that free personal 
care for those qualified for it would add to the demand for such care and thereby 
impose an additional cost on top of that driven by demographics. Therefore, free 
personal care would increase public expenditure from £1.1 billion to at least £6 
billions in 2051. Moreover, Joffe and Lipsey argued that free personal care would not 
necessarily increase spending on services for elderly by a single penny. Mainly 
because the incentive for people to provide for themselves privately would be 
weakened and free personal care would only transfer income and wealth to the rich 
and their families at the expense of those most in need. In addition, such service 
provisions would also pre-empt the resources of the state in this area, whereby 
funding for the Royal Commission’s other proposals would not be available. (Royal 
Commission 1999). Joffe and Lipsey recommended, therefore, six proposals, which 
differed, modified or added to the recommendations in main report. These were: 
· The Government should allocate additional funding, which we provisionally 
estimate at not less than £300m, to deal with the present shortfall of funding 
for nursing homes, residential homes and community care, including more 
money for home care, prevention and rehabilitation.  
· The Government should alleviate the worst effects of means testing by:  
                                                 
5 The 24 Recommendations can be seen in appendix 1  
a. Putting in place a loans scheme, which would virtually guarantee that no 
elderly person would be forced to sell their home to pay for care while they 
retain equity in it.  
b. Raising the ceiling for the means-test from £16,000 to £30,000 and reduce the 
tariff income for by those with assets over £10,000 from £1 a week per £250 
of capital to £1 a week per £500 of capital.  
c. Removing the anomaly that those in nursing homes pay for their nursing care, 
whereas those in hospitals, residential homes and in their own homes do not, 
following a detailed examination of the cost and other ramifications of such a 
change.  
d. (David Lipsey only) Considering further whether to make personal care free to 
those who have been in residential or nursing care for four years or more.  
· To promote a more genuine public-private partnership in the provision of care, 
the Government should review the tax treatment of pensions, with a view to 
removing obstacles to the use of pensions to fund policies providing for long-
term care, and make the sale of long-term care insurance policies subject to 
conduct of business regulation.   
· The Government should provide an extra £300m (inclusive of the funds 
already committed under "Caring for Carers") annually to provide help to 
carers, focusing the extra money on those with the greatest needs, and on 
poorer elderly people and carers.  
· The various options for specific savings set out above, including the phasing 
out of uncompetitive Local Authority direct provision of residential and 
nursing care, measures to tackle bed-blocking and the introduction of a 
universal charging regime and means-test for home care, should be 
energetically pursued  
· The Government should devote further effort to promoting joint health and 
social service budgets for care; and consider in due course whether these 
budgets should be invested in its proposed primary health groups  
 
The Political Parties 
In the NHS plan, which is the Labour government’s response to the Royal 
Commission’s recommendations and the White Paper for future reforms, the Labour 
government proposed various solutions to the current problems and thereby declared 
their position. 6 The Labour government followed roughly the position of the minority 
report, which indicates that Lipsey and Joffe, the authors of the minority report, were 
more influential than those behind the majority report.The government agreed that the 
ageing population was problem, since it meant a rise in public expenditure. Therefore, 
instead of supporting free personal care financed through general taxation, the 
government followed the recommendation by the minority report of only making 
nursing care free of charge. Their main argument was that their proposals would 
improve standards of care and fair access to services more efficiently and that free 
personal care would be too expensive for the public budget. The government also 
supported the argument that the NHS was under funded and that a National Care 
                                                 
6 ‘See appendix 1 for Government’s response to the Royal Commission’s recommendations 
Commission should be established to secure general standards. Part of the 
government’s suggestions were also the abolition of the existing CHC’s and creation 
of new institutions for representing patients as well as giving health secretaries 
authorities to disclose patient information, which is in the public interest. (The NHS 
Plan 2000) Moreover, new Care Trusts should also be established to ensure better 
collaboration between the NHS and social services whereby bed blocking could be 
prevented. (The NHS Plan 2000). In sum, New Labour’s position towards reforms 
was no longer a universal long-term care system with free services. Instead, Labour 
followed the former Conservative government’s political line, which favoured means 
test and delegation of the care responsibility to the individual. However, New 
Labour’s political line was at a more generous level than its predecessor. The New 
Labour Party is, thereby, compromising with their promises of their 1997 Conference 
speech made by Tony Blair, where he argues the value of peoples home should be 
excluded when assessing means. (Guardian, 1/3-2000).  
 
Although the Conservative Party supported the government’s rejection of free 
personal care, they opposed to the abolition of the CHC’s, the extension of the health 
secretaries’ power to use, for instance, confidential patient information for research. 
Their main argument was that these changes would create mistrusted in the current 
system due to the vague definition of public interest and that doctors might have to 
choose between breaking their pledge of patient confidentiality and breaking the law. 
Moreover, the Conservative Party blamed the government for being control freaks 
instead of democratic. (Guardian 22/3-2001) 
 
The Liberal Democratic Party supported free personal care. Their main arguments 
were that the current system was unfair and morally wrong, since old people had to 
sell their homes to receive care and that people with Alzheimer’s and Dementia had to 
pay for care where other patients receive such services for free. (Press Release of 
Liberal Democrats 2000). 
 
National Assemblies 
The Scottish national assembly favoured the recommendation of making both nursing 
care and personal care free of Charge. The Welsh assembly advocated for allocating a 
flat rate payment for older people needing registered nursing care. (Help the Aged 
2002).  
 
The Select Committee on Health   
The Select Committee on Health supported overall the recommendations made by the 
Royal Commission.  The Committee also advocated for integrating formally health 
and social care services. Moreover, they supported the idea of care in the home as the 
most feasible solution, which should be available for individuals as long as possible. 
In relation to this, they also recommended the government to learn from Danish 
experiences of providing long-term care. However, the committee acknowledged that 
for historical and financial reasons it would be impossible to transfer exactly the 
Danish method of onto the UK. Finally, the Committee emphasised that it would be a 
dereliction not to implement the recommendations made by the Royal Commission.  
(Select Committee on Health 1999a) 
 
The NHS & representatives for the LA 
The representative for the LA such as the Association of Directors of Social Services 
and the Local Government Association (LGA) supported the reorganisation of the 
NHS. However, they recommended that the matter of short, medium and long term 
financial planning were reconsidered along with amendments of governance and 
accountability of Care Trusts. Moreover, they also advocated for better services for 
the elderly. (Memorandum by the Association of Directors of Social Services 2001 & 
LGA Briefing 234, 5/30-01). The NHS also favoured free personal care.  
 
 
The SPAIN group, RCN, RCP and BASW 
BASW, RCP, RCN and the SPAIN group supported free personal care, since it 
otherwise would result in unfairness and discrimination. The organisations also 
advocated for a more transparent system, so elderly and their families could make the 
right choices for them. ( Help the Age, March 2001). Moreover, they also declared 
that the definition of social care was unclear and particularly RCN advocated for free 
nursing care to all assessed to be in need. The organisations were also critical towards 
the proposal of making confidential patient information public (RCP 29/1-02) Except 
from this, the organisations supported the proposals launched by the Labour 
government in the 2000 NHS-plan. (RCN, 13/8-2001, RCP 29/1-2002,  Age Concern 
31/01-02, BASW Briefing1999).  
 
In sum, the different actors had different positions towards the Labour Government ’s 
proposed solutions. In the following the political debates are analysed.  
 
2.12 A political debate dominated by the Labour Government 
The political debates prior to the 2001 Health and Social Care Act took place within 
the Standing Committee of the Parliament and the Health Select Committee of the 
House of Common. However, there were also ongoing debates taking place in the 
media, where several of the key actors pinpointed their views. The different interest 
groups were also invited for a consultation meeting prior to the reform. As a result, 
the public were to some extent better informed about the ongoing political debates 
than during the policy-making process prior to the 1990 NHS and Community Care 
Act.  
 
2.12.1 The Political Debates within the Select Committee on Health  
The political debates within the Select Committee on Health took place on the 11th of 
March 1999. (Select committee on Health (1999c) Almost six months before the 
Government published its responses to the Royal Commission. The participants were 
labour MPs, officials of DoH and Sir Stewart Sutherland (chair of the Commission). 
The purpose of the debates was to enable the Committee to examine the expenditure, 
administration and policy of the Department of Health and associated public bodies. 
(Select Committee on Health, 1999b). Therefore, most of the debates were 
characterised by the different MP’s asking questions to Sir Stewart Sutherland in 
order to clarify different aspects of the Royal Commission’s report. The results of the 
debates were published in the Select Committee on Health’s report “The Long Term 
Care of the Elderly”. The Committees recommendations, which are presented, in 
section 4.5, complied largely with the Royal Commission’s recommendations. This 
indicates that the Royal Commission had an impact on the position of the Select 
Committee. In their response to the Committee’s report, the government supported 
most of the Committees recommendations, except for the proposal of integrating 
health and social care services. (Department of Health, 1999). This indicates that 
although the Select Committee on Health was an influential actor in the political 
game.  
 
2.12.2 The Political Debates within the Standing Committee  
Similar to the political debates within the Standing Committee prior to the 1990 NHS 
and Community Care Act, the New Labour Government also tended to ignore the 
requests from the opposition during the meetings in the Standing Committee. Most of 
the debates consisted mainly of the opposition asking questions to the Minister of 
Health, John Denham, who then rejected or ignored the proposed questions rather 
than actual policy-making. (Standing Committee E 8/1-2001, Standing Committee E 
18/1-2001, Standing Committee E 6/2-2001, Standing committee E 8/2-2001). As a 
result, neither the Liberal Democrats nor the Conservatives could resist the proposed 
solutions in the NHS plan. However, the Conservatives managed to get their request 
about keeping the Community Health Councils (CHC’s) accepted by the Government. 
This was not due to their power in the Parliament, since New Labour had the majority 
of votes in the Parliament. (Labour 419 against the Conservatives 165, Liberal 
Democrats 46) (General Election Result 1997). The change was instead caused by 
Labour backbench rebellions, who refused to support the abolition of CHC’s. The 
government had, therefore, to compromise on this topic in order to ease the bill’s 
passage through the second and third reading. Moreover, the Scottish Executive 
decided to allow free personal care for Scottish elderly and the Welsh Assembly 
introduced a flat rate payment for older people needing registered nursing care, which 
put pressure on the responsible ministers to change track. However, none of these 
changes affected the government’s position and the Bill was passed through 
parliament without any further radical changes. (Guardian 12/3-2001, LGA Briefing 
5/30/01)) This indicates that the New Labour government had the possibility to ignore 
the opposition without fear of the reform being rejected in the Parliament as long as 
they had the support of the other Labour MPs. The Labour Party can, therefore, be 
seen as the most influential actor in the Standing Committee due to their political 
power.  
 
 
2.12.3 The Public Debate in the Media and the 2001 Health and Social Care Act 
Consultation  
The public debate in the Media and the consultation organised by the Department of 
Health in January 2001 indicates as well that the interest groups only had a limited 
influence. Despite most interest organisations repeatedly advocated for free personal 
care financed through the general taxation the government ignored this request. 
(Guardian, 29/7-2000, Guardian 1/1-2000, Guardian 10/1-2001, Alzheimer Scotland, 
30/8-2001,Guardian 23/1-2001, Guardian 26/1-2001, Guardian 26/4-2001, 
Department of Health Consultations ) The government also ignored the criticism put 
forward by various actors about using patients’ medical files for research and the 
establishment of care trusts during both the Consultation meetings and the public 
debates in the media. (Guardian 23/1-2001,) This also supports the argument that the 
Labour Government was the most influential actor.  
 
The analysis indicates that the actual policy-making took place within closed policy 
communities due to the lack of the other political parties, the media and various 
interest groups influence on the agenda.  
 
2.13 The 2001 Health and Social Care Act 
The Act was intended to deliver many of the aspects of the NHS Plan and the 
Governments responses to the Royal Commission’s report that required changes to 
primary legislation. Despite criticism from the opposition, the reform followed largely 
the proposed solutions by the Labour Government. However, Scotland achieved an 
exemption that enables them to provide free personal care and the CHC’s were kept 
although only for a limited period.  The reform constituted of five parts. Part one 
introduced changes to the way the NHS including family health services are run and 
funded in England and Wales. The introduction of more public and patient 
involvement in the NHS was part of this section. Part 2 dealt with pharmaceutical 
services in England and Wales and some aspects of such services in Scotland. Part 
three provided the establishments of care Trusts and the transfer of staff in connection 
with partnership arrangements in order to improve the collaboration between the LA 
and NHS. Part four introduced changes to the funding and provision of long-term care 
in England and Wales. Among these changes was the introduction of free nursing care 
in Wales and England, whereas both nursing care and personal care were made free of 
charge in Scotland. Part five concerned the control of patient information and the 
extension of prescribing rights and various miscellaneous and supplementary 
provisions. (The 2001 Health and Social Care Act). 
 
The overall goal of the reform was to improve the current system by introducing free 
nursing care and promote better services on long-term care as well as making the 
current system more transparent. (The NHS Plan 2000) 
 
2.13.1 The Path dependency of the Reform   
    Although, the Labour Government similar to its predecessor emphasised that 
meeting the caring needs of an individual is primarily the responsibility of the family, 
the individual and the community, the reform indicated radical changes. Firstly, the 
reform introduced a fundamental restructuring of the NHS and the central 
governmental control was extended. (Department of Health (2001). The introductions 
of ring fenced grants, the rights to publish patient information are examples of this. 
Secondly, the new initiatives of modernising social services and the emphasis on 
improving the quality of services for carers and users are also radical compared with 
the former Conservative government. Most notably is the fairness of meeting the 
adequate needs of the individual and equity. The introduction of free nursing care is 
an example of the latter. These changes indicate that the 2001 Health and Social Care 
Act only to a certain extent is path-dependent, since New Labour follow the same 
general framework as its predecessor e.g. the desire to contain spending and use of 
means-test. 
 
2.13.2 The Implications  
The implications of the reform are still too early to assess, since the reform first will 
come fully into force in October 2003. The free nursing care is estimated to benefit 
around 35.000 people per year.  
 
2.14 Recent Political Debates 
Both before and after the implementation of the Act, the government launched a 
variety of new reforms. Among them are the establishment of the National Care 
Commission and the series of National Service Framework such as the 2001 
framework for older people, which intend to establish more coherent service standards 
within the health and social care sector.. (White Paper on Modernising Social Services 
2000). The initiatives from April 2001 concerning disregarding of the value of homes 
for up to a three months period and changed the limits for means test is also one of the 
government’s attempt to improve the current system. New Labour changed the means 
test limits from £ 16.000 to 18.000, but it is still far from the limits suggested by the 
Majority and the Minority group of the Royal Commission (60.000 and 30.000 
pounds respectively) (The NHS Plan 2000). New Labour also introduced the 1999 
national strategy for carers, which intends to support carers in various ways (1999 
National Carers Strategy).  Some of the more recent attempts for change is the 
secretary of Health Alan Milburn’s plans of tackling the democratic deficit within the 
health service by giving elected members of the public wide-ranging control over the 
new foundation hospitals. (Guardian 14/11-2001) The government has also 
announced a new contract for hospital consultants. The government has tried via 
different incentives to encourage hospital consultants to work more for the NHS than 
their own practices in order to reduce the waiting lists at the hospitals. However, 
consultants in England and Wales rejected the deal whereas consultants in Northern 
Ireland and Scotland have supported it. (Guardian 1/11-02). What the result is going 
to be is still uncertain. The most recent attempt by New Labour is the introduction of 
the delayed discharge bill, which has been subject to massive criticism both within the 
parliament, the House of Lords and the outside world due the finning of the LAs in 
case of delayed discharges. Another interesting aspect within the political debate is 
that the Conservative Party has recently changed their position regarding the inclusion 
of peoples’ homes in means tests. Instead of supporting their previous policy, the 
Conservative leader Ian Duncan reported recently at the Conservatives’ Party 
Conference that such assets should be excluded from the assessments (Guardian 
10/10-02). This is a new discourse of Conservatives and new policies might follow 
this new direction.   
 
2.15 Conclusion  
The New Labour government dominated the political debate of the reform. The 
influence of the opposition was limited. They only managed to change the agenda due 
to backbenchers rebellion within the New Labour Party. Similar to the policy process 
prior to the 1990 NHS and Community Care Act, the political structure of Whitehall 
and the majoritarian system account for the weakness of the opposition and the 
absence of veto points within the debate. However, a new direction seems to appear. 
In contrast to former reforms, the 2001 Health and Social Care Act was debated more 
intensively within the media and thereby the public. Moreover, the Queens Speech in 
the opening of Parliament 2002 also indicated that social care for elderly would be a 
topic that will attract more political attention in the future. (Guardian 13/11-2002) The 
Liberal Democratic Party’s inclusion of long-term care in their Manifesto also 
indicates a time of change.   
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Appendix 1: The Government’s Responses to the Royal Commissions 
recommendations on Long-term Care  
 
Table: The Government’s responses to the Royal Commission’s 
recommendations  
The Royal Commissions 
Recommendations   
 
 
Government Response 
1. Personal care should be available after an 
assessment, according to need and paid for 
from general taxation 
 
The Government is making an unprecedented 
new investment over the next three years in 
improving older people's services making 
them more responsive and more fairly 
funded. The Government's investment would 
fund the cost of the Royal Commission's 
recommendation. However the Government, 
does not believe that making personal care 
universally free is the best use of these 
resources. 
 
2. The Government should establish a 
National Care Commission  
 
Broadly accepted in December 1999 with the 
announcement of a single National Care 
Standards Commission, now enshrined in the 
Care Standards Act 2000 
3. The Government should ascertain precisely 
how much money goes to supporting older 
people in residential settings and in people's 
homes 
 
Any division between acute and long term 
health care spending would be somewhat 
arbitrary. The Government believes that it is 
more important to get the right incentives in 
the system to promote older people's 
independence and to provide care closer to 
home. This is what the proposals in the NHS 
Plan on intermediate care and associated 
services aim to do. 
 
4. The value of the home should be 
disregarded for up to three months after 
admission to care in a residential setting and 
the opportunity for rehabilitation should be 
included as an integral and initial part of any 
care assessment 
 
Both elements accepted in this response. 
Value of home will be disregarded for up to 3 
months from April 2001, benefiting around 
30,000 people a year.  
 
 
 
5. Measures should be taken to bring about 
increased efficiency and improved quality in 
the system, including a more client centred 
approach 
 
Accepted. Proposals in the NHS Plan for 
personal care plans and closer working 
between health and social care. Quality 
Strategy for Social Care to be published next 
month. 
 
6. Other changes to the current system, such Many suggestions accepted – free NHS 
as changing the limits of the means-test, or 
making nursing care free (subsumed by 
recommendation 1) 
 
nursing care from October 2001, benefiting 
around 35,000 people. Capital limits to be 
uprated to restore 1996 value from April 
2001, benefiting around 20,000 people.  
 
 
 
7. The resources which underpin the 
Residential Allowance in Income Support 
should be transferred to local authorities 
 
Accepted – will be implemented from April 
2002.  
 
 
 
8. The Government should consider whether 
"preserved rights" payments in social security 
should be brought within the post 1993 
system of community care funding 
 
Accepted – will be implemented from April 
2002, benefiting up to 65,000 people.  
 
 
 
9. The Government's proposals on pooled 
budgets should be taken further, with pooled 
budgets being implemented nationally 
 
Broadly accepted in the NHS Plan, with 
proposals for strengthening partnerships 
between health and social care. 
 
10. Budgets for aids and adaptations should 
be included in and accessible from a single 
budget pool and Local Authorities 
should be enabled to make loans for aids 
and adaptations for individuals with 
housing assets  
 
Accepted in principle for aids and minor 
adaptations. Potential for use of pooled 
budgets using Health Act 1999 flexibilities 
 
11. The system for making direct payments 
should be extended to the over 65s  
 
 
 
Accepted and implemented from February 
2000. 
12. Further research on the cost effectiveness 
of rehabilitation and the development of a 
national strategy on rehabilitation  
 
 
 
Accepted in principle. Research is being 
undertaken on cost effectiveness of 
rehabilitation, and the National Beds Inquiry 
and NHS Plan proposals on intermediate care 
provide the context for developing a national 
framework for rehabilitation. 
13 and 23. Further longitudinal research is 
required to track the process and outcomes of 
preventive interventions  
 
  
 
 
 
Accepted in principle. Work with the Office 
for National Statistics on proposal for a 
longitudinal survey of ageing. 
14. It should be a priority for Government to 
improve cultural awareness in services 
 
Accepted as important in the NHS Plan and 
offered to black and ethnic minority elders  
 
 
 
 
will be addressed as part of the National 
Service Framework for Older People. 
Reinforced for social care by project work 
with individual councils and inspection 
reports. 
15. The role of advocacy should be developed 
locally, with backing from central 
Government  
 
Accepted as important. Chapter 10 of the 
NHS Plan sets out our new proposals for 
patient advocacy services in the NHS. 
 
16. There should to be wider consultation on 
the provision of aids and adaptations and on 
what should be free and subject to a charge 
 
 
 
  
 
 
Broadly accepted. New powers in Care 
Standards Act 2000 will enable statutory 
guidance to cover fairer charging 
arrangements for services provided at home. 
17. Better services should be offered to those 
people who currently have a carer  
 
 
 
Accepted in principle. Additional resources 
for carers' services provided in the Spending 
Review. 
18. The Government should consider a 
national carer support package  
 
Accepted, as above, and through the 
Government's National Carers' Strategy 
19. The National Care Commission should be 
made responsible for making and publishing 
projections about the overall cost of long-
term care  
 
Agreed that this is an important task, but it  is not 
central government's responsibility. The Department of 
Health has commissioned the Personal Social Services 
Research Unit at the LSE to make projections 
20. The Government should set up a national 
survey to provide reliable data to monitor 
trends in health expectancy  
 
The Government agrees that a national 
longitudinal data may be valuable for 
measuring trends in health expectancy. 
Approval for this is being considered 
21. The Government should conduct a 
scrutiny of the shift in resources between 
various sectors since the early 1980s  
 
The Government believes joint 
commissioning has developed significantly 
and that the new partnership arrangements 
(including pooled budgets) in the Health Act 
1999 are also changing the allocation of 
resources and therefore remove the need for 
such scrutiny 
22. A more transparent grant and expenditure 
allocation system should be established  
 
 
 
Accepted. The Government intends to issue a 
Green Paper in September 2000 on improving 
the way funding is allocated to local 
government. 
24. The Government should consider how the 
provision of care according to need would 
This recommendation relates to 
recommendation 1 
relate to Independent Living Fund provision 
for the personal care needs of younger 
disabled people  
 
 Source: The NHS Plan 2000 
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3.1 Introduction: 
The National Childcare Strategy, the Sure Start Programmes and the Integrated Child 
Credit can be seen as the New Labour government’s responses to its predecessor’s 
lack of initiatives to improve women’s access to the labour market. In 1998, the New 
Labour government announced the National Childcare Strategy, the Sure Start 
Programmes and the Childcare Tax Credit as part of their work package. Their overall 
purpose was to support families, particularly women’s return to the labour market and 
children’s ability to attend day-care by introducing various means. The Childcare 
Strategy concentrated on improving the supply and quality of formal childcare 
provisions. (National Childcare Strategy, 1998) The Sure Starts Programmes aimed at 
tackling child poverty, social exclusion and increasing the number of working 
families in disadvantaged areas. (Sure Start 2002) The Childcare Tax Credit’s (CTC's) 
objective was to help working families with the costs of childcare. In 2002 New 
Labour improved the CTC by introducing the Integrated Child Credit (ICC) as part of 
the “2002 Tax Credit Act”. The ICC concentrated on combining the existing income-
related means of support to families into one single seamless system, redirecting the 
payment to the main carer, increasing the limits for means-test, giving continuing 
support ir respective of adults work status and creating a fairer system for both one- 
and dual earners. (HM Treasury & Inland Revenue, 2002). In the following, this paper 
will mainly describe and analyse the policy processes prior to the ICC reform. The 
paper is divided into five sections. The first section examines the background for the 
new reforms of New Labour and gives a brief outline of the National Childcare 
Strategy, the CTC and the Sure Start Programmes. The second section indicates the 
key problems that lead to the ICC. The third section analyses the policy processes 
behind the ICC reform by presenting the key actors and their position as well as the 
main issues of the political debate. It, thus, focuses on the period of 2000- 2002. The 
fourth section presents the main characteristics of the reform and assesses its impact 
on women’s access to the labour market. The fifth section consists of the current 
political debate of women and the labour market. 
 
3.2 Background information- Pressure for change 
Lack of affordable and adequate childcare facilities became an increasingly 
controversial issue during the 1990’s. Mainly because, users of childcare demanded 
more services, sessions and flexible opening hours and that inadequate childcare and 
high day-care prices were seen as the main barriers for women’s particular lone 
mothers’, return to the labour market. (Land & Lewis 1998). The economic activity of 
British women with children were relatively low 54% in the mid 1990’s. (Land & 
Lewis 1998). Particularly, the numbers of unemployed lone mothers were relatively 
high 58% compared with Finland 35% and France 15%. (Kilkey and Bradshaw 1999). 
The main reason was that among the group of working mothers, only those with 
higher incomes could afford to pay the high day care prices. Poorer women had to 
rely on family and friends. Therefore, mothers,’ particular lone mothers, unable to 
rely on such sources were often unlikely to take up paid employment. (Land & Lewis 
1998). Although, the former Conservative government acknowledged these problems, 
little was done to solve them. They saw childcare primarily as a private matter and 
expected the market, family and friends to meet the childcare needs of the women. 
This discourse is also reflected in the child care initiatives launched by the 
Conservative government.  
 
3.2.1 The Conservative Government’s Initiatives to Improve Women’s access 
to the Labour Market 
In 1991, the Conservative government launched the initiative Employers for 
Childcare. With the initiative the government hoped that employers would offer 
childcare facilities and would, thereby meet the demands from the public. However, 
the initiative failed and was quietly closed down in 1998. Only 4% of the employers, 
mainly councils and the NHS, offered childcare services and the number of available 
places were limited.  (Guardian 11/10-200).  A means-tested childcare supplement for 
the low wage earners and the nursery voucher schemes based on an internal market 
approach were also part of the Conservatives strategy of encouraging mothe rs, 
particular lone mother’s, to take up paid employment and improving the existing day-
care facilities. However, these initiatives were also unsuccessful. Relatively few 
claimants benefited from the means-tested childcare supplement introduced in 1994. 
The poorest already received the maximum family credit and most of them relied on 
day-care provided by family or friends, which was excluded from criteria for 
childcare support. (Land & Lewis 1998) Instead of creating better and more extensive 
nursery school provisions, the nursery voucher schemes from 1996 had the opposite 
effect. Although, parents of four-year old children were giving vouchers worth 1.100 
pounds a year to towards the cost of private, voluntary or public nursery education, 
many still chose public schools. Firstly, most parents valued continuity of care very 
high and welcomed, therefore, the opportunity to send their children to the same 
school in which they would attend primary school. Secondly, some head teachers 
informed parents that their child would stand better chances for being accepted at the 
particular primary and secondary school if their child attended the schools nursery. 
Consequently, the service level decreased since the Local Authority schools recruited 
more four-year olds than their capacity. They were fearful of loosing funding and 
numbers of children to the independent sector. Moreover, the nursery provisions did 
often not expand, since the public, private and voluntary nursery schools did not have 
the capacity to do so. (Land & Lewis 1998 and Guardian 13/3-1997). Therefore, the 
Conservative government did not manage to respond to the demands of the public 
concerning improved and affordable care services.  
 
This growing discontent among users of childcare concerning the high day-care prices 
and inadequate services, the fiasco of the nursery voucher schemes, the New Labour's 
election manifesto pledge to meet the childcare needs of the electorates and the 1997 
election result created the immediate background for better childcare services. 
Coming into office in 1997, New Labour abolished both the nursery voucher schemes 
and the existing childcare supplement and replaced them with their own National 
Childcare Strategy, the Sure Start Programmes and the Child Tax Credit. Their main 
intention was not only to improve the current childcare facilities. They also wanted to 
encourage more women, particularly lone mothers to return to the labour market, 
since it would benefit the national economy by reducing the number of families 
relying on means-tested benefits. Particularly, Harriet Harman, the former minister of 
Education and Employment, had advocated strongly for these initiatives. She had 
managed to convince a sceptical Chancellor of Exchequer Gordon Brown that 
inadequate childcare facilities were the main reason for the low level of British 
working mothers compared with Scandinavia and France. This enabled the initiatives 
for improving the provision of childcare facilities. (Guardian 11/10-2000). This 
indicates that Gordon Brown in particular can be seen as a veto point within the New 
Labour government. Without his content, reforms seldom become a reality due to the 
power of the Treasury. In the following, the National Childcare Strategy, the CTC and 
the Sure Start Programmes are presented. 
 
3.2.2 The National Childcare Strategy & the Childcare Tax Credit 
The National Childcare Strategy was launched by the publication of the Green Paper: 
Meeting the Childcare Challenge in 1998. Its main purpose was and still is to support 
families particularly women’s access to the labour market by increasing the supply 
and quality of formal childcare provisions. (National Childcare Strategy, 1998). Over 
a five-year period the national childcare strategy intends, to make out of school 
childcare available in every community, which needs it, in order to help one million 
children over a five-year period. It consists of four key objectives such as quality of 
childcare, affordability of childcare, accessibility of childcare and partnership for the 
age group 0-14 and 0-16 for children with special needs.  
 
The means used to achieve the objectives vary. Firstly, higher quality and standards 
are achieved by the Office for Standards in Education inspections of childcare 
facilities funded by the government and by training employees as professional carers. 
Secondly, free part-time nursery education is made available for all eligible four-year 
olds and funding has been given to expand free care for three-year olds. To eliminate 
geographical diversities in the service provision funding is given to establish childcare 
facilities in areas where such services are lacking. Thirdly, childcare is made 
affordable by the introduction of the Childcare Tax Credit, which is an integrated part 
of the Working Family Tax Credit (WFTC) announced in the 1998 budget and 
implemented in 2001. (For information about the WFTC see chapter on poverty and 
social exclusion) The Childcare Tax Credit is a means-tested tax credit, which is 
eligible for parents, who work more than 16 hours a week and rely on registered 
childcare e.g. nurseries, playgroups and registered childminders. The credit covers 
70% of the childcare costs up to a maximum of 100 pounds for families with one 
child and 150 pounds for families with two or more children. (Budget 1998, National 
Childcare Strategy 1998 and Rake 2001) Fourthly, the development of partnerships is 
regulated by the local authorities through programmes such as Early Years 
Development and Childcare Partnerships. Their main purpose is to identify potential 
demands for childcare, outline childcare plans and establish and run information 
centres about childcare facilities. (The National Childcare Strategy 1998). In sum, 
New Labour therefore, follows the political line of its predecessor although the 
government’s policies are more generous. Means-test and funding given to support 
the development of private and voluntary day-care facilities instead of direct benefits 
payments and establishment of public nurseries seems to support this.  
 
3.2.3 The Sure Start Programmes 
Building on the National Childcare strategy and the Government’s various reforms to 
support children and their families, the Sure Start Programmes were launched in July 
1998. The programmes are one of the cornerstones of the Government's aim to tackle 
child poverty and social exclusion.  In 1998/99 about 24% of British children lived in 
households whose incomes were below 60% of the national average (Office of 
National Statistics 2001) Sure Start aims to improve the health and well being of 
families and young children under four, particularly those living in disadvantaged 
areas. (Sure Start 2002) The first 260 programmes are already in operation and at least 
500 programmes are expected to be set up by 2004. Parts of the programmes 
concentrate on increasing the number of working families in deprived areas by 
creating pathways out of poverty and improving childcare facilities for 0-3 year olds. 
(Sure Start 2002). In relation to this, a recent EU Survey illustrates that it is primarily 
women that tend to live in workless households. (Franco & Winqvist 15/2002) 
 
The Sure Start programmes are implemented through community based programmes, 
where local areas are required to form a partnerships of statutory and voluntary 
agencies, parents and other members of the community to plan and manage the 
programmes.  (Sure Start 2002 & Sure Start- National Evaluation 2000).  
 
3.3 The Improvements by the National Childcare Strategy, the CTC and 
Sure Start 
The National Childcare Strategy, the Child Care Tax Credit and the Sure Starts 
Programmes have improved the childcare situation of many families and enabled 
more women to re-enter the labour market. Recent surveys indicate that there in 2001 
is one childcare place for every 6.9 children under eight compared with one in nine in 
1997. (Guardian 3/3-2001). In addition, the economic activity for women has raised 
from 66.8% in 1992 to 84.1% in 1999. (Daguerre, 2002). Despite these 
improvements, a large percentage of lone mothers are still unemployed and the most 
common working pattern for dual earne rs was the male full-time/female part-time 
worker in 2000. (Franco & Winqvist 9/2002). Moreover, a recent survey indicates that 
24% of non-working mothers are prevented from taking up employment, since they 
have to look after their children and one out of 10 mothers working part-time would 
like to work, if childcare was made more affordable (Guardian 26/3-2002). This 
indicates that the British childcare system still have problems meeting the care needs 
of working families. In the following, the key problems prior to the Integrated Child 
Tax Credit reform will be presented.   
 
3.4 The Key Problems Prior to the Integrated Child Credit Reform 
Various surveys funded by the government and the EU indicates various problems 
within the current childcare system. These problems have been classified into the 
following three categories. 
  
3.4.1 Affordable Childcare & The Child Care Tax Credit 
The British childcare fees are among the highest in Europe. A typical nursery place 
for a four-year old costs €135 (€203) per week in inner London and £90 (€137) per 
week in the Northeast of the country. In sum this is more than £4700 per year, which 
is more than an average family with two children uses on food. (Guardian 3/2-2001). 
This geographical variation in the childcare prices is not acknowledged by the 
Childcare Tax Credit. All claimants are means-tested against the same criteria no 
matter where they live. Therefore, there is an element of lottery regarding childcare 
prices, where parents living in London and the Southeast benefit less from the tax 
credit due to the ceilings of the CTC. (Guardian 3/2-2001). Moreover, the 70% 
ceilings of the CTC along with the high day care prices and low wages of lone 
mothers was also seen as a major impediment to women's paid employment. Often the 
high childcare costs and the low wages meant that most of the salary went to pay for 
the fees. The incentive for taking up paid employment, thereby, disappeared. (Rake 
2001 & Guardian 26/3-2002). Moreover, single mother's lost their social security 
network when entering the labour market. The LA would no longer help them to force 
absent fathers' to pay their child supplement. Therefore, it would be more 
disadvantaged if single mother’s applied for work. (Hadlow & Baldock 2001).  
 
The current criteria of the CTC have also had a negative impact on women's ability to 
find new jobs when made redundant. Claimants often have had to give up their 
childcare place in case of redundancy, since they lost their entitlements to the credit 
and could, therefore, not pay the fees. The criteria for the Childcare Tax Credit also 
prevented a large group of families to benefit from the tax credit. The credit does not 
include informal care and people working less than 16 hours per week. Therefore, 
graduates wishing to retrain after having children saw it as an impediment that they 
could not claim the credit due to the 16 hours rule. (Guardian 5/12-2000 and Hadlow 
& Baldock, 2001). Another side effect of the ICC was also that the work incentive of 
families without children became relatively poor compared with families with 
children. Families with children would be nearly £50 better off per week while 
working while unemployed families without children returning to the labour market 
only had a surplus of £20 per week. (Treasury 29/11-2001). Moreover, the means-
tested threshold also contained an unfair aspect towards families with only one earner. 
A one-earner family where the income was £40.000 p.a. was not entitled to the CTC 
whereas a dual-earner family, where both parents each earned £30.000 would receive 
full credit. (Conservative, 21/2-2001). 
 
3.4.2 Information gap, Inflexibility & Geographical Diversities of Childcare 
Provisions  
An information gap was also seen as a major problem with the CTC. Although, the 
National Childcare Strategy had established information centres about various 
entitlements, a large majority of lone parents entitled to the credit did not claim it. 
They were often not aware of the existence of the benefit. In relation to this, the 
complexity of current system often worsened the awareness of the different 
supplements. (LITRG 2000). The inflexibility of the opening hours of the day-care 
facilities was also seen as a barrier for women to take up employment. Most day-care 
facilities opens at 8.45 p.m. and closes at 5.10 am. Therefore, childcare facilities are 
not available for shift- and weekend working parents such as cleaning ladies, cashiers 
and bus drivers. (Hadlow and Baldock 2001, Larsen, Baldock and Hadlow, 
forthcoming) A main problem is also the lack of national homogeneity in the 
provision of childcare facilities. A recent survey indicates that Mothers' queue for 
day-care facilities due to insufficient level of facilities. (Chevalier & Viitanen 2002). 
This is particularly seen in rural areas where parents often have to drive miles to bring 
and fetch their children from the day-care facilities. (Hadlow & Baldock, 2001 & 
Larsen, Baldock & Hadlow, forthcoming).  
 
3.4.3 Retraining of Women 
Another problem that appears from the New Labour's different initiatives of getting 
more women into the labour market is that they mainly focus on the provision of 
childcare facilities and not retraining. Although, the New Deal for Lone Parents 
provides training opportunities for single mothers, this remains insufficient to upskill 
this section of the labour force. One of the side effects of the government’s initiatives 
is that retains women, particularly lone mothers, in low paid jobs.  Indeed, lone 
mothers often have low educational skills. Thus, failure to address this problem 
implies that they cannot find employment above the minimum wage and improve 
their living circumstances. Consequently, the government ’s initiatives may, therefore, 
not have the intended effect of getting women and, thereby, children out of poverty. 
(Rake 2001). 
 
In sum, most of the key problems appear as a result of year's neglect of childcare 
provisions and in works benefits. However, the problems seem to be worsened by the 
pressures from the EU. The Lisbon target of raising the employment rate by women 
by 60% and reducing the number of redundant lone mothers by 2010 puts indirectly 
pressure on New Labour. Also the fact that Britain belong to the group of member 
states with the largest percentage of children living in poverty seem to pressure the 
government to intervene. The 2002 Tax Credit Reform including the ICC is an 
example of the New Labour government's initiative to anticipate some of the 
problems connected to the CTC. The positions of the key actors participating in the 
political processes behind the reform are presented below. 
 
3.5 The Key Actors and their Position 
During the period of 1999-2001 seven key actors can be identified: The Labour Party, 
especially Tony Blair and the Chancellor of the Exchequer Gordon Brown, the 
Treasury, the Inland Revenue, the Social Services Select Committee, the CBI and 
Trade Unit Congress (TUC) and the Fawsett society. Think Tanks such as Institute for 
Fiscal Studies and the Women’s Budget Group also produced influential research. By 
contrast, the Liberal Democratic Party and the Conservatives only had a limited 
impact on the drafting of the reform due to them being in opposition. 
 
3.5.1 Political Parties 
The New Labour Government 
In the 1999 budget and the 2001 Inland Revenue consultation paper, New Labour 
proposed various solutions to the current childcare problems and thereby declared 
their position. Inspired by the American, Australian and Canadian tax and benefit 
systems, the Labour Government proposed that the ICC would be a single seamless 
system. The ICC would replace the support currently available through the CTC, the 
Child element of WFTC and the child elements of Income support. The means-tested 
ICC would be paid in addition to the Child Benefit. It is payable to families with 
children, who receive the employment tax credit and work jointly a minimum of 30 
hours per week and those families on in work benefits. The administration of ICC for 
families on work benefits will be transferred from the Benefit Agency to the Inland 
Revenue. Employers will administrate the ICC for families in work. Part of the ICC 
would, therefore, be incorporated in the Employment Tax Credit and not the ICC 
reform. Moreover, the government proposed that supplements would be paid into 
bank accounts in order to insure that all family members have access to the 
supplement. The government also put forward that payments were directed to the 
main carer instead of to the main provider, that the age- limit of ICC would be 16 
years and that the supplement would cover various groupings of children such as 
children placed in care or under hospital treatment. (Inland Revenue, 2001 and Budget 
1999) In sum, the New Labour’s position towards the reforms followed the former 
Conservative government's political lines, although their policies were more generous. 
Similar to its predecessor, New Labour continued to rely on means-test and tax credits 
instead of direct benefits when supporting families in their caring needs.  
 
The Conservatives 
The Conservatives were critical towards the redistributive mechanisms of the new tax 
credit reform including the ICC. In their 2001 Manifesto: “Time for Common sense”, 
they claim "that the task of bringing up children is made much more harder when 
families keep less of what they earn, because the government is taking more. 
(Conservative Party Manifesto, 2001 and Daguerre & Taylor-Gooby 2001). The 
Tories also accused New Labour for attempting to abolish the universal child credit 
by making it means-tested. (Guardian 1/6-2001).  In addition, the Conservatives 
introduced the proposal of a new Married Couple’s Allowance worth up to £1.000 a 
year for families with children 11. One parent could, thereby, choose to stay at home 
or work part-time to look after a child. (Conservatives 31/5-2001). This indicates that 
the Conservatives still see childcare as a private matter. Their 2001 Manifesto seems 
to support this, since it does not contain any state support for childcare and tend only 
to provide a minimum support for families. (Conservative Party Manifesto, 2001 and 
Daguerre & Taylor-Gooby 2001).  
 
Liberal Democrats 
The Liberal Democrats were sceptical towards the ICC. They believed that the reform 
would impose increasing administrative costs for small businesses. According to the 
Liberal Democrats, the ICC would also leave 1.4 million families worse off due to the 
changes of the minimum threshold for the entitlement of the ICC. (Liberal Democrats 
19/11-2001 & Liberal Democrats 23/10-2000). The IFS came to similar estimations, 
since they assessed that around 1.1 million better-off families would loose money by 
the new system (Brewer, Clark, & Myck, 2001).  
 
3.5.2 Ministries and Governmental Departments 
The Treasury & Inland Revenue  
The Treasury and the Inland Revenue supported the introduction of the ICC. They 
also favoured that the Child Benefit administration should sit alongside with the ICC, 
since it would improve delivery and reduce bureaucracy for families with children. 
They also supported the idea of better collaboration between the different professional 
bodies and the Inland Revenue. (Treasury 5/3-2001 and the Inland Revenue, 2001)  
 
Social Security Committee/ Select Committee on Work and Pension  
The Social Security Committee, which later changed to the Select Committee on 
Work and Pension, welcomed overall the introduction of the ICC. However, they 
recommended that the universal Child Benefit should continue to play a substantial 
role in supporting children and should be a separated supplement from the ICC. They 
also recommended that a specific budget for research of families' need for the ICC 
should be established and that the government consulted various professional bodies 
during the policy-making process. Inspired by the Australian and Canadian childcare 
system, the Committee also advocated for one seamless system, where all families 
with children are included and a maximum award of the ICC is given. According to 
the Committee, this along with a better co-operation between the different benefits 
departments and the Inland Revenue would reduce the complexity of the current 
system. The Committee also favoured a no age-related element in the rate of child 
credit per child and that the ICC rate would not distinguish between the first and 
subsequent children. Moreover, they advocated for redirecting the tax credits towards 
the main carer instead of the main provider, where the option of either paying into 
bank accounts or giro cheques should be given. (Social Services Committee, 2001). 
  
3.5.3 Social Partners  
CBI 
The CBI also welcomed the introduction of the new tax credit system as a valuable 
way of incentivising work. They supported the extension of the principle of tax credits 
to employees without children. However, they opposed to the administration of WTC 
through the pay packets, as this would place a substantive administrative burden on 
businesses, particularly small enterprises, which do not have the capacity to cope with 
such administrative burdens. The administrative costs of the system would cost 
employers 220million. Therefore, the CBI recommended that the Inland Revenue 
should administrate the credits. However, if this was seen as impractical, the 
employers, especially smaller enterprise had to receive compensation for the 
administrative costs associated with the implementation of the scheme. (CBI 2000). 
 
TUC 
The TUC broadly supported the 2002 Tax Credit reform and thereby the ICC. Part of 
their key message was to reform the policy on transitions into employment whereby 
the need to disrupt benefit claims was minimised as much as possible during such 
transition. TUC also welcomed the redirection of the delivery mechanisms of the ICC, 
where the payment went directly to the main carer instead of to the main provider. 
According to TUC, this would reverse the WFTC's negative impact on the gender 
gaps within families. In some families, the organiser of childcare may not the same as 
the main provider whereby the support giving may not be directed to where it is 
needed. Moreover, TUC also favoured the incentive to build on to the Universal Child 
benefit instead of making the Child Benefit means-tested. (TUC, 16/11-2001, see the 
section on poverty for more information on Universal Child Benefits) 
 
3.5.4 Think-tanks and Voluntary Organisations  
Women’s Budget Group  
The Women’s Budget Group is an increasingly influential think tank. It brings 
together a unique configuration of women economists and social policy experts from 
academia, voluntary organisations and unions to reflect upon gender implications of 
economic and social policy. In their responses to Social Security Select Committee 
and the Inland Revenue's consultation paper on the ICC, the Women's Budget Group 
supports the main initiatives of the ICC. They recommend that all taxpayers 
contribute to the support of children and that payments for children and childcare are 
paid to the main carer. They also advocate for excluding parent's employment status 
regarding their entitlement to the ICC and that women's financial autonomy should 
were possible be encouraged.  In addition, the Think-tank also favour a separation of 
the ICC and the Employers tax credit, since it otherwise would limit the role of 
childcare to the provision of care whilst parents are working. They are also critical 
towards the payment methods of the ICC, since payments via bank accounts rather 
than giro cheques would enable one partner to obtain the supplement freely within the 
consent of the other partner. (Women's budget groups 2000 and Women's budget 
group 2001).  
 
The Low Income Tax Group of the Chartered Institute of Taxation (LITRG) 
The LITRG also welcomes the ICC, since it successfully would reduce child poverty. 
However, they were critical towards the complexity of the tax credits and advocated 
for clarity and simplification. In their response to the Social Security Committee and 
the Inland Revenue, they also advocate for a broader collaboration between the Inland 
Revenue and professional bodies in order to achieve a more coherent approach 
towards tackling child poverty. (LITRC, 2000 & LITRC, 2001).  
 
The Fawsett Society 
The Fawsett society is one of the leading campaigning organisations for equality 
between men and women in the UK. They supported the introduction of the ICC, but 
were sceptical towards the inclusion of the ICC in the Employers Tax Credit, since it 
would transfer money from women to men. Fawsett Society therefore supported the 
idea of paying the ICC to the main carer. Moreover, they also advocated for annually 
assessment of parents’ entitlement to the ICC and that the entitlement to ICC was 
made independent of parents’ employment situation. (Fawsett Society, 2000). 
 
3.6 A debate dominated by Openness  
The political debates prior to the ICC reform took place within the Social Services 
Select Committee of the House of Common, a public consultation issued by the 
Inland Revenue and the Standing Committee of the Parliament. Due to the public 
consultation and the debates within the media, the political debate prior to the ICC 
reform represented a more democratic policy-making process than previous reforms. 
Various interest groups had the possibility to participate and influence the process-
policy process, since the public consultation promoted an open debate with the 
possibility to change the proposed solutions of New Labour.  
 
3.6.1 The Social Security Committee/ Select Committee  on Work and Pension 
and the Government’s Responses 
The political debates within Social Security Committee took place from the 1st of 
November 2000 to the 17th of January 2001. Almost six months before the 
Government published its draft for public debate on the ICC reform. (Social Security 
Committee, 21/11-2000). The participants were labour MPs, officials from the Social 
Services Department, the Treasury and the Inland Revenue as well as various 
professionals and organisations. The purpose of the debates was to enable the 
Committee to examine the expenditure, administration and policy of the Department 
of Social Security (and any associated public bodies). The Committee first invited 
interested parties to submit written evidence and then decided to take oral evidence 
from academics, think-tanks, officials and interest groups. (Social Services 
Committee 2001). Therefore, the debates were characterised by various professionals 
and organisations giving their view on the government’s draft of the ICC published in 
the 1999 Budget. The Women’s Budget Group, the LITRG and the Fawsett Society 
recommended that the ICC supplement were given to the main carer instead of the 
main provider. Particular, the Women’s Budget Group recommended that options to 
the payment method were given to the main carer. The LITRG recommended that the 
current system was simplified and that collaboration between the involved agencies 
and departments was intensified. These recommendations are reflected in the Social 
Services Committee’s report “Integrated Child Credit”. This indicates that these 
groups were relatively influential. However, the Women’s Budget Group and the 
Fawsett Societies recommendation of separating the ICC and the Working Tax Credit 
was not incorporated in the Committee’s report. This indicates that other actors may 
have been more influential.  
 
In their response to the Committee, the government overall supported the 
Committees’ recommendations outlined in the report on Integrated Child Credit. Most 
of the recommendations by the Committee are also reflected in the Inland Revenue 
consultation paper from the 19th of July 2001. Inviting various professional bodies to 
a public consultation was also one of the main recommendations by the Committee. 
(Select Committee on Work and Pensions, 2001). This indicates that the Social 
Service Committee was an influential actor in the policy-process.  
 
3.6.2 The Public Consultation issued by the Inland Revenue  
On the 19th of July 2001 the Inland Revenue issued the consultation document “new 
Tax Credits- Supporting Families, Making Work Pan and Tackling Poverty” inviting 
comments on the proposals for implementing the new tax credits including the ICC 
from 2003. Responses were requested by October 12th. This open debate can be seen 
as rather radical. Most of the invited actors praised this new discourse of New Labour 
in their responses to the Inland Revenue. (Women’s Budget Group 2001, LITCG 
2001, Fawsett Society 2001). The key issues for consultation were the idea of paying 
the ICC to the main carer instead of main provider, the age of the dependent children 
and the children covered by the ICC. (Inland Revenue 2001). The Inland Revenue 
received 170 responses from various groups and invited several actors for formal and 
informal meetings. Most of respondents welcomed overwhelmingly the proposals set 
out in the consultation paper. However, some respondents questioned parts of the 
reform. Concerning the ICC, some respondents were sceptical towards the calculation 
of working hours when deciding whether parents are qualified for in-work support. 
This aspect the government promised to continue to discuss this with the respondents 
in order to find the most appropriate measures. Despite scepticism from some 
respondents concerning the opportunity of combining working hours, the government 
decided to go along with this approach. Although, some respondent among them the 
Women’s Budget Group and the Fawsett Society requested a separation of the 
Childcare tax Credit from the Employers Tax Credit, the government did not follow 
this. Most respondents agreed with the government that the main purpose of removing 
barriers to work would disappear with such a change. In addition, the government 
promised to continue discussions with employer representatives such as the CBI, to 
simplify the administrative costs of them regulating the part of the ICC given to 
working families. TUC’s and the Social Services Committee’s request of building the 
ICC on top of the Child Credit was also supported by the government and the 
majority of respondents. (Treasury 29/11-2001).  The public consultation indicates 
that the political debate was perceived as more open than previously debates, since 
various interest groups had the possibility to influence and comment on the proposals 
launched by New Labour.  
 
3.6.3 The Standing Committee  
Similar to the political debates prior to the reforms on long-term care, the New 
Labour government tended to ignore the requests from the oppositions during the 
meetings in the Standing Committee between the 15th to the 24th of January 2002. ( 
Standing Committee A, 15/1-2001, Standing Committee A, 17.1-2002, Standing 
Committee A, 24/1-2002). As a result, neither the Liberal Democrats nor the 
Conservatives could resist the proposals published in the Inland Revenue’s 
Consultation Paper. The Conservatives criticism towards the redistributive 
mechanisms of the ICC was along with their proposal for a New Marriage Allowance 
ignored by the government. Gordon Brown also denied the accusation of the Tories 
concerning means-testing the Child Benefit. The Liberal democrats’ request that 
changes had to be made to prevent 1.4 million families losing up to £520 each due the 
thresholds of the ICC was partly ignored by the government. Although, they 
acknowledged that this was a delicate area, the government consciously did not want 
to draw unnecessary attention to the Liberal Democrat’s request, since the estimates 
were not particularly robust. Therefore, the government prevented that up to date 
calculations were circulated among the other MPs by making such calculations 
unavailable. (Guardian 22/11-2002). In sum, the reform was passed through the 
Parliament without any radical changes on the 8th July 2002. This indicates that the 
New Labour government had the possibility to ignore the opposition without fear of 
the reform being rejected in the Parliament. The New Labour can, therefore, be seen 
as the most influential actor in the Standing Committee due to their political power.  
 
In sum the Labour government can be seen as the most influential actor, since they 
had the power to either accept or ignore the requests from the opposition and various 
interest group. However, the public consultations along with remarks from the various 
interest groups in their responses to the government indicate that the actual policy-
making debate was more open than previously debates on childcare. This new 
direction towards open debates could be because childcare and tax credits recently has 
become controversial issues with a high political profile. Lack of information about 
the practical implications and function of the current system could also be a reason for 
the new direction by the government. This seems also to be supported by the political 
debates within the Standing Committee where most of the opposition’s requests were 
ignored.  
 
3.7 The Integrated Child Credit reform 
The Integrated Child Credit reform is part of New Labour 2002 Tax Credit reform, 
which comes into force 2003. The 2002 Tax Credit reform consists of the ICC and a 
Working Tax Credit for working households facing low income including those in 
which an employee is disabled. The two credits are “intended to create a single 
income-related strand of support for families with children, complemented by a single 
strand of support for adults in work.” (Explanatory Notes to Tax Credit Act 2002). 
The 2002 Tax Credit Act sets out the administrative framework for the new credits 
and the conditions of the entitlement to the credits and the elements of them. The 
means-tested ICC draws together all the existing income-related means of support for 
families with children into one payable credit. These means are the child element in 
income support, income –based jobseeker’s allowance, WFTC, DPTC and the CTC. 
The ICC is available to households with at least one child under 16 or 19 if the child 
is under education irrespective of the employment status of the family. The credit 
consists of a basic family element and an element in respect of each child or young 
person. The latter element will be higher in case of disabled children. (Explanatory 
Notes to Tax Credit Act 2002). The thresholds for the ICC are along side the Child 
benefit £54.25 a week for the first child for families with an income of less than 
£13.000 per year and £26.50 a week for the first child for families with an income of 
less than £50.000 a year.  Although, the working tax credit is payable to families 
irrespectively of children, the credit also contains a childcare tax credit element for 
families with an income of maximum £14.000, working minimum 16 hours per week 
and using registered childcare. Families with children can receive up 70% of eligible 
childcare costs of up to £135 per week for one child and £200 pounds per week for 
two or more children. This illustrates that the thresholds have been extended 
compared with those of the ICC and the WFTC. In addition, the children’s tax credits 
are all to be paid to the main carer instead of the main provider. (Treasury & Inland 
Revenue, 2002 and Explanatory Notes to Tax Credit Act, 2002). Similar to the 
Australian system of integrated child payments, the gross household’s annual income 
will be the assessment criteria of the ICC. (Explanatory Notes to Tax Credit Act 2002 
& Social Services Committee 2000). 
 
The objectives of the 2002 Tax Credit Act including the ICC are; to support families 
with children by recognising the responsibilities that follow parenthood, tackling child 
poverty by offering help to those in need and increase the incentives for people to take 
up paid employment. (Treasury & Inland Revenue 2002). Therefore, the overall goal 
is to improve the current system by removing barriers to paid employment for 
particular women and to make the current system more transparent. The improved 
childcare supplements conflicts with the government’s intention of restricting the 
budget. This is particularly seen lately, where Gordon Brown has been forced to 
borrow money to finance the economic gaps in the 2003 budget. (Guardian, 27/11-02) 
 
3.7.1 The Path dependency of the Reform   
The introduction of the ICC in 2003 represents a radical change from traditional New 
Labour childcare tax credits. Firstly, making more families eligible for the new tax 
credits represent a swift change. Secondly, drawing together existing family support 
into the ICC as well as administrating the ICC to all families regardless of their 
employment status also signals a radical change. It indicates a more inclusive, 
simplified and coherent family policy that effectively can ease the transition into paid 
employment. Thirdly, the closer collaboration between various departments 
administrating the tax credits and exemptions also indicates a radical change, since 
the payment of such benefits prior to the tax reform was claimed various places. 
Fourthly, redirecting the childcare support to the main carer also represents a radical 
change from previous tax credits, since it used to be paid to the main provider. 
Despite these changes, the policy instruments remains similar to those used previously 
by both New Labour and its predecessor. Fiscal administration rather than the Benefit 
Agency are the instruments used to encourage families’ particular women to take up 
paid employment. Moreover, funding is given to support the development of private 
and voluntary childcare facilities instead of creating public nurseries. Therefore, the 
2002 Tax Credit Reform is only radical in the sense of simplicity and generosity.  
 
3.7.2 The Implications of the Reform 
The implications of the reform are still too early to assess, since the reform first will 
come into force in April 2003. However, both the Inland Revenue and the IFS have 
made assessments of the possible effects of the new reform. The Inland revenue 
estimates that the ICC will create a more secure system of support for families by 
removing the distinction between support paid to working and non-working families 
with children. They also assess that the new credit system will deliver higher quality 
service to the recipients due to the simplification of the current system. In addition, 
employers compliance cost are estimated to be reduced by 11 million per year, since 
the current system will be simplified and awards will be paid by the Inland Revenue. 
(Inland Revenue, 2002). The IFS estimates that the ICC will cost the Exchequer 31.8 
billion a year. Around 5.7 million families will receive the ICC and 3.8 million 
families will be better off than now. (Brewer, Clark & Myck, 2001). However, the 
IFS’s also reports that the new tax credit will cause loss for better off families, since 
they will not be able to claim the CTC due to the changed thresholds. Therefore, the 
ICC reform may have both positive and negative effects on women’s access to the 
labour market.  
 
3.8 Recent Political Debate 
Both before and after the political debate of the ICC, the government launched a 
variety of new initiatives and reforms to solve some of the key problems within the 
current system. Among these initiatives is the broadcasting of information about the 
different tax credits available to families in order to make people aware of the 
different supplements. The 2001 interdepartmental childcare review, which examined 
the whole childcare system and the different programmes running is also one of the 
government’s initiatives. Closer collaboration between the different programmes 
within New Labour’s childcare package such as Sure Start, Early years and childcare 
provisions was also a new attempt from the government. (Guardian18/7-2002). In 
addition, the government has also extended the finances given to the creation of new 
childcare facilities. The government also introduced flexible working for workers 
caring for a child under six, a two weeks paternity leave and extended maternity leave 
with eight weeks in order to help families reconcile work and caring responsibilities. 
Despite these new initiatives, the opening hours of the day-care facilities and 
retraining of women still remains untouched issues. Moreover, there are doubts 
whether the government will be able to reach its target of the national child care 
strategy by 2004.(Guardian 2/11-2002). In addition, the discussion about how many 
families that will loose or benefit from the current system has reappeared on the 
political agenda. The government has been blamed for hiding crucial information 
about the winners and losers under the new assessment system. (Guardian 22/10-
2002). The government is also faced with a financial gap within next year’s budget. 
The Chancellor of Exchequer Gordon Brown has been forced to find money 
elsewhere. Whether this will affect the different childcare initiatives including the 
implementation of ICC is uncertain.  
 
3.9 Conclusion 
The New Labour government dominated the political debate of the reform. The 
influence of the opposition was limited. They hardly managed to change the political 
agenda although particularly the Liberal Democrats had evidence that the ICC reform 
would harm a large group of people. The political structure of Whitehall and the 
majoritarian system account for this. However, a new direction seems to appear. In 
contrast to former reforms, New Labour invited various interested groups to 
participate in a public debate about the new changes of the tax credit system. 
Therefore, the increased openness to discussion of proposed policy changes might 
illustrate a new way of governance by the government. 
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4 Low Pay and Social Assistance: Minimum Wage and Tax 
Credits 
Anne Daguerre and Trine P. Larsen 
 
This paper examines the evolution of policies for the low-paid during the period 
1985-2002. These are activation polices since they aim to move as many people of 
working age as possible into the labour market. Their main target was low-income 
families. However, low income single people are also becoming a target of making 
work pay strategies.  
To achieve this general goal, two main policies have been implemented: in work 
benefits designed to make work pay and the National Minimum wage.  Family Credit 
introduced in 1988 was replaced by the Working Family Tax Credit (WFTC) in 
October 1999 whilst the minimum wage was implemented in April 1999.This paper 
focuses primarily on the WFTC and the new tax credits to be introduced in January 
2003 since the NMW is also part of the government’s making work pay strategy.  
This paper is divided into four sections. The first section provides some brief 
background information concerning the social assistance system prior to 1999. The 
second section analyses exogenous and endogenous pressures for change, which led 
to the introduction of the WFTC in June 1999 (Tax credit Act 1999) and the minimum 
wage in July 1998 (National Minimum Wage Act adopted in July 1998) under New 
Labour’s legislature. It also provides a description of the key actors. The third section 
analyses the policy processes which led to the implementation of the two reforms. It 
identifies the diagnoses of the problem (competing policy paradigms), the proposed 
solutions and analyses the decision-making processes. The fourth section provides a 
brief assessment of the 1999 reforms. It also identifies the remaining causes for 
concerns and unveils the government’s plans for a Working Tax Credit and an 
Integrated Child Credit.  
 
4.1 Poverty trends and the social assistance system before 1999  
 
4.1.1 Poverty trends  
 
In the UK the main trade-off of deindustrialisation and cost-containment policies has 
been a significant increase in low-income households. The number of people with 
incomes on or below the state’s safety net has increased by three-quarters since 1979. 
By 1997, 14 million people were officially qualified as poor1.  The number of people 
living on low incomes was fairly static during the 1960s, 1970’s and early 1980s, 
fluctuating between 10 and 15 %. It then rose steeply from 1985 to reach a peak of 21 
% in 1992. There was then a slight drop and the proportion has remained at around 
18% over the last four years (Social Trends, 2002:99).  
 
Groups at risk are: individuals in workless families, families with children, single 
female pensioners, individuals living in households headed by a member of an ethnic 
minority community, individuals containing one or more disabled people, individuals 
leaving in the North East, and, on after housing costs only, London, were also at 
particular risk of low incomes (see Households Below Average Incomes Survey, 
Report for the period 1994/5 - 2000/1, table 3.3).  
 
Although there is no official definition of the working poor - a term imported from the 
USA - the percentage of people on low wages (21%) is higher in the UK than in the 
EU (15%) as table 1 in the appendix shows. A low-wage employee is defined here as 
an employee whose monthly wage is lower than a nationally defined threshold. In 
2002, more than one employee in five in the United Kingdom is on low wages 
(Eurostat, 2002). 
 
There were 767,000 families in receipt of Family Credit in 1997-1998. . Annual 
expenditure on Family Credit in 1998/99 was estimated at £2,612 million.  
 
4.1.2 The main characteristics of the social security system before 1999  
 
The British welfare2 system has long been characterised by a continuous development 
of means-tested benefits. In the UK more than 70% of the population live in 
households benefiting from social transfers other than pensions (unemployment 
benefit, illness/disability allowance, family allowance, housing benefit, etc.) as table 2 
shows (Eurostat, 1999). Non-contributory benefits are administered by the Social 
Security Administration; that is, the Benefit Agency placed under the responsibility of 
the Department of Social Secur ity. Contributory benefits based on National Insurance 
contributions (such as pensions or maternity leave) are administered by the National 
Insurance Contributions Fund, also a semiautonomous agency.  
 
In work means-tested benefits represent a traditional characteristic of the British 
social assistance system (referred to as National Assistance). Britain was one of the 
first European countries to offer financial assistance to low-income families on work 
(Walker, 1999:103). In 1971, family income supplement (FIS) was introduced as a 
temporary measure. FIS was a means-tested benefit for families with an adult working 
at least 24 hours a week and with a dependent child. Low-income families and more 
particularly lone parents were the main targets of this benefit. FIS was administered 
by the social security administration placed under the responsibility of the Department 
of Social Security. In 1988, FIS was renamed family credit (FC). FC was the main 
UK in work benefit from 1988 until October 1999. It was much more generous than 
FIS and was designed to encourage working-poor families to take up paid 
employment. A family with children needed to have one adult working 16 hours or 
more per week to qualify for WFTC. FC was payable for 6 months at a flat rate 
regardless of changes in the claimants’ circumstances. More importantly, it was paid 
to mothers even when the eligibility was in respect of father's earnings. The average 
payment at the end of 1996 was £57 a week (IFS, 1999).  
 
4.1.3 Policy context and Conservative policies  
 
For reasons that have been explained elsewhere (Holmwood, 2000; Lloyd and Payne, 
2002), Britain has a low-wage and low-skill labour market. From 1979 onwards the 
Conservative government pursued a constant strategy of labour market deregulation 
and actively helped business in keeping low wages, not only to avoid inflationary 
pressures, but also to maintain the profitability of British capital:  
“The British case is one in which employers are weakly co-ordinated, and therefore 
enlists the state in the task of deregulating labour markets to support low-cost-
competitive strategies…The neoliberal revolution of Thatcherism is best seen as a 
restoration, both in the long-run historical sense and in the economic sense of 
restoring the incentive-compatibility of labour market structures with other supply-
side governance structures in the UK.” (Wood, 2001:408-409).  A low-wage 
equilibrium meant that replacement rates of social assistance benefits – which 
increasingly replaced contributory-based benefits such as the Unemployment Benefit 
- should be kept at a minimum in order to avoid poverty traps and work disincentives. 
If benefits are higher than wages, why bother to work? To counteract the adverse 
effects created by this system, it then made sense to “make work pay”. This 
characteristic also helps to explain why the Conservatives constantly tried to cut 
social security benefits and to freeze them. This move was not dictated by ideology 
but by the need to maintain the competitiveness of the British economy. This 
explained the expansion of in work benefits since the 1970s, as Holmwood 
(Holmwood, 2000) cogently argues:  
“In order to sustain an apparent relative advantage of low wages, it became necessary 
to order social welfare policies accordingly. There is a requirement that benefits 
should be lower than wages for available jobs and as wage in unskilled jobs fall so, 
too, must benefits.” (Holmwood, 2000: 471).  
 
Before the introduction of the National Minimum Wage (NMW) in April 1999, some 
workers were earning as little as £2 an hour or even less In this context, benefits 
levels would always be too high in comparison to wages. 
 
The politics of means testing, the deregulation of the labour market and the expansion 
of in work benefits cannot be analysed as separate phenomena. Such a policy had an 
adverse effect: to cut down wages and benefits levels can help create a British 
underclass characterised by welfare dependency. To encourage this population to 
return to the labour market implies to improve in work benefits to counteract the 
problem of low wages and was therefore part of a relatively cheap activation strategy.  
 
4.2 Pressures for change and policy debates in the 1990s  
 
4.2.1 Exogenous pressures for change  
 
Exogenous pressures (Europe, OECD) did not set the agenda for change although 
some policy paradigms were transferred from EU social policy documents or the 
OECD.  
 
4.2.2 Europeanisation   
 
Tony Blair wanted to place Britain at the heart of the EU. The new government was 
thus much more sympathetic towards European social policies and employment rights 
than the Conservative government. The British opt-out of the Maastricht Social 
Protocol was to be removed.  However, the Labour government made it clear that it 
would not support a large extension of European Social policy.  
However, the creation of the Social Exclusion Unit located within the Prime Minister 
Office was an indication of the adoption of a more pro-European stance. Indeed, the 
French concept of social exclusion was channelled to the British policy debate 
through EU documents (see also the New Deal 1998 paper for a more complete 
explanation).  
 
4.2.3 American influences  
 
The American in work benefit, the Earned Income Tax Credit (EITC) which was 
expanded under Clinton’s presidency as part of a making work pay strategy for the 
working poor, became THE reference for British reformers in the second half of the 
1990s (Deacon, 2002). For instance the House of Commons Social Security Select 
Committee visited the USA to examine the EITC.  
This thinking was particularly influential amongst policy advisers to Tony Blair and 
Gordon Brown, not least because of the links between the New Democrats and New 
Labour.  
 
4.2.4 The OECD  
 
In the second half of the 1990s, the Anglo-Saxon world became increasingly 
concerned with the problem of the working poor. The OECD played a leading role in 
this debate. The expression “to make work pay” appeared in 1996: the title of chapter 
2 of the OECD Employment Outlook was “Making Work Pay.” (OECD, 1996). In 
1998 the OECD published a report The Battle Against Exclusion: Social Assistance in 
Australia, Finland, Sweden and the UK, which explicitly contrasted the Liberal 
welfare regime with the Social-Democratic regime. The existence of unemployment 
traps and the issue of the minimum wage were also mentioned in the UK case.  In 
Australia and the UK the dilemma of social policy was to maintain a sufficient safety 
net (basic replacement rates of unemployment and social assistance benefits) whilst at 
the same time creating enough work incentives for the low-paid (OECD, 1998). Thus 
the lack of statutory wages coupled with a low-pay equilibrium were causes for 
concern and identified as challenges to the British welfare state. In fact, as in the case 
of the EU, New Labour used these views as a justification for the development of in-
work benefits and the introduction - at a very low level - of a minimum wage. 
However, make work pay strategies were not introduced in the UK as a result of 
changing policy paradigms in the OECD as it is sometimes assumed.  
 
In fact, these policies were already in place since 1971 with the FIS. Thus in work 
benefits were not adopted as a result of changing international policy debates per se. 
They developed owing to an increased awareness of the issue at the domestic level, 
which resonated well with the diagnosis proposed by various OECD reports in the 
second, half of the 1990s. Had such problems not been a long-term challenge for the 
British welfare state, the recommendations of the OECD would not have been taken 
into account. In this respect, it is not pure coincidence that Continental and 
Scandinavian welfare had not a working poor agenda in the 1990s: the scope of the 
phenomenon was much less developed in these countries and therefore did not require 
political treatment.  
 
4.3 Endogenous pressures for change, diagnoses of the problems 
and key actors  
 
4.3.1 Domestic pressures played a much greater and direct role than exogenous 
pressures for change.  
 
In 1997 the main cause for concern for the new administration was twofold: 
1- The rise in workless households - between 1979 and 1996, households with no 
one in employment had more than doubled from less than one in ten to just less 
than one in five working-age households, making a total of 3.4 million 
households (DSS, 1998b: 3).  
2- Social exclusion and child poverty: 4.3 million children were declared poor in 
1997, a situation which was described as a scar on the soul of the nation.  
 
 
Whilst big levels of worklessness had been a cause for concern for the Conservatives 
(see the JSA paper) since early 1990s, child poverty was definitely a Labour problem. 
In fact, social exclusion and child poverty never figured on the Conservative agenda, 
in sharp contrast to New Labour. However, New labour did not want to be seen as a 
tax and spend party and stuck to the Conservative plans under the leadership of 
Gordon Brown. Thus redistribution was given a low profile and the government 
continuously repeated that to raise the level of benefits would not solve the problem 
of child poverty and social exclusion (Hewitt, 1998).  
 
4.3.2 Diagnoses of the problem  
 
The 1998 Green Paper A New Contract for Welfare claimed that the welfare state had 
created disincentives to take paid employment. The fact that low skilled people were 
stuck in low-paid employment and/or long spells of unemployment owing to 
extremely low wages was also mentioned. Family Credit was believed to be too 
complex as there was some evidence that some families simply did not take advantage 
of this opportunity, although information campaign tremendously increased benefit 
take-up in the mid-1990s (OECD, 1998). Lastly, child poverty was mainly due to 
worklessness.  Low levels of social assistance benefits were not identified as a 
possible explanation for child poverty in the 1998 Green Paper. New Labour wanted 
to balance budgets as much as its predecessors and wanted to break free from the 
image of a high tax and spend party which had led to electoral disaster in 1992 
(Deakin and Parry, 1998; Taylor-Gooby, 2001).  
 
The introduction of a national minimum wage was one of the first reforms undertaken 
by the government in order to reward work. Also, the fact that even a deregulated 
labour market like the USA had a national minimum wage (about $5 an hour) did play 
a role in the decision to introduce a minimum wage in the UK.  
 
4.4 Key actors  
 
Within the government, the key actors were: The Prime Minister and the Minister for 
Welfare Reform, Frank Field, appointed by Tony Blair in May 1997, the Department 
of Social Security, the Treasury (Gordon Brown), the Inland Revenue and the 
Department of Trade and Industry.  The Social Exclusion Unit was also influential, at 
least at first.  
 
On the minimum wage, the key actors were the Low Pay Commission, the Treasury 
and the Department of Trade and Industry. In July 1997 nine members of the 
independent were appointed: Professor George Bain (Chairman), The Low Pay 
Commission drew its members from various backgrounds, including business and 
employees’ associations. As well as studying 500 written submissions, they took oral 
evidence from a wide range of organisations, and held over two hundred meetings 
throughout the United Kingdom. The LPC initiated a large consultation process heard 
from large and small employers, trade unions, individual employees including 
homeworkers, and a range of other interested organisations. The Commission was set 
up to make recommendations to Government on the level at which a National 
Minimum Wage should be set.  
 
The Conservatives and the Liberal Democrats were in opposition.  
 
Among social partners, The Confederation of British Industries (CBI) and the Trade-
Union Congress (TUC) were the most crucial actors.  
 
On the research side (think tanks), the IFS, the Joseph Rowntree Foundation and the 
Child Poverty Action Group offered advice and policy recommendations to the 
government.  
 
4.5 Policy making processes behind the adoption of the National 
Minimum Wage and the expansion of in work benefits  
 
The minimum wage underpinned the reform of the tax and benefits system and 
intended to make work pay, in particular by removing the work disincentives faced by 
very low-paid workers. The minimum wage was to be linked to reform of the tax and 
benefit system, with a 10p starting rate for income tax and introduction of earned 
income tax credits if it was to reduce poverty (Financial Times, October 14 1997).  
Georg Bain stated that the LPC aimed to set up a NMW, which would encourage 
people to move from welfare to work.  
 
The original idea of the WFTC was to integrate the tax and benefit system in order to 
make work pay. The government was willing to consult and listen. During the first six 
months of Labour term a plethora of ministers, working parties outside advisory 
groups and task forces were appointed to review the benefit and tax system. This gave 
rise to confusion. However, the Treasury increasingly took the lead in the design of in 
work benefits.  
 
4.5.1 Proposed solutions  
 
The NMW  
 
The Low Pay Commission (LPC) 
 
In June 1998 the Commission published its first report.  
 
The Commission’s main recommendations on the National Minimum Wage were:  
· Consistent with introducing the wage at an early date and the Commission’s 
aim to proceed with prudence, the initial rate should be £3.60 per hour 
introduced in April 1999. The Commission advised that the appropriate rate 
should be £3.70 per hour in June 2000. 
 
· An initial Development Rate of £3.20 per hour should be introduced in April 
1999. The Commission advised that the appropriate Development Rate in June 
2000 should be £3.30 per hour. 
 
· A minimum Development Rate should be available for 18-20 year olds. It 
should also be available for those aged 21 or over for up to a maximum of six 
months for workers beginning a new job with a new employer and who are 
receiving accredited training. 
 
· All those aged 16 and 17, together with those on apprenticeships, should be 
exempt from the National Minimum Wage. 
 
The Department of Trade and Industry  
 
The DTI was the department responsible for the new legislation. The LPC reported to 
the DTI and the Prime Minister. The DTI (Margaret Beckett was the President of the 
Board of Trade) accepted the recommendations of the LPC but was even more 
cautious than the LPC in relation to the rates of the NMW, especially for young 
workers. The DTI accepted a main rate of £3.60 per hour before deductions with 
effect from April 1999. When combined with the Working Family Tax Credit and 
other benefits, for a one-earner couple with two children, this meant an effective 
wage of more than £7 per hour.  
 
The Treasury  
 
Margaret Beckett had wanted to implement the LPC’s recommendations in full, 
especially with a wage as “high” as £3.20 an hour for people aged 18-21. However, 
the Chancellor had overruled her because of fears about the impact of the youth rate 
on the Government’s New Deal for Young People.  
 
The WFTC  
 
Proposals for integration fell into two main categories: a negative income tax, under 
which the tax system was extended to cover those whose incomes were below the tax 
threshold so that their liability to tax incomes became negative; and, a social dividend 
or basic income guarantee, under which all individuals were paid a basic income free 
of tax.  
 
4.5.2 Frank Field’s proposals   
 
Frank Field, former director of the Child Poverty Action Group and the Low Pay 
Unit, became chairman of the House of Commons Select Committee from 1990 to 
1997. During these years, the Committee conducted inquiries into the benefit system. 
Frank Field became convinced that welfare fraud was not an invention of the tabloid 
press. Within New Labour, he was one of the architects of the idea that the social 
assistance system created disincentives to work. He also firmly believed that 
redistribution should be given a low profile and that a simple rise in benefits levels 
would not tackle the problem of poverty.  
 
He spelled out his main proposals for reform in his book Making Welfare Work 
(1995). The book proposed to motivate low-paid people back into work by extending 
the coverage of insurance benefits that are not mean-tested. Available resources 
would be put into a new insurance scheme that would replace means-tested provision.  
He also proposed to create a stakeholder welfare by virtue of which people own the 
welfare capital created by their contributions and those of their employers. Everyone 
in paid employment would be required to contribute to a stakeholder scheme which 
provided cover against sickness and unemployment, and also take out a second 
private pension which would run alongside the National Insurance scheme. The right 
to benefits should thus be akin to property rights since they would be paid out of an 
identifiable fund to which the recipient had contributed (the stakeholder scheme). This 
iconoclast thinking by Social-Democrat standards attracted Tony Blair’s support. 
Indeed, “stakeholding was already something of a buzzword in British politics in the 
mid-1990s.” (Deacon, 2002:46). Tony Blair appointed Frank Field as Minister for 
Welfare Reform in May 1997.  
 
There were two main problems with Frank Field’s proposals: The complexity and the 
costs. The Secretary of State for Social Security, Harriet Harman, was opposed to the 
scheme. So was Gordon Brown, the Chancellor of the Exequer, who devised the 
Treasury proposals for making work pay.  
Frank Field’s proposals were not mentioned in the DSS Green Paper, a New Contract 
for Welfare, which was presented to Parliament in March 1998. He was effectively 
sacked in July 1998, not least because of the intervention of Gordon Brown. Since 
July 1998 any proposals which would involve an increase in National Insurance 
contributions were systematically ruled out by the Treasury (Deacon, 2002:114).  
 
4.5.3 The Treasury  
 
The Government announced in May 1997 the formation of a task force to consider the 
streamlining and modernisation of the interaction between the taxation and benefit 
systems. In the Budget speech in July 1997, the Chancellor announced that the task 
force would look at proposals for an Earned Income Tax Credit and that its findings 
would inform the Spring Budget. The Chancellor appointed Martin Taylor, Chief 
Executive of Barclays plc. The "Taylor Task Force" brought together officials from 
the Treasury, the Inland Revenue, the Department of Social Security and the 
Department for Education and Employment.  
 
 
Martin Taylor ruled out the idea of a full integration of the benefit and tax system 
because the two systems have different aims.  Social Security benefits cannot be 
considered as a form of negative taxation. Thus the two systems - the benefit and tax 
system- should be kept separate. Instead, the Task Force proposed that WFTC should 
replace FC.  
 
In his Pre-Budget Statement to the House on 25 November 1997, Gordon Brown 
announced that a new tax credit for working families would be one element of the 
government’s welfare to work strategy (Hoc Research Paper 98/46, p. 10).  
 
4.5.4 The Social Exclusion Unit  
 
The Social Exclusion Unit was created in December 1997 under a former Treasury 
official, Moira Wallace.  Geoff Mulgan, the director of the think tank Demos, had 
thought up the unit. The original focus of the unit was health and education, crime, 
social housing and continued economic regeneration, plus welfare to work (Financial 
Times, 30 September 1997). This represented a slight lose of turf for the Treasury, 
which also put social exclusion on the top of the government’s priorities (Deakin and 
Parry, 1998:52).  The Social Exclusion unit had a specific remit, involving the co-
ordination of work across departments. The Unit reported directly to the Prime 
Minister (PM) and combined civil servants and others from outside Whitehall 
including the police, probation, business and local government. It aimed to improve 
understanding of the problems, to encourage more co-operation across departments 
(including persuading Whitehall to listen and learn from what works on the ground) 
and to make recommendations to tackle exclusion more effectively (Bochel and 
Bochel, 1998: 68). The Social Exclusion Unit was not involved at first in the design 
of the new Tax Credits, which were Gordon Brown’s territory.  
 
4.6 The final proposals  
 
4.6.1 The NMW  
 
The National Minimum Wage Act 1998 received the Royal Assent on 31 July 1998. 
The NMW was of £3. 60 an hour. The Act ensured that all workers except the self-
employed were covered. The Act set out a separate for young people aged 18-21 year 
old – in order not to discourage employees to recruit young workers and to protect 
youth employment - at £3 an hour. The goal of the reform was to abolish the 
unemployment trap and to move low-paid people from welfare into work. The DTI 
estimated that about 2 million workers (1.4 million of whom would be women) would 
benefit from higher pay as a result of the NMW (HC research Paper 99/18). The Act 
also provided for the establishment of the LPC on a statutory basis and contained a 
battery of enforcement mechanisms. This was in line with the LPC’s 
recommendations according to which the NMW should be properly implemented.   
 
On 11 September 1998, the DTI published Draft National Minimum Wage 
Regulations for First Consultation. The Contribution Agency and the Inland Revenue 
(which were to be combined into a single body in April 1999) would have overall 
responsibility for enforcing the NMW.  
 
The government laid the final regulations before Parliament on 16 February 1999. 
 
4.6.2 The WFTC  
 
The government accepted most of Martin Taylor’s proposals. The government's 
intentions were announced in the Budget on 17 March 1998. From October 1999, the 
WFTC was to replace Family Credit. In parallel a tax credit for working people with 
disabilities was to be introduced — Disabled Person's Tax Credit (DPTC) — to 
replace Disability Working Allowance. Both WFTC and DPTC included a new 
childcare tax credit and will be administered by the Inland Revenue. From April 2000 
these tax credits were payable through the wage packet. 
 
The goals of the WFTC can be summarised as follows:  
1- As announced in the DSS Green Paper 1998, to build an active welfare state: this 
was the overall goal of welfare reform. Thus the new tax credits were part of a 
more general activation strategy designed to make work pay  
2- To abolish the unemployment trap for the low-paid: indeed, under Family Credit, 
people could be better off in benefits than in paid employment owing to the fact 
that FC was a passport to housing benefits;  
3- To abolish the poverty trap: “half a million working families, with children, whose 
pay is so low that they receive in work benefits, are still required to pay income 
tax” (HC Deb. 17 March 1998)  
4- To rebuild popular support for the welfare state by ending the stigma attached to 
welfare benefits: negative income tax was not part of the Social Security budget 
and was considered in a much more positive fashion by beneficiaries and 
taxpayers alike.  
 
Overall, the WFTC drew on the previous FC and had the same goals, i.e., to make 
work pay. However, the policy instruments differed in two major ways.  
 
First, the WFTC was more generous than the FC, with increased earnings for children, 
a higher earnings threshold, a reduction in the taper from 70 per cent to 55 per cent 
(so WFTC is removed more gently than the previous FC) and the availability of 
childcare credits for all WFTC claimants. The total number of families estimated to 
benefit was 1.4 million rather than half a million under the previous system (HM 
Treasury, 1999, p.32). An important part of the increased generosity of WFTC was 
the childcare credit (see paper on child care strategy).  
 
Second, the method of payment was radically different: the WFTC was administered 
through the pay packet rather than the benefit system in order to reinforce the 
distinction between the rewards of work and remaining on welfare. It was 
administered and assessed by the Inland Revenue rather than by the Benefit Agency’s 
Family Credit. From October 1999 to March 2000, payments of WFTC were made 
directly by the Inland Revenue to whichever partner the couple had nominated. From 
April 2000, payment s were made through the pay pocket for people on PAYE. Self-
employed people and others not on PAYE received payments direct from the Inland 
Revenue.  
 
4.6.3 The position of other actors  
 
A- The NMW  
 
The NMW Act was relatively controversial. Conservatives members voted against, 
while Liberal members supported the Government. It was debated in Standing 
Committee D for nearly 70 hours over nineteen sittings from 22 January to 17 
February 1998. This included a record 26-hour sitting. Few amendments were made 
and most were technical.  
 
The Conservatives were fiercely opposed to the NMW on the grounds that this policy 
would “take us back to the strikes and the inflation of the 1960s… We have 
consistently argued for a minimum income rather than a minimum wage – with 
benefit top-ups for families that need the extra.”  (HC research paper 99/18).  
 
The TUC and the CBI welcomed the NMW. However, both agreed that young 
workers should not receive a lower minimum wage than older employees. Adair 
Turner, then director general of the CBI (now Chairman of the LPC) said that while 
the 3.60 figure was “at the top end of what is acceptable to business, overall it should 
not place too much pressure on inflation or lead to major job losses” (quoted in HC 
Research Paper 99/18, p.15.  
 
Trade Unions welcomed the NMW as an “historic victory for the low paid” but 
claimed that the rates were too low.  
 
B- The WFTC  
 
There was relatively little debate in the House of Commons and the Bill was adopted 
without major political disputes.  
 
The HC Select Committee  
 
The HC Social Security Select Committee in the 1999/2000 session was extremely 
critical of what it described as slowness on the part of the relevant departments and 
public bodies. It also criticised the timetable of the implementation of the WFTC, 
pointing out that this timetable was probably unrealistic. 
 
The committee remained critical of the government’s failure to progress reform of 
housing benefit and therefore to address the very high marginal tax rates, which had 
continued to exist for many tenants in low-paid work. 
 
The committee was also critical of the government’s reluctance to rigorously examine 
fraud within FC and by implication to assess properly the scope for fraud and 
manipulation of WFTC, especially for employers 
 
The transfer from women and children to men in poor families was also an issue for 
concern.  The government’s original intention was that WFTC would be paid through 
the pay packet to all those on PAYE (self-employed people and others not on PAYE 
would receive payments from the Inland Revenue). The Committee expressed 
considerable amount of concern concerning this provision, which led to a change in 
that decision, such that among those on PAYE, the couple could choose to have 
WFTC paid like a cash benefit to the partner no t in PAYE employment.  
 
The Conservatives  
 
The Conservatives supported the principles of in-work benefits but pointed that this 
was already the aim of FC. They criticised the method of payment which would 
increase the administrative burden on employers and added that “the move from FC 
payable to the mother as a benefit in the post office to a WFTC payable to the father 
would shift income from half a million women to their husbands. To soften this the 
Chancellor has given couples the right to choose to have the benefit paid to the 
mother. This could create a source of discord in low income households.” (HC 
research paper 98/46, p.27).  
 
The Liberal Democrats welcomed the extra support to low paid workers but were 
concerned about the lack of integration of housing costs into the credit.  
 
The CBI and the TUC supported the introduction of the WFTC in October 1999 since 
they agreed it would help reduce poverty and raise the incentive to work. However, 
both the TUC and the CBI opposed administration through the pay packet albeit for 
different reasons.  
 
The TUC  
 
The TUC supported the proposals for WFTC but urged the government to focus 
welfare reform on transitions into employment. Making work pay was too narrow 
since it did not facilitate the transition into paid employment, assuming that paid work 
should be a prerequisite for help with childcare costs. More importantly, the TUC 
opposed the delivery mechanisms of the WFTC.  
 
The CBI  
 
The CBI supported the principle of WFTC since it can tackle poverty and raise 
incentives to work. However, the CBI opposed administration of WFTC through the 
pay packet. Therefore, it recommended that overall responsibility for the 
administration of the Credit should lie with the Inland Revenue (CBI, 1998:1). The 
Institute of Directors described to the Social Security Committee the administrative 
burden which the WFTC involved, including entering the amount of WFTC on the 
payroll system; aligning the award with the pay periods; readjusting a payment at the 
end of the period of an award; and dealing with other employers concerning 
employees who have commenced employment elsewhere or been taken on part-way 
through the period of an award. (HC report, 1999). 
 
The research community and feminist groups  
 
The Joseph Rowntree Foundation and most feminist researchers welcomed the 
adoption of the WFTC. However, the WFTC was criticised on the grounds that it 
widened the gender gap since it was delivered through the pay packet: it favoured the 
wallet (men) rather than the purse (women) whereas women are still the main carers:  
"The choice of a tax credit as the vehicle of delivering support low-paid families has 
consequences for gender equality within families…It is already clear that for sole 
earner couples payment of the WFTC through the wage packet is likely to exacerbate 
economic inequality between men and women…Credit may result in a direct transfer 
from purse to wallet." (Rake, 2001: 218).  
The WFTC was far from being gender neutral and was been criticised by the 
academic community feminist groups such as the Women’s Budget Group, the 
Fawcet Society and some women Labour MPs. Moreover, if the objective was to end 
child poverty, this method of payment could be very detrimental to children well 
being since research showed that women spent more on their children than men did 
(Mc Laughin, Trewsdale and McCay, 2001:168). 
 
The IFS  
 
The IFS agreed that the reform could help “some people “to move into paid 
employment. But it also pointed out to the limits of the reform since it would not 
change the structure of the labour market (low-paid employment):  
“ But no respectable research has ever shown that tax or benefit incentives can 
transform the labour market.”(Quoted in the HC Research Paper 98/46, p.28).  
 
 
The LPC  
 
The LPC welcomed the WFTC but expressed some concern over the administration 
and flexibility of the new system. Like the IFS, it noted that “the low paid labour 
market is more insecure than ever and unless the new system can deal with his, work 
disincentives will persist”.  
 
4.7 Assessment of the reforms and new tax credits in 2001 
 
The WFTC can be described as a “re-packing” of the previous Family Credit. Only 
policy instruments, especially the method of payment, differed. Whilst the Family 
Credit was administered by the Benefit Agency to the main carer, the WFTC is 
administered as a top- up earning for low wages and is thus administered directly 
through the pay wallet by employers. However, the goals remained identical with 
those of the Family Credit: to make work pay for low-income families with children, 
with an increased focus on families. The reform also enabled the Treasury to tighten 
its grip on the Welfare to Work agenda.  
 
4.7.1 The new regime: main features and assessment  
 
A- The NMW  
 
 The NMW is placed under the responsibility of the DTI but overall responsibility for 
implementation lies with the Inland Revenue. The Treasury has thus a leading role in 
the implementation of the legislation. In October 2001 main and development rates of 
the national minimum wage increased to £4.10 and £3.50 respectively. 
 
B- The WFTC  
 
Family Credit                                                     Working Family Tax Credit  
 
Administered and assessed by Benefit Agency’s 
Family  Credit Unit  
Assessed and administered by Inland Revenue. 
This required a transfer of BA staff to the Inland 
Revenue.  
 
Claimed by woman in couple  Claimed by  man or woman according to 
couple’s choice  
Paid by order book, or direct debit to 
account of claimant’s choice  
Paid through wage packet by employer or 
direct from the Inland Revenue to 
nominated partner  
Main earner must be working 16 hours 
per week or more 
Main earner must be working 16 hours 
per week or more 
Extra credit for those working 30 hours or 
more  
Extra credit for those working 30 hours or 
more 
Paid over six month period after which 
claim can be renewed  
Paid over six month period after which 
claim can be renewed 
Started to be withdrawn once net income 
reached £80.65 (from April 1999) One 
adult credit per family plus additional, 
age-related credits for children  
Starts to be withdrawn once net income 
reached £90. One adult credit per family 
plus additional, age-related credits for 
children. Same rate as under FC 
Reduced at rate of 70p for each extra 
pound earned over threshold  
Reduced at rate of 55p for each extra 
pound earned over threshold 
 
Source: HC Research Paper 99/13  
 
 
 
4.7.2 Assessment of the reforms  
 
A- The NMW  
 
The NMW had effectively benefited low-paid workers although the figure was less 
impressive than the government’s initial target (2 million workers). Nevertheless, 
ONS figures confirmed 1.2 - 1.5 million workers had benefited from the NMW by 
April 2000. 
 
The rates remained too low, especially for young people. It has been suspected that 
employers recruit young people aged 18-21 because they are attracted by the lower 
youth rate but fire these workers once they reach 22 years of age.  
 
The increased role of the Treasury  
 
Although the Treasury’s influence is less direct than in WFTC, the Department of 
Finance has nevertheless a leading role. The fact that responsibility for the 
management of the reform has been transferred to the Inland Revenue is very telling 
in this respect. It confirms that the Treasury is taking overall responsibility for the 
working poor, as the enforcement mechanisms to implement WFTC also make it 
clear.   
 
B- The WFTC  
 
The predominance of the Treasury  
 
The Treasury became a dominant actor in directing social policy to the detriment of 
the DSS (Deakin and Parry, 1998).  John Hills noted the new role of the Treasury as 
follows:  
 
The dominance of the Treasury in making welfare and social policy is new and 
striking. Not only have most of the significant arrangements been made as part of its 
budget and spending arrangements, but the tax system is also being used as an 
explicit instrument of social policy (Hills, 1998:29).  
 
The WFTC also initiated a new division of labour within Whitehall in relation to 
activation policies. Indeed, the WFTC was part of an overall activation strategy, just 
like the New Deal. Under the new and implicit division of responsibilities, the 
Treasury was taking direct responsibility for a system which redistributed money to 
the working poor (the WFTC and other tax credits) while the DSS retained 
responsibility for the Child Support Agency and those out of the labour market (the 
New Deal).  
 
The WFTC redistributed money to low income families. The family was the reference 
and the norm of Brown’s policies. Indeed, the Chancellor gave two-parent families 
the same status as lone parents and set up an implicit model of a family with children 
headed by a married couple, both in work (Deakin and Parry, 1998:49). 
 
Finally, the Chancellor also took the lead in the battle against child poverty.  
 
4.7.3 Key problems arising from the implementation of the WFTC  
 
The main problems of the WFTC had to do with the method of payment. We can 
identify seven problems that have been left unsolved by the implementation of the 
WFTC.  
· The transfers of cash from purse (the main carer, i.e., and the woman) to the 
wallet (the man) is not being solved by the current voluntary system. The WFTC 
significantly redistributed personal income from individuals in social categories 
with low personal incomes – women and children- to those in a social category 
with comparatively high personal incomes – men  
· There was increased potential for fraud and error; as a result, enforcement 
mechanisms had to be implemented for employers who failed to pay WFTC to 
employees when directed to do so by the Inland Revenue   
· Although New Labour had promised to deliver a seamless system of family 
support for families and their children, the WFTC was tremendously complex. 
The amount of red tape was increased under the management of WFTC, for 
families, employers and the Inland Revenue 
· The WFTC’s redistributive impact was less important than expected by the 
Treasury: according to the HBAI survey 200/2001, working family tax credits 
recipients were skewed towards the bottom of the income ladder (DWP, 2002:75) 
· Low take up of the WFTC has been a source of concern for the government. The 
WFTC take-up rate was 62%, lower than that of FC (72% in summer 1999). Only 
72% of entitled families with children had claimed the children tax credit by 
December 2001 (IFS, 2002). It was suggested that the complexity of the WFTC 
deterred potential recipients from applying. It was thus crucial to create a tax 
credit and benefit system which was easy to understand and easy to use from the 
recipient's perspective. 
· Single people with low-paid jobs were relatively disadvantaged by the WFTC 
since only low-income families with children were eligible.  
· Lastly, the minimum wage remained too low, especially for single people over 25 
and without children. Minimum-wage work still paid little relative to staying on 
benefit: a single parson over 25, without children, renting an earning £4.10 an 
hour received £115 a week when out of work, £136 when working 30 hours and 
£148.32 when working 40 hours (IFS, 2001). Work disincentives remained high 
due to the predominance of a low-paid, deregulated and insecure labour market.  
A significant proportion of low-paid people would still be slightly better off on 
welfare than in work given the low rates of the minimum wage. In this respect, it 
is very telling that the government prefers to raise in work benefits – this is the 
purpose of the new working tax credits to be implemented in January 2003 – 
rather than the minimum wage.  
 
 
4.7.4 The new tax credits: Key features and assessment  
 
In Budget 2000, the Chancellor announced the introduction, from 2003, of two 
separate income tax credits: 
· a Working Tax Credit - to tackle in-work poverty and improve work 
incentives, by making work pay for those in low-income households or with 
disabilities; and  
· a Child Tax Credit for families with children - building on the foundations of 
universal Child Benefit, by providing a seamless, secure system of income-
related support for families with children, whether that family is in or out of 
work. 
 
These credits will replace the existing credits (Working Families' and Disabled 
Person's Tax Credits, Children's Tax Credit, the New Deal 50plus Employment 
Credit) and the child-related payments in Income Support and income-based 
Jobseeker's Allowance. The Government's reforms to help improve work incentives 
are designed to tackle two key problems: 
· the unemployment trap, when those without work find that the difference 
between in- and out-of-work incomes is too small to provide an incentive to 
take a job; and  
· the poverty trap, when those already in work are discouraged from working 
longer hours or taking a better paid job because it may leave them little better 
off. (HM Treasury, 2002).  
 
 
On 27 November 2001, Gordon Brown in a Pre-Budget Speech to the House of 
Commons announced that:  
 
“ We will later this week introduce legislation for the next step: extending the 
principle of the WFTC to make work pay for those without children as well… On top 
of universal Child Benefit we will integrate into one payment all- income related 
support for children, as we advance towards our goal of abolishing child poverty.” 
(Gordon Brown, Budget Statement, HC, 27 November 2001).  
 
The Tax Credit  Act was passed by Parliament in July 2002.  
 
The government establishes a distinction between in work benefits available to all 
working age individuals and benefits to support families with children regardless of 
the work status of the carer. The WTC has a clear making work pay purpose and is, 
together with the more universal and enhanced New Deal, one of the pillars of the 
government’s overall activation strategy. This strategy consists of consists of moving 
as many people of working age as possible into the labour market (HM Treasury 
2002, chapter 4).  
 
4.8 Key features of Working Tax Credit  (WTC)  
 
The employment tax credit aims to reduce poverty and improve work incentives 
amongst those without children. Its key features can be summarised as follows:  
 
On its introduction, the Working Tax Credit will guarantee minimum incomes of:  
· £183 a week for a single earner couple without children, aged 25 and over and 
working full time on the minimum wage; and  
· £237 a week for a family with one child and one earner working full time on 
the minimum wage. 
· Entitlement to the Working Tax Credit will be based on annual income, in line 
with the Child Tax Credit and the rest of the tax system; 
·  eligibility will be extended to people aged 25 and over without children or a 
disability - those most likely to face poor work incentives or persistent poverty 
- who work 30 hours or more a week;  
· those with children or a disability will be eligible for Working Tax Credit 
provided they work 16 hours a week or more.  
· A 30 hour premium will be available to couples with children who jointly 
work 30 hours or more a week, and to disabled workers who work 30 hours or 
more.   
· The childcare element of the Working Tax Credit will be paid directly to the 
person with main responsibility for care of the children - usually the mother - 
alongside the new Child Tax Credit. This childcare element recognises the 
extra costs faced by working parents with childcare needs, mirroring 
arrangements in the WFTC and the DPTC.   
· The arrangements for payment of tax credit via the employer, including the 
application procedure for advance funding, will be simplified to help both 
recipients and employers (HM Treasury, 2002; see also table 3).  
 
 
4.8.1 Assessment  
 
WTC represents an important step in a long-term trend towards topping up low 
incomes for individuals and couples with earnings from work. It is the first time that 
more general support of this type has been paid on a national basis, not restricted to 
people with particular characteristics such as having children or a disability. Certain 
categories, however, are still excluded from this wider entitlement: under-25s and 
part-time workers without children or disabilities.  
 
The impact of the WTC on those without children is straightforward: people working 
full-time but on a sufficiently low income to qualify for some credit will see their 
income rise. Entitlement to the WTC for those without children is limited to those on 
low incomes: couples will need a joint weekly income of less than about £255 or £185 
for the more and less generous options respectively to be entitled to anything, and 
single people less than £175 or £120 a week. The overall distributional impact of non-
pensioner families without children is relatively small. The more generous option 
goes to 450,000 families and costs around £370 million, and the less generous option 
goes to 3000,000 families and costs around £290 million. The direct impact on 
poverty is negligible: a fall of 0.4 of a percentage point (IFS, 2002:79) 
 
The Institute for Fiscal Studies (IFS) estimates that the reform for families with 
children will cost the Exequer around £1.8 billion a year, and that around 5.7 million 
families will receive the integrated child credit, of whom around 3.3 million will be 
made better off. Extending the WTC to workers without children could benefit around 
400,000 families at an approximate cost of £350 million (IFS, 2001).  
 
However, the problems identified under the implementation of the WFTC have not 
disappeared. In particular, the WTC will not suffice to address the problem of the 
unemployment trap given the low level of the minimum wage: £4.20 an hour for 
workers aged 22 and over and £3.60 for workers aged between 18 and 2 in October 
2002. This remains insufficient.  
 
4.9 Conclusion 
 
The British government is traditionally characterised as a powerful agent at the 
agenda-setting and formalisation stages of the public-policy making but is usually  
considered  relatively weak at the initiation, implementation and evaluation stages. In 
particular, it used to have weak delivery mechanisms and to depend on local bodies 
for policy implementation. This changed under New Labour, which tremendously 
reinforced control mechanisms and tried to implement an evidence-based policy.  
 
Another striking feature of New Labour reforms for the working poor is the 
dominance of the Treasury. Indeed, the Chancellor has gained direct responsibility for 
the implementation of the WFTC and the NMW through the transfer of 
responsibilities to the Inland Revenue. This trend is reinforced by the latest tax credits 
reforms. On 25 June 2001, the Prime Minister announced that responsibility for Child 
Benefit in Great Britain would be transferred to the Inland Revenue in January 2003 
on the grounds that it makes sense for a single department to administer both Child 
Benefit and the new tax credit for families with children. This means that Gordon 
Brown will directly supervise family support families as well as policies for the 
working poor.  
 
Neither the NMW nor the WTC can be as considered path-dependent reforms. These 
policies  mark a break with previous policies since it is the first time in British history 
that an employment tax credit will be administered on a universal basis. Moreover, 
despite the persistently low rates of the NMW, the April 1999 reform is relatively 
revolutionary in the British context. However, it should be noted that these reforms 
aim to move people from welfare to work rather than tackle poverty. Ministers remain 
reluctant to radically modify the structure of the labour market and are torn between 
conflicting objectives in this respect.   
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4.11 Appendix 
 
 
Table 1- Low wages in the EU – General level and breakdown by reason (%) 
 B DK D EL E F IR
L 
I L NL A P UK EU 
Total low-wage employees 9 7 17 17 13 13 18 10 16 16 16 6 21 15 
Breakdown by reason:               
(1) Part-time working 63 41 41 12 32 39 30 28 26 65 44 24 55 43 
(2) Low rate of 
remuneration 
24 38 42 73 54 39 44 57 53 17 40 52 21 37 
(3) Both 7 18 12 9 7 13 19 10 17 13 9 10 12 11 
(4) Neither* 6 4 6 7 7 9 8 4 3 6 7 15 12 8 
Total (1)-(4) 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 
(*) "Neither" refers to low-wage employees working 30 hours or slightly more and/or 
whose rate of remuneration is equal to or just above the low rate of remuneration. 
Source: Eurostat, 2002 
 
 
Table 2: Recipients of social transfers other than pensions  
and share of these transfers in total income, in %  
 
Recipients 
of transfers 
(other than 
pensions)  
Share of 
transfers 
(other than 
pensions) in 
total income 
 
Recipients 
of transfers 
(other than 
pensions)  
Share of 
transfers 
(other than 
pensions) 
in total 
income  
B  70  14  I  17  3  
DK  75  16  L  66  8  
D  55  7  NL  68  13  
EL  18  2  A  64  10  
E  37  8  P  63  5  
F  63  10  UK  73  12  
IRL  81  12  EU-131  52  9  
            Source: Eurostat 1999  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 3: The principal elements of the WTC: 2003-04 amounts  
 
Basic element 29.20 
Couple and lone parent element 28.80 
30 hours element 11.90 
Maximum credit for lone parents and 
couples 
69.90 
Childcare element  
-maximum eligible cost  200 
-maximum eligible cost for one child 135 
-percentage of costs covered 70 
Income below which maximum Working 
Tax Credit is payable 
97.00 
 
Source: HM Treasury 2002 
 
5  UNEMPLOYMENT  
 
 
Section I  
 
The 1996 Jobseeker’s Allowance Act (JSA)  
 
Anne Daguerre and Trine P. Larsen 
 
This paper will be divided into four sections. The first section describes the system 
before the implementation of the reform as well as unemployment trends in the first 
half of the 1990s. The second section explores endogenous and exogenous pressures 
for change and the general political climate which underlain the proposals for the 
reform of the unemployment protection system, the Jobseekers Allowance Act 
implemented in October 1996. The third section analyses the policy-making processes 
behind the drafting of the Jobseekers Allowance Bill. It thus focuses on the period 
1994-1995.  The fourth section describes the main characteristics of the new regime 
and assesses the agenda for reform in 1996-1997. 
 
5.1 Labour market trends and the unemployment protection system 
before 1996  
 
5.1.1 Labour market trends  
 
The UK was affected by the two major economic recessions in the mid 1970s and 
early 1980s. Conservative governments’ neo- liberal policies of accelerating the 
process of de- industrialisation and deregulation of the labour market contributed at 
first to rising unemployment levels which reached around 12% in the mid 1980s. In 
the second half of the 1980s unemployment subsided but rose rapidly again after 1990 
to a peak of 10.5% in 1993 (see table 1 below).  
 
Table 1 
Standardised unemployment rates (unemployment as a percentage of the civilian 
labour force) 
1975 1980 1985 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 
(Jan) 
4.1 6.2 11.
5 
7.1 8.9 10.
0 
10.
5 
9.6 8.7 8.2 7.0 6.3 6.1 5.5 
Source: 1960-1974. OECD (1988) Historical Statistics 1960-1986; 1960-1997: OECD 
(1999): Historical Statistics 1960-1997; 1998-2000: OECD Main Economic 
Indicators, 
 
Overall labour force participation and employment rates rose throughout the 1990s. 
The UK has a high proportion of working-age people who are not in work but not 
classified as unemployed either. Since the early 1980s there has been a substantial 
increase in sickness rates in Britain. 
 5.1.2 Unemployment protection in the early 1990s 
 
The UK has a unique form of benefit support for unemployed people. First, social 
partners have no role in the administration of contributory benefits. Instead, the 
delivery of both contributory and means-tested social security benefits has remained 
centralised, top-down and integrated. Second, the government determines the terms 
and conditions of any type of income maintenance, with (in the mid 1990s) the 
Department of Social Security as the responsible agency for the delivery of benefits. 
The administration of benefits was run by an executive agency, the Benefits Agency 
under the responsibility of the Department of Social Security. Jobcentres carried out 
training and labour market policies and were placed under the responsibility of the 
Department of Employment.   
 
Following the Social Security reforms of the mid-1980s, the unemployment 
protection system was divided between a contributory benefit, the unemployment 
benefit noted UB and a means tested social assistance scheme, the Income Support or 
IS  (previously Supplementary Bene fit). UB was available to claimants who were 
capable of and available for work. It was paid as a weekly amount for the claimant 
with an addition for an adult dependant. The maximum entitlement period was 12 
months. It was financed out of the National Insurance Fund. Those who did not meet 
the contribution conditions, or who had exhausted their entitlement, were able to 
apply for tax-funded means-tested support. IS, still in existence in 2002, covers the 
basic living expenses. In the mid 1990s IS was not payable to people in full time work 
(not working for more than 16 hours per week). Families with children and at least 
one person in work could claim means-tested in-work benefits (Family Credit).  
 
5.1.3 Policy context and Conservative policies  
 
Job seeking behaviour became the major focus in unemployment protection reforms 
in the early 1990s. A compulsory 'Restart' interview after six months of 
unemployment had already been introduced in 1986. The Social Security Act 1989 
introduced new rules which stipulated tha t claimants had to provide evidence that they 
were ‘actively seeking employment’. Tighter benefit entitlement and annual 
performance targets also pushed stricter enforcement of rules. Evidence showed that 
the implementation of a 'stricter benefit regime' did have an impact on getting people 
back into work (Clasen, 2001).    
 
Conservative policies since 1979 consisted of deregulating the labour market. They 
effectively served business interests in the sense that they enabled to create and 
maintain a disposable, cheap labour force at the employer’s disposal, the so-called 
working poor. It was hardly surprising, therefore, that the CBI and other major 
business should support these policy interests. However, by the early 1990s the CBI 
put an increasing focus on the need to train the labour force. It was being 
acknowledged that more money should be spent on training. The objectives of the 
National Education and Training Targets for Foundation and Lifetime Learning were 
first formulated by the Confederation of British Industry in 1991 at the prompting of 
the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development. They proposed the 
creation of a learning society through a process of skills revolution (Mainly, 1998: 
50).  
 
5.2 Pressures for change and policy debates in the 1990s  
 
Policy reforms in the 1990s were driven by three chief motives: to cut social security 
benefits, to move people back in the labour market and to increase work incentives.  
 
5.2.1 Exogenous pressures for change  
 
Cost containment and reducing public sector borrowing became more relevant in the 
early 1990s because of the impact of the recession and rising unemployment which 
led to a rapid increase in social security spending. The Conservative government 
projected the rising costs as disproportional (DSS 1993a). It referred to similar 
problems faced by other industrialised countries (DSS 1993b). Targeting benefits at 
those in real need became a major justification in social security policy. Check the 
figures on means-tested benefits.  
  
The Maastricht Treaty 
 
Although it is difficult to assess the direct influence of the Maastricht Treaty on the 
Jobseekers Allowance proposals defined in the 1994 DSS and DoE White Paper, it 
can be listed as an exogenous pressure for change in an era of financial austerity and  
monetarist policies.  
 
The OECD Jobs Study published in 1994 promoted an activation strategy for job 
seekers which consisted of linking benefits to participation in programmes for getting 
people back into work. In 1993, the UK was among the OECD country that had gone 
furthest in adopting such policies (Financial Times, 27 June 1994). In the UK, the 
OECD jobs strategy cannot be considered as an exogenous pressures for the paradigm 
shift towards “workfare” because this change had already taken place at an early stage 
with the election of Margaret Thatcher in 1979 and the subsequent deregulation of the 
labour market.   
 
5.2.2 Endogenous pressures for change and diagnoses of the problem  
 
To cut expenditure on unemployment related benefits (UB and means-tested benefits) 
became target for the government, for three reasons. First, expenditure on 
unemployment-related benefits increased from about 9% of the overall social security 
budget at the end of the 1980s to around 12% by 1993/4 (table 2 below). The will to 
cut social expenditure was closely related to the increased role of the Treasury under 
the leadership of the Chancellor of the Exchequer, the radical Conservative Michael 
Portillo. The so-called Portillo reviews constitute a Treasury intervention into the 
territory of the spending departments, in contrast with the former reactive annual 
Public Expenditure Review system. They presaged the 1997 Labour Government's 
Comprehensive Spending Review, contributing to the extension of direct Treasury 
control of a widening range of aspects of social policy (Taylor-Gooby, 2001).  
 
Table 2 
Total social security expenditure and spending on unemployed people, 19901-2001/2, 
1998/9 prices 
 
 Grand total 
benefit 
spending 
(billion) 
On unemployed people 
Billion                % 
Unempl. 
Rate (1) 
1990/91 72.3 6.8 9.4 7.1 
1991/92 79.9 9.1 11.3 8.9 
1992/93 87.8 10.9 11.5 10.0 
1993/94 93.6 11.5 12.3 10.5 
1994/95 95.0 10.4 10.1 9.6 
1995/96 96.5 9.4 9.7 8.7 
1996/97 97.6 8.1 8.3 8.2 
1997/98 95.7 6.1 6.4 7.0 
1998/99 95.6 5.4 5.6 6.3 
1999/00 97.3 5.1 5.2 6.1 
2000/01 96.2 5.2 5.4 5.5 
2001/02 98.3 5.2 5.3  
 
Source: DSS (2000) The Changing Welfare State: Social Security Spending,  
 
Second, unlike in the early 1980s when policies aimed at removing vulnerable groups 
from the official statis tics by using welfare without work instruments (Walker and 
Howard, 2000), the early 1990s were characterised by requiring unemployed people 
'to take the low paid jobs being generated in the deregulated labour market' (Finn, 
1998: 109). Third, the government believed that of lack work ethic on the part of 
some behaviour claimants prevented a faster fall in unemployment rates. Particularly 
in some areas, such as London, some unemployed people were regarded as either not 
looking for work effectively or not actively seeking employment (DE 1988). 
Moreover, Peter Lilley, the Secretary of State for Social Security launched a major 
campaign against welfare fraud which became a highly sensitive topic in the early 
1990s. Whether this campaign was a response to popular concern raised by the media, 
especially the tabloid press, or an entirely autonomous governmental initiative 
remains to be investigated more thoroughly. In any case, the campaign against welfare 
fraud enabled the government to draw a sharp line between the deserving poor and the 
undeserving poor, thus building on the Poor Law tradition.  
 
Rise in unemployment related benefits, behavioural problems on the part of 
jobseekers in terms of a) unrealistic wage expectations and b) lack of work ethic were 
diagnosed by the Secretary of the State for Social Security Peter Lilley and the 
Secretary of State for Employment, David Hunt, as the major causes for concern.  
Right wing think tanks strongly influenced by American authors such as Murray and 
Mead launched an intellectual crusade against welfare dependency. The neo- liberal 
political and ideological climate provided a window of opportunity for the 
government in the context of a complete lack of opposition from the Labour 
movement (King, 1995). The Labour party was as its lowest in 1992-1993 following 
its electoral defeat in 1992 and trade unions were unable to resist any governmental 
initiatives.  In this context, the Conservative government enjoyed tremendous freedom 
in putting forward its proposals for a major reform of the unemployment protection 
system in 1993 (announced in the Budget in 1993 following the Portillo review).  
 
5.3 Policy making processes behind the adoption of the Job Seekers 
Allowance Act: 1993-1995  
 
5.3.1 The initial project: the unification of Income Support and Unemployment 
benefit  
 
The Jobseekers Allowance proposals were announced in the 1993 Budget. The 
Secretary of State for Employment, David Hunt, a moderate Conservative, was a 
leading influence. The idea behind the Job Seekers’ Allowance was to merge 
unemployment benefits and Income Support into a single benefit and make it more 
conditional on participation in training programmes and job search activities. This 
was a typical workfare strategy which would eventually make social assistance 
conditional on participation in the labour market or work-related activities, thus 
effectively suppressing the right to a contributory-based unemployment benefit. The 
JSA proposals also supported the move towards a making work pay strategy since 
they provided a Back to Work Bonus to the unemployed. Lastly, the control of job 
search behaviour was to be reinforced through mandatory visits to the Jobcentres and 
possible benefit cuts if the job seeker turned down a job offer without a very strong 
reason. The latest idea was inspired by the experimental adoption of American 
welfare to work programmes in 1992-1993.   Overall, the most fundamental and 
innovative proposal consisted of the unification of unemployment and social 
assistance benefits. This was also the most controversial proposal within Whitehall.  
 
5.4 The final proposals (White Paper 1994) 
 
The Jobseeker Bill was to be put forward as a joint initiative in the 1994-1995 
Parliamentary session by the DSS and DoE. The Department of Employment wanted 
to take over the DSS’s responsibilities in running and delivering the new allowance, 
which was to be implemented in April 1996. The Department of Social Security 
opposed this plan. The two departments reached a compromise in June 1994 
according to which the Employment Service and the Benefits Agency would run 
jointly the new allowance.  
 Employment Service was to be responsible for advice and  
tests such as availability for work whilst financial aspects, including the  
calculation and payment of the benefit, would remain the responsibility of the  
Benefits Agency (Financial Times, 22 June 1994). This meant that the unification of 
unemployment and social assistance benefits, which was one of the main goals of the 
Bill, could not be achieved.  . 
 
 
In October 1994, Peter Lilley and Michael Portal, the new Employment Secretary 
who replaced David Hunt in July 1994, signed the 1994 White Paper (cm 2687). The 
proposals intended to simplify the benefit structure for the unemployed, to provide a 
simple gateway service and to activate jobseekers into the labour market. These three 
major goals were matched by a set of policy instruments: 1- a new benefit with 
stricter entitlement rules (since the benefit lasts only 6 months instead of 12 under 
UB); 2 - the move of the staff of the BA and the ES in an unique location, e.g. 
jobcentres, and 3- increased powers for employment offices staff in controlling job 
search behaviour. 
 
The proposals raised important security concerns among the staff of the Benefit 
Agency. The civil service trade unions, representing the staff who would administer 
the new benefit, were worried about working without protective screens. They feared 
that angry customers facing a cut in benefit could become violent. 
   
5.4.1 The parliamentary process  
 
The Jobseeker's Allowance was very controversial.  
The Labour party in the House of Commons and the House of Lords opposed its 
introduction. Labour and the TUC argued that it would be punitive and push people 
into inappropriate jobs. Labour MPs fiercely opposed the Bill as shown by the 
discussion at committee stage but the government was not hearing them. This was 
pointed out by the Financial Times:  
 
“Anyone seeking the allowance must answer the question: 'What is the lowest 
wage you are willing to work for?' The amount has to be before tax, national 
insurance contribution or any other deduction and must not include bonuses or 
overtime. When asked repeatedly by Mr Ian McCartney, shadow employment 
minister, if there was any minimum wage figure that would be acceptable as a 
condition for receiving the Jobseeker's Allowance, Miss Widdecombe said there was 
none. ”  
 
(Financial Times, 1 February 1995). 
 
 
Despite this opposition, New Labour under the leadership of Tony Blair carefully 
avoided to commit the party to the abolition of the JSA for fear of being seen as soft 
on the unemployed. Tony Blair insisted that the JSA would stay in force 
under a Labour government. This is indicative of Labour’s approach to the 
unemployed under the auspices of the Third Way. In fact, the two main political 
parties reached an implicit intellectual consensus on the need to implement a tougher 
approach on the job shy. This was becoming New Labour’s mantra under the rhetoric 
of rights and responsibilities.  
 
5.5 Assessment of the reform and alternative proposals in 1995-1996  
 
The new regime had a difficult start: whilst its implementation was scheduled for 
April 1996, it came into force in October 1996. Policy instruments were not in place 
to regulate the new regime. Furthermore, the JSA was characterised by an extreme 
complexity. The need to simplify benefit administration was left intact by a Byzantine 
regime which led to increased confusion due to its incremental nature. This was the 
key to chairman of the Commons Social Security Committee Frank Field’s proposals. 
He argued that only a radical welfare reform could satisfactorily address the 
complexities and the inconsistencies of the unemployment protection system.  
 5.5.1 The new regime: the Jobseekers Allowance 
 
Jobseekers’s Allowance (JSA) replaced unemployment benefit and income support 
for unemployed people from 7 October 1996. There are two different types of JSA. 
Contribution-based JSA is paid to people who have satisfied the National Insurance 
contribution conditions; income-based JSA is paid to claimants who pass a means 
test. To qualify via either method, the claimant must be under pensionable age and 
cannot be in work for more than in 16 hours a week but must be capable of starting 
work immediately and be looking actively for employment. They also must have a 
current agreement with the Employment Service. If a claimant takes down a job offer 
without good reason, he may be denied further payments of JSA. Contribution-based 
jobseeker allowance can be paid for up to 6 months. Claimants cannot receive income 
support (IFS, 2000). Those who do not qualify for contribution-based jobseekers’ 
allowance may be able to receive income-based jobseekers allowance if they have a 
sufficiently low income. Claimants cannot receive income support and must not be 
working more than 16 hours a week. Income-Based Jobseeker allowances are paid as 
long as the conditions are met (unlike contributory JSA, see table 3 below). 
 
 
Table 3: The JSA 
 
Membership Compulsory 
Waiting period 2 days 
Qualifying 
condition 
1. Contribution-based JSA (CB JSA) 
minimum 25 contributions to National Insurance Fund paid and 100 
credited within last 2 years 
2. Income-based JSA (IB JSA) 
Means-tested; savings over £3000 will affect the level of JSA, savings 
over £8000 disqualifies; disqualified if partner works for 24 hours per 
week or more; earnings for work below 24 hours will affect the level of 
benefit  
Level 1. CB JSA and IB JSA: 
18-24 year olds: £31.95 per week 
25 and over: £53.05 per week 
 
2. additions for IB JSA only: 
couple: £42, £53.05 or £83.25 (depending on age of partners) 
lone parents: £42 (under 18), otherwise £53.05 
depending children (until 16 years of age): £31.45; older dependent 
children (until 19): £32.25 
 
3. premiums: 
family: £14.50 
Disabled child: £30 
Carer: £24.40 
Severe disability: £41.55 
Pensioner: £39.10 (single); £57.30 (couple) 
 
 
Maximum 
duration 
CB JSA: 6 months 
IB JSA: in principle indefinite 
 
Obligations Availability, capability, actively seeking work 
Signing Jobseeker's Agreement specifying actions to find work and which 
type of employment 
Fortnightly interviews to re-establish benefit entitlement and review 
Jobseeker's Agreement 
 
 
Source: Clasen, 2001.  
 
5.6 Assessment of the reform and key problems  
 
The JSA was delayed by 6 months due technical difficulties with its 
implementation. According to government officials, the delay was caused by 
problems in getting a new information technology system to deliver the benefit in 
time. There were also delays in 
training staff at the 1,200 Benefit Agency offices to operate the new benefit 
rules.  
 
The new law achieved little in terms of rationalisation of the system. In fact, it 
increased the complexity in the management of an already tremendously piecemental 
and fragmented system. The JSA statutory regulations ran to more than 160 pages 
made up of 
13 parts, eight schedules and 172 clauses (Financial Times, 21 August 1996).  
 
The diagnosis of the opposition in 1995-1996 was that Conservative hire and fire 
policies created rising “job insecurity”. Gordon Brown, the shadow chancellor, 
claimed that 8.7m people experienced at least one spell out of work since the last 
general election (Financial Times August 1996). In this context, the JSA could only 
make matter worse. Long-term unemployment remained a major problem and a rising 
number of people experienced spells of unemployment, mainly due to low levels of 
skills. Therefore a more inclusive activation programme for the unemployed was in 
order. But in contrast to the TUC, Labour never called for the restoration of the 12 
months entitlement period for contributory JSA. Moreover, New Labour was cautious 
not to attack new benefit entitlement rules as studies showed tougher eligibility 
criteria had a positive impact on getting people back in the labour market (see above). 
Moreover, one of the major reasons of Labour’s lack of opposition was the concern 
with welfare fraud, which was at the heart of the Conservative rhetoric behind the 
JSA. The fear of being seen as soft on “free riders” became one of the underlying 
factors of Labour’s lack of opposition to the JSA in the context proposals in 1996-
1997. New Labour was committed to the advent of a responsible society, which meant 
that free riders would no longer be tolerated.   
 
5.6.1 Alternative proposals  
 
Labour proposed to launch special programmes for the under 25 since youth 
unemployment was a major problem. Frank Field's approach to welfare reform was  
integrated active inclusion. More modest proposals came from the Labour's Social 
Justice Commission in 1994. 
 
5.7 Conclusion:  a path dependent reform? 
 
The JSA was in line with past Conservative policies and can be for this reason 
labelled as a path-dependent reform. Indeed, despite the original intentions of the 
Employment Secretary, David Hunt, the JSA went only halfway towards  
an integrated social activation strategy. The JSA was an unfinished business, as Frank 
Field was prompt to point out. Although unemployment rates started to decline in 
1993, the British labour market remained highly polarised. The JSA left intact the 
problem of the working poor, long-term unemployment, regional disparities and lack 
of skills.  
However, the JSA also represented a turning point in terms of its impact on New 
Labour’s thinking since it reinforced the intellectual consensus on employability as a 
key solution to unemployment across the political spectrum. Indeed, in the mid-1990s 
Tony Blair was imposing the focus on supply-side policies after an internal battle 
between Old Labour and New Labour. New Labour ruled out demand-side reforms 
and accepted the emphasis on employability which was at the core of the 
Conservative agenda. However, Labour’s proposals took into account the need to 
increase low-paid work through the re- introduction of wage regulation (the adoption 
of minimum wage).  
 
 
 
  
6 The New Deals: 2001 Onwards 
Section II 
 
 
This paper is divided into four sections. The first section provides some background 
information regarding labour market trends and the structure of the unemployment 
system in 2001. It also describes New Labour policies. The second section explores 
endogenous and exogenous pressures for change which underlain the proposals for 
the redesign of the New Deal in 2001. Four main changes are being currently 
implemented. 1-  An administrative revolution in the Public Employment Services 
through the creation of Jobcentres Plus, which consists of merging Employment 
Services and Benefit Agencies in order to create a single point of access to all benefit 
claimants; 2- the introduction of conditional social assistance; 3- Targeting resources 
at those who are hardest to help; 4-  The introduction of more demand-led policies 
aimed at meeting employers needs. The goal is to move the vast majority of people of 
working age back in the labour market; receipt of means-tested benefits is becoming 
increasingly conditional upon attendance in work-focused interviews. The third 
section analyses the policymaking processes behind these f changes. The fourth 
section identifies the trajectory of welfare reform in 2002.  
 
6.1 Background information  
 
6.1.1 Labour market trends  
 
In the UK, low levels of GDP growth in the second half of 2001 and the first quarter 
of 2002 suggested that unemployment might start to rise. Despite this, unemployment 
generally continues to decline. However, economic inactivity has started to increase 
marginally. This has been more evident amongst some population groups that had 
until recently benefited from improvements to their labour force position - particularly 
lone parents, ethnic minorities and older workers. 
Moreover, employment growth has tailed-off since mid 2001 and some areas of the 
UK have experienced rises in unemployment (the North of England, Wales and 
Northern Ireland). Some sectors (manufacturing) are declining due to the macro-
economic situation whilst others continue to grow strongly and are experiencing 
shortages (service industry, especially in the public sector; see also table 1 in the 
appendix). As the Work and Pension Committee put it in its third report: “The 
consequences for the Government's strategy are clear. Firstly, demand for jobs may 
grow at a slower pace than overall growth in the economy; secondly, new entrants and 
re-entrants will have to be equipped to higher standards of basic employability.” (HoC 
Select Committee on Work and Pensions, 2002).  
 
6.1.2 Unemployment protection in 2001-2002 
 
The extent to which the New Deal has involved a pattern of localisation of 
social assistance remains unclear. The New Deal for Young People (NDYP) 
has been at the forefront of the Government’s intention of marrying national 
mainstream labour market policy with local flexibility (Millar, 2000). The 
Government emphasises that the NDYP involves an important degree of 
decentralisation and that it is delivered by local partnerships between the Employment 
Service (ES) and other agencies, mainly private providers.  The Chief Executive of 
the Employment Service, stated that there should be “the maximum degree of 
flexibility” for the partners to decide how they would plan and contract the delivery of 
the New Deal Programme (Education and Employment Committee 1998, p. 19). 
While the basic structure of the programme is the same across the country - (a 
Gateway of four months followed by one of four Options and then a Follow Through) 
– there are variations in the partnership structures, delivery models and contractors 
used in the 144 different Units of Delivery (UoDs). In fact, the Employment Service 
maintained a firm grip over the New Deal. Typically, the New Deal involved a pattern 
of delivery fragmentation at the local level between Employment Services, local 
authorities and contracted out providers. However, responsibility for the system 
design remained located within the Employment Service, i.e., the central level 
(Lodemel and Trickey:2001).  
 
The administrative division between passive and active policies was left intact by the 
New Deal: the Employment Service (ES) was supervising active labour market 
polices (training and control of the behaviour’s claimant) under the responsibility of 
the Department of Education and Employment (DfEE) whilst the Benefit Agency 
(BA) placed under the respons ibility of the Department of Social Security (DSS) was 
in charge of passive employment policies (benefit delivery). In practice, BA staff was 
located in the ES agencies, the jobcentres, in an attempt to create a single point of 
contact for jobseekers. Until 2001 the DfEE played a key role in the design of the 
New Deal. This was recently subject to changes due to a transfer of labour market 
prerogatives to social security. In June 2001 the Department of Social Security was 
renamed Department of Work and Pens ions (DWP). DWP was formed from the 
Department of Social Security and the former DfEE, now called the Department of 
Education and Skills (DfES). The Department for Work and Pensions was created 
after the last May 2001 General Election with the principal aim of implementing the 
Government's Welfare to Work strategy. 
 
The New Deal could potentially lead to major changes in the administration of the 
social security in line with a workfare strategy. Indeed, section 57 of the Welfare 
Reform and Pensions Act of 1999 specifies that benefit claimants under the age of 60 
may be required to take part in a work-focused interview as a condition of benefit 
receipt. This section applies to income support, housing benefit, council tax benefit, 
widow’s and bereavement benefits and all categories of disability benefits1. Although 
these new regulations were not yet implemented in 2000, the 1999 Welfare and 
Pensions Reform Act clearly provided the legal instruments to render social assistance 
benefits conditional on attendance in work-focused interviews.  
 
6.1.3 New Labour policies in 1999-2000 
 
The New Deals were extended gradually to other claimant groups in 1998-1999 (see 
the New Deal 1998 document for details). The New Deal has introduced a set of 
policies aimed at intensifying the job-search process and easing the transition into 
paid employment.  The 6 New Deal programmes (New Deal for Young People, New 
Deal for Long-term Unemployed, New Deal for Lone Parents, New Deal for 55+, 
New Deal for Disabled and New Deal for Partners of Unemployed People) are part of 
a consistent supply-side model. This model is based on a range of 'joined-up' policies, 
linking labour market policies with efforts to 'make work pay' (minimum wage, tax 
credits) and other services which increase incentives to move off benefits and into 
work (Clasen, 2001). Thus demand side policies are virtually non-existent, which may 
raise future problems in case of recession (Work and Pension Committee, 2002). The 
New Deal programmes are also part of an evidence-based policy, which has gained 
renewed currency in the context of the current Labour government’s commitment to 
modernise government (Sanderson, 2002:4). The government’s activation strategy is 
based on a constant array of in-house, commissioned and independent evaluative 
research, which feeds into new pilot and experimental schemes in order to adapt and 
expand existing programmes. However, such policies are in fact limited in scope since 
they take place in an overall context of a low-wage, low-inflation equilibrium, 
which is still dominant in the UK despite the introduction of the minimum wage 
at a relatively low level 
 
6.2 Pressures for change and policy debates in 2000-1  
 
The government’s strategy consists of broadening welfare to work programmes 
through mandatory programmes for all economically inactive people and changes in 
administrative delivery. Several influences are at play in this process. Exogenous 
pressures - apart from American influences- are relatively marginal in setting the 
agenda for change in 2000. Change in programme design is due to endogenous 
pressures, mainly messages from research.  
 
6.2.1 Exogenous pressures for change  
 
The OECD  
 
Shifting claimants from receiving monetary transfers towards participation in training, 
job creation, work experience and other forms of labour market integration measures 
is a common trend across many countries. However, the OECD has advocated for the 
need to provide a single integrated service for all working age people, a 
recommendation which resonates well with the creation of a network of Jobcentres 
plus across the country (OECD 1998).  
 
European influences  
 
The European Union (EU) Joint Employment report (COM, 2001) does not mention 
the integration of Public Employment Services (PES) into a single agency in its 
recommendations to the UK. However, the report advocates for the improvement of 
existing local partnerships in order to render labour market policies more responsible 
to local needs. To some extent, this recommendation was taken into consideration by 
the National Action Plan in 2002. The EU report also recommends to target efforts on 
most vulnerable groups such as older workers, lone parents and ethnic minorities. The 
extent to which the redesign of the New Deal can be considered a response to the EU 
employment strategy remains, however, very unclear. 
 
American influences  
 
Welfare reform in the UK is influenced by American influences in three major ways. 
First, the current government is promoting a Work First approach2 whilst at the same 
time defining targets for job retention.  The Work First Approach is the main rationale 
for the  current reform administrative of Public Employment Services, i.e. the creation 
of jobcentres plus. When announcing the creation of Jobcentres Plus, the Secretary of 
State for Work and Pens ions, Alistair Darling declared:  
 " Why are we setting up Jobcentre plus? The main reason is so we can provide 
everyone with the help they need to get into work, or if they lose their job - to get 
back as quickly as possible. It is a work first approach." (Pioneer, issue 7, January 
2002). 
 
Second, the decision to establish a one single point of service to all benefits claimants 
is at least partially based on the American welfare reform experience. Policy learning 
from the USA is the explicit aim of frequent visits at the administrative, academic and 
evaluation level. Alistair Darling emphasised the need to move from a benefit 
eligibility culture to a culture of personalised assistance with job search, which 
implied the removal of screens in the New Jobcentres. To justify this step, he referred 
to the American experience:  
“ On the screens, I have made it clear to staff that we cannot deliver the sort of service 
we want, under Jobcentre Plus, of seeing people, helping them into work from behind 
a glass screen…But I was in America a couple of years ago and I went to an area in 
New York which was a pretty tough sort of area and they had taken down their 
screens and they have had not any trouble since.” (Select Committee on Social 
Security, May 2001).  
 
Third, the move towards compulsion under the current redesign of the New Deal for 
Lone Parents and Disabled People is also based on American welfare to work, but 
there are differences between the UK and US approaches. In particular, a crucial 
element of Temporary Assistance for Needy Families (the programme for lone parents 
on welfare benefits) consists of imposing a five year time limit for receiving passive 
benefits. Time limits are not considered a viable option and do not appeal to 
policymakers. The Work and Pension Select Committee ruled out the idea of time 
limits after a visit to the USA in June 2002: 
“ How can so-called 'inactive' groups be encouraged to participate in the work 
programmes on offer, and should the Government be seeking to enforce its "work 
first" message by threatening penalties, as it does for participants in New Deal for 
Young People (NDYP) and New Deal 25 Plus (ND25+)? On our study visit to the 
United States, we had the opportunity to observe the US welfare system - limited in 
the main to lone parents - where the "work first" ethos is reinforced by an absolute 
federal time limit of five years on claiming welfare and where participation in welfare 
to work programmes is obligatory, with the imposition of sanctions (extending to "full 
family sanctions" - the loss of all benefit for the family) - in some states if the lone 
parent does not comply. We reject the options of time limits on benefits and 
requiring lone parents to work as a condition of receiving benefit” (HoC, 2002, 
815).  
 
However, the Work and Pension Select Committee - where Labour MPs are the 
majority, the Chairman being a Liberal democrat -  accepted the notion of work-
focused interviews for benefit claimants, especially for lone parents but also for 
disabled adults. The endorsement of a work-first approach therefore entails the 
adoption of local workfare based on regular control of benefit claimants behaviour.   
 
6.2.2 Endogenous pressures  
 
As the New Deal has been based from the start on a continuous evaluation exercise 
(see the 1998 New Deal document), messages from research have played an important 
role in the redesign of the programme. The Work and Pension Select Committee, on 
the one hand, and the Employment Select Committee on the other hand, have enabled 
to gather the views of the relevant local actors (the partners of the New Deals). This 
does not mean that they played an actual role in the decision-making process.  
 
6.3 Key actors, problems and diagnoses of the problem  
 
6.3.1 Key actors  
 
At the national level, the Conservative Party and the Liberal Democrats had little 
influence if any on the redesign of the New Deal, not least because the opposition has 
been muted since its second defeat in the May 2001 General Election. Within 
Whitehall, the former DfEE under the leadership of David Blunkett, then secretary of 
State for Education and Employment, was a key player in the redesign of the New 
Deal. The Employment Service was also a leading agency in the process due to its 
direct involvement in the monitoring of active labour market policies, but has now 
been transferred to the JobCentre Plus under the leadership of the DWP.   
The DSS and later the DWP equally played a key role in the redesign of the New 
Deal. For instance, the DWP has a social research division which commissions 
external research and evaluation and carries in house evaluation. The Employment 
Service has pursued the same policy.  
By contrast to the Employment Service, the Benefit Agency was not an important 
player. In fact, under the leadership of Alistair Darling, the DSS tried to regain some 
control on the management of the social security system and confined the BA to a 
more subordinate position.   
Although the Treasury was not formally involved in the design of the New Deal, the 
Treasury was a key player because of the close monitoring of departmental spending. 
Alistair Darling and Gordon Brown maintained a close working relationship. The 
Social Security Committee mentioned that the DSS had little autonomy, if any, vis-à-
vis the Treasury. Lastly, the Department of Trade and Industry was also involved in 
the design of the New Deal.  
 
Parliamentary debates are almost non existent in the New Deal. In contrast to the Job 
Seeker Allowance there has been no Act of Parliament concerning the New Deal, 
apart from the 57 section of the Welfare Reform and Pension Act.  
 
The Confederation of British Industries has been described as the real leader of the 
opposition (The Times, 12 November 2002). It should be noted that the government – 
especially the Treasury and the Cabinet Office- has deliberately avoided to confront 
capital, which explains why the politics of employability has been dominated by 
business interests.  
The extent to which the TUC can be regarded as an important player is highly 
debatable as there is no evidence of a strengthened labour movement. However, the 
New Deal is based on the notion of local partnerships. Providers have also been able 
to play a limited role.  One leading agency is Working Links, which is partly owned 
by the Employment Service. Working Links has obvious links with the American 
contractor America Works (Financial Times, 22 January 2001).  
 
 
 
6.3.2 Identification of the problems  
 
In 2001, two problems were identified as major causes for concern in relation to 
active labour policies: persisting level of worklessness amongst disadvantaged 
groups; stubbornly low levels of employment and persisting high levels of inactivity 
in certain areas such as the North of England, Wales and  London.  
 
Diagnoses of the problems: competing explanations   
 
Persisting levels of worklessness among disadvantaged groups were already a major 
cause for concern. The policy discourse is becoming more sophisticated as the 
government establishes a distinction between the youth who have no good reason to 
be idle and truly disadvantaged groups such as older workers, lone parents and the 
disabled. The youth have no excuses for being idle in the current system as the 
education Secretary, Charles Clarke, recently pointed out (the Times, 13 November 
2002).  
The explanation for high levels of inactivity for disabled adults and lone parents 
combine two competing explanations. The first is that both groups are not taking 
available jobs due to a poor work ethic (the classic dependency culture argument). 
The second focuses on barriers to employment such as lack of adequate childcare, 
relevant skills and lack of labour market attachment due to long inactivity spells. The 
second explanation for understanding inactivity therefore focuses on the hardest to 
employ as those who are job-ready are now back into the labour market.  
 
High levels of inactivity in certain areas such as the North of England, Wales and 
London pose a serious dilemma to the government. Indeed, individual employability 
measures are not sufficient to fight unemployment in deprived areas as various New 
deals evaluations repeatedly point out. There has been a tendency for the Government 
to downplay the regional variations. The Work and Pensions Select Committee Third 
Report quoted various testimonies from local authority representatives. “Mr Webster, 
Glasgow City Council When asked for potential solutions to the regional differences 
said that: The most helpful single thing that the UK Government... could do would be 
to stop saying that there are not any important local jobs gaps and start saying that 
they expect all levels of government to promote maximum employment growth in the 
areas which have the most difficult labour markets." (HoC Work and Pensions 
Committee, 2002).  
 
In light of these hard facts, the government is reluctantly accepting that a lack of 
demand for labour may be in  some areas a major cause of low employment rates. The 
Employment Zones were a response to this problem. Since April 2002, the 
government is experimenting pilot job creation schemes such as Step 1. More demand 
led policies may then become necessary, which raises the issue of the compatibility of 
demand-led strategies with the government’s reluctance to regulate the labour market.   
 
6.4 Policy making processes behind the redesign of the New Deal  
 
6.4.1 Proposed solutions  
 
The overarching goal of welfare reform in 2001 is to “transform a passive benefit 
system into an active welfare state” (Cm 5260, 2001: 73). This policy is clearly based 
on a Work First Approach: “ Although the progress on raising employment rates has 
been encouraging, there are still many people who are on benefit when they could be 
working. We believe that nobody should be written off or be allowed to write 
themselves off (Cm 5260, 2001: 73).  
 
The solutions to the problems identified in section 2 are fourfold: 1- a change in the 
Public Employment Services through the creation of Jobcentres plus; 2- the expansion 
of conditional social assistance; 3- Targeting resources at those who are hardest to 
help; 4-  the introduction of more demand-led policies aimed at meeting employers 
needs. 
 
1 - The creation of Jobcentres Plus: The creation of a network of Jobcentre Plus was 
announced in the government’s Green Paper Towards Full Employment in a Modern 
Society in March 2001 (Cm 5084). The new agency integrates social benefits delivery 
(the former Benefit Agency) and labour market measures (the former Employment 
Service). This administrative change is being implemented gradually. Starting in 
October 17 areas Jobcentre Plus pathfinder offices are offering a fully integrated work 
and benefit services. However, the DWP acknowledges that “it will take several years 
to integrate the entire local office network of Jobcentres and Benefits Agency offices 
fully. During this time, services will continue to be provided in local social security 
offices and Jobcentres, which will be part of the Jobcentre Plus network.” (DWP 
website).   
 
2- The gradual introduction of conditional social assistance for all working age benefit 
claimants: “With the start of Jobcentre Plus, everybody making a claim to benefit in 
those areas will be required to take part in work-focused interviews, to find out about 
the options available to them (Cm 5260:73). This recommendation is based on the 
provisions of section 57 of the 1999 Act.  Since April 2002 all lone parents are 
required to attend annual work-focused interviews before applying for Income 
Support (Cm . 5260, 2001: 79).  Participation in the New Deal remains voluntary. In 
practice, personal advisors will scrutinise the needs of all benefit claimants since all 
people will have a work-focused interview to discuss the opportunities available for 
taking up work. People on incapacity benefits are now required to attend work-
focused interviews as a condition of benefit receipt as announced by the Secretary of 
State for Work and Pensions, Andrew Smith. Moreover, they will lose 20% of their 
benefits if they fail to attend (Guardian, 19 November 2002).  
 
3- Targeting resources at those who are hardest to help. The DWP has committed 
itself to pursuing active labour market interventions regardless of the stage in the 
economic cycle. It recognises that its efforts towards the harder-to-help categories of 
non-employed must be increased if the labour market turns downwards:   
"If the economy is weakened, it is not the newly unemployed who would be most 
affected, but those farthest away from the jobs market Jobcentre Plus and other 
measures targeted at particularly disadvantaged individuals and areas are the right 
ones to pursue whatever the stage of the economic cycle." (HoC 2002).  Special effort 
is given to the childcare needs of single parents: by 2004, there should be a childcare 
place for every lone parent entering employment in the 20 most disadvantaged areas. 
A childcare co-ordinator will be introduced in every Jobcentre in April 2003. The 
DWP is trying to help the hardest to employ who are now on the welfare rolls.  
 
4- The implementation of a demand-led strategy. This was a major theme of the 
Government's Green Paper Towards full employment in a modern society. The Green 
Paper emphasises the importance of moving the New Deal and the workforce 
development system as a whole from being supply-driven (developing clients' skills 
generally) to demand-led (where the starting point is engaging employers in the 
design of training and work experience and using their hiring requirements to define 
programme content and the basic standard of job readiness clients need). The strategy 
requires Jobcentre Plus to have a 'dual-customer focus,' both serving the needs of 
benefit cla imants and also employers.  
 
6.4.2 The leading role of the Department of Work and Pensions  
 
 Tony Blair himself announced the creation of Jobcentres Plus as they are clearly an 
example of the government's "work-first approach" to benefits (Guardian, June 10, 
2002). The Treasury also plays a leading role although the New Deal is not formally a 
Treasury policy. Frank Field, the former social security Minister, argues: "All the big 
initiatives in that ministry are planned in the Treasury. Some departments have 
become, in Bagehot's phrase, little more than "the dignified parts of the constitution." 
(Guardian, 16 April 2002). The Treasury is now considering options to "tighten up" 
the New Deal - aimed at underlining "the right to work if you can".  
The chancellor said the changes were likely to affect the registered unemployed, 
rather than lone parents or people with disabilities. The Chancellor said that despite 
the success of the New Deal, thousands had fallen through the net, "able to work but 
unwilling to do so". The new measures would ensure that "the opportunities offered 
are matched by the obligation to make the most of them" (Financial Times, 17 
September 2002). The advisor on labour market issues is at present Paul Gregg, from 
the University of Bristol. 
The DWP has been confirmed as the leading department in the implementation of 
welfare reform. The new Secretary of State for Work and Pensions, Andrew Smith, 
who replaced Alistair Darling in June 2002, was previously Treasury chief secretary. 
 
The main departmental responsibilities are located within the DWP, but the DfES (the 
ES in particular), the Treasury and the Department of Trade and Industry equally play 
an important role (see table 2 in the appendix). The DWP has been reorganised 
around three key client groups (working age, children and families and pensioners) to 
reflect the different policy and service strategies of each. The Working Age Group 
Director was Ursula Brennan. 
  
Within Whitehall, the DWP has taken over responsibilities of the Employment 
Service and there was thus a considerable transfer of competencies from the DoEE 
towards the DWP. The Chief Executive of JobCentre Plus is Leigh Lewis, previously 
at the Employment Service. In the DfES Ivan Lewis is the under secretary of state for 
adult learning and skills.  His area of responsibilities includes employability and 
competitiveness – skills agenda as well as links with the DWP.  
 
6.4.3 The positions of other actors  
 
The Conservatives are still relatively muted due to 1) their defeat in the 2001 General 
Election 2) their internal divisions (cf. the crisis of the leadership of Iain Duncan 
Smith) and 3) the consensus about the desirability of welfare-to-work strategies.  
Some Labour MPs on the left criticise the compulsory approach and point out that 
unemployed and economically inactive need more help, no compulsion since they 
have structural barriers to employment such as lack of skills, alcohol or/and drug 
abuse problems (Financial Times, 16 September 2002).  
Likewise, the Child Poverty Action Group is opposing plans to tighten up the 
un0employment protection regime on the grounds that it is already the strictest regime 
ever. In their view, noting else can be done to reinforce the powers of the Personal 
Adviser (Financial Times, 16 September 2002).  
 
The CBI supports the new schemes and welcomes the emphasis on employer needs.  
 
The TUC has reservations about the compulsory element of the programmes. The 
TUC has accepted the principle of a one work-focused interview for benefit 
claimants. However, the organisation notices the important mile-stone represented by 
the work-focused interview obligation now imposed on lone parents (and other 
groups, such as disabled people): “ For the first time there is an employment-related 
benefit criterion applied to claimants who are not counted as unemployed. This is a 
new feature of the British social security system, and is an important element of the 
way it is moving from being ‘passive’ to “activation.” (TUC news, 2002). It has also 
consistently argued for a job creation supplement to the New Deal, a proposal which 
had been partially implemented in April 2002 with the launch of a Step UP 
programme on a experimental basis. The new scheme is strongly supported by the 
TUC since very closely resembles the intermediate labour market programme they 
proposed more than two years ago - recruitment concentrated on people with the most 
severe problems, work paid at least the national minimum wage, time off for 
jobsearch and help throughout from a support worker.  
 
The Public and Commercial Services Union (PCS), the union that represented civil 
servants and other workers in the Employment Service and the Benefit Agency, 
opposed the removal of the screens in the new Jobcentres plus for security reasons.  
 
6.5 Assessment of the reform and on-going concerns  
 
6.5.1 Path-dependency of the re -design of the New Deal  
 
The reforms implemented in 2001-2002 do not involve a substantial re-casting of the 
New Deals.  Change is incremental and does not require a transformation of policy 
goals. The government is pursuing its workfare approach, which was already the main 
rationale for the creation of the New Deal in 1995-1996. In fact, the government is 
remarkably consistent in its attempt to move all people from welfare to wok using a 
combination of sticks and carrots. The government is adopting a tougher stance on 
jobseekers. The main impetuous for reform is the change in the nature of the benefit 
claimant population, which requires the development of old and new policy 
instruments.  
 
Old policy instruments – by New Deal Standards – are: subsided employment, 
enhanced opportunities for job seekers, sanctions in case of non compliance with 
programmes requirements, especially work-focused interviews and personal 
assistance with job search. Personal advisers are given increased powers and are now 
responsible for assessing clients' eligibility to benefits regardless of their status. This 
duty used to be the responsibility of benefit agencies. 
 
New policy instruments involve a radical managerial and cultural revolution within 
the Public Employment Services. The launch of JobCentre plus can be thus regarded 
as a new policy instrument although the creation of one-stop services has been a on-
going goal since the implementation of the JSA in October 1996.  
 
New policy instruments also involve the development of specific programmes in 
order to address severe and structural barriers to employment such as drug and 
alcohol abuse, mental health problems (chronic depression is labelled as “lack of self-
esteem in the New Deal jargon) and homelessness. For instance, the DWP has set up a 
special programme for drug addicts, "progress2work". It is already piloting a scheme 
which compels participants who need to beef up their literacy and numeracy to take 
courses, under pain of benefit sanction. In 1998-99, about 275,000 benefit sanctions 
were imposed on people who were deemed not to be making enough effort to find, or 
stay in, work (Financial Times, 16 September 2002).  
These new programmes are expanding as the claimant benefit populatio n is changing: 
job-ready people have found paid employment and those who remain on benefits are, 
in some cases, just not employable under current labour market conditions.  
 
Demand-led strategies have led to the implementation of job creation schemes such as 
Step 2 on a Pilot basis.  The key policy instruments are the Innovation Fund, one the 
one hand, and Step Up 1- and 2, on the other hand. The government launched the 
Innovation Fund in 1999 in order to test the intermediary approach. Intermediaries 
can be public, private or not- for-profit and need not be New Deal contractors. 
Intermediary organisations can provide specialised pre-employment and post-
placement services. They can help unemployed and disadvantaged people to get, keep 
and advance in jobs and careers. They help to define business requirements and offer 
assessment and then education and training that are specially customised for 
employers. Many provide support services and skill development after job placement 
along with training for front line supervisors. They have an employer-focused, 
demand-led approach.  Likewise, personal advisors are required to identify employers’ 
needs and gently persuade them to recruit. Whilst job seekers are subject to an 
increasingly compulsory regime, no compulsion or regulation will be applied to 
reluctant employers. The politics of persuasion is the only policy instrument at the 
government's disposal to address the problem of labour skills shortage and lack of 
demand for labour in declining sectors and deprived areas.  
 
 
6.5.2 Ongoing debates and concerns  
 
Trade-Unions, Labour’s Left and welfare organisations are increasingly uneasy about 
the radical move towards a workfare regime. This has been an on-gong concern since 
at least 1996. Another source of concern is related to the stigmatisation of the poor. 
The problem is how to draw a line between the deserving and the undeserving poor 
under the tougher stance on voluntary joblessness announced by Gordon Brown in his 
speech against “those who are able to work but unwilling to do so”. (FT 16 September 
2002). 
 
Another on-going problem concerns the issue of job retention. In fact, many 
claimants, especially the most vulnerable, keep going back to the JSA or income 
support after short periods of paid work. In the case of the New Deal for Young 
People, which is the most successful of all New Deal programmes, 20 % of benefit 
claimants come back to the JSA after short period of paid employment, that is, less 
than 13 weeks. Indeed, the official definition for sustained employment is a work 
experience of 13 weeks, which is in fact very short (less than four months).  
Moreover, 29% of NDYP participants leave the programme for unknown destinations 
(National Audit Commission, 2002). 
 
Lastly, there is some concern concerning the performance of the New Deal in case of 
a recession (DWP, 2002).  
 
 
6.6 Conclusion 
 
In sum the reform of the New Deal can be best characterised as path-dependent  
despite the creation of new policy instruments. These developments suggest a process 
of convergence within New Deal. The programme is increasingly becoming 
compulsory for all categories of clients and places an even greater emphasis on 
flexible, short-term support for job search. In the future, the New Deal should become 
the same for all clients although individuals would draw upon different aspects of the 
programme: " Should this come about, it would mean that New Deal would be less a 
set of targeted programmes and more a mainstream activity of Jobcentre Plus." 
(Hasluck, 2001:234). 
The involvement of the Treasury remains equally clear and Welfare-to-Work coupled  
with the implementation of a work first approach is jointly designed by Tony Blair 
and Gordon Brown with the full approval of the DWP.  
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6.8 Appendix 
 
Table 1: Employment change by region and sector, 2001-2001 
 
Employment change by region - employees, UK, seasonally adjusted
(Standard Statistical regions) 
Men & women Dec-00 Dec-01 Annual Change 
East Anglia 905,000  912,000  +7,000  +1% 
East Midlands 1,724,000  1,740,000  +17,000  +1% 
London 4,047,000  4,073,000  +26,000  +1% 
North West 2,629,000  2,641,000  +12,000  0% 
Northern 1,148,000  1,141,000  -8,000  -1% 
Northern Ireland 644,000  648,000  +4,000  +1% 
Scotland 2,215,000  2,190,000  -25,000  -1% 
South East 4,927,000  4,926,000  -2,000  0% 
South West 2,013,000  2,057,000  +44,000  +2% 
Wales 1,079,000  1,070,000  -8,000  -1% 
West Midlands 2,270,000  2,271,000  +2,000  0% 
Yorkshire and Humberside 2,071,000  2,072,000  +1,000  0% 
Total 25,671,000  25,741,000  +71,000  0% 
Employment change by sector -
employees, UK, not seasonally adjusted (SIC 92) 
Men & women Dec-00 Dec-01 Annual Change 
Agriculture and fishing 280,000  252,000  -27,000  -10% 
Energy and water 177,000  179,000  +2,000  +1% 
Manufacturing 3,904,000  3,745,000  -159,000  -4% 
Construction 1,161,000  1,245,000  +84,000  +7% 
Distribution, hotels and restaurants 6,158,000  6,244,000  +86,000  +1% 
Transport and communications 1,552,000  1,547,000  -5,000  0% 
Banking, finance and insurance, etc 5,018,000  4,990,000  -28,000  -1% 
Public administration, education & health  6,270,000  6,392,000  +122,000  +2% 
Other services 1,288,000  1,288,000  0  0% 
Total 25,809,000  25,884,000  + 75,000  0% 
 
Source: House of Commons Select Committee on Work and Pensions, Third 
Report: “The government’s employment strategy”.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
6.9 Table 2:  Main Departments' responsibilities in relation to 
ALMPS 
Ensuring macro-economic stability  Treasury 
Promoting competition, enterprise and innovation  DTI 
Tackling discrimination  DWP 
and DTI  
Making work financially worthwhile  Treasury 
and 
DWP  
Broaden welfare-to-work programmes to focus more on those who are economically 
inactive and long-term unemployed adults, as well as improving the delivery and 
responsiveness of the New Deal. Make the New Deal a permanent deal, and 
continually seek to improve it.  
DWP 
Investment in learning to ensure that people have the skills and to update and add to 
these skills in response to a changing economy - help break the "low pay, no pay" 
cycle and help people stay and progress in work.  
DfES 
Put employers at the centre of the strategy and ensure that improvements in skills 
training are based on the needs of employers.  
DWP 
Promote diversity and create opportunities for all.  DTI 
Assist the hardest to help DWP  
Improve the service for all people of working age, who are either claiming benefit or 
seeking work and apply the principle of employment first for all working age benefit 
claimants.  
DWP 
 
Source: House of Commons Select Committee on Work and Pensions, Third 
Report: “The government’s employment strategy”. 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
 
 
 
1 See Rhodes M.  (2000), “ Social democracy and the third way in British welfare”, West European 
Politics, p. 178-179. 
 
2 Welfare in this context equals means-tested cash benefits such as Income support, disability benefit 
and the like.  Contributory-benefits based on National Insurance contributions are not part of the 
welfare system. Child Benefit, being a universal allowance, is not included in the welfare category.   
 
 
 
